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E OS

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*THREE TIMES FOR TOMORROW*¹

Hayward R. Alker and Kinhide Mushakoji²

Our joint presentation will be in the form of a report of a violence-opposed study of past and future conflict trajectories, followed by an extended commentary. That commentary locates our recent efforts by comparison with those of an ancient, still influential, conflict early warning tradition, that mode of oracular intelligence codified in the I Ching and its associated commentaries and practices.³ These approaches together suggest three ways of constructing possible futures: as idealized virtual realities, as naturalistic scientific accounts, and as socio-cultural mediations between nature and the heavens (and hells) of the human imagination.

I

HAYWARD R. ALKER

First I shall report on a soon-to-be-concluded project of the International Social Science Council on Conflict Early Warning information Systems (CEWS)⁴.

¹ Adapted from the oral presentations at the Rio conference, May 12, 1999. We keep Alker and Mushakoji's remarks in the first person for this reason.

² Alker is John A. McCone Professor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles; Mushakoji is associated with the Faculty of Global and Inter-Cultural Studies, Ferris University, Yokohama.

³ This is done in more detail in Mushakoji and Alker's joint paper, "Rashomon Retellings as Ambiguity-Tolerant Early Warnings," will appear in H. R. Alker, W. T. Gurr and K. Rupesinghe, eds., Journeys Through Conflict: Narratives and Lessons, in preparation.

⁴ In existence from December 1992 until June 1999, the CEWS project was Coordinated by Alker, with Kumar Rupesinghe as Co-Coordinator. It was funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, and supervised by the International Social Science Council in Paris. It was, in effect, a mutli-disciplinary

The purpose of this project may be described as providing narratives, frameworks, methods of analysis and lessons relevant for the non-governmental and inter-governmental institutions whose function it is to try to help better manage the many potentially violent conflicts which are erupting locally around the world. Central to the CEWS approach is the recognition that these conflicts themselves involve, in many ways, divergent historicities—the ways in which continuing peoples and societies tell their own histories.

To know more about the future, we must better grasp the lessons of the past. But lessons about the past are usually framed in terms of judgments of past successes and failures, judgments which even the most advanced of scientific techniques cannot make for us, or for others. The CEWS project has been focused on constructing and analyzing (partly) sharable accounts of conflict prevention successes and failures in recent local conflicts; these are being used to facilitate better systematic, information-rich ways of looking at, and helping to shape, the future.

Project participants have recognized that whether the outcome of a potentially violent conflict is judged to be a case of successful conflict prevention is a very debatable subject. Conflict histories are ambiguous, they involve multiple perspectives, they are multi-episodic. Sometimes successes are only ironically described as such—in the absence of a larger failure or at the cost of a larger, later failure. Our approach has been to try and clarify and constructively examine these differences in perspective, not bury them beneath or within codification procedures that are hard to understand or to justify.

The key ideal organizing project research comes from the beliefs and values of conflict managers, mediators or preventers: that although inter-group conflicts are inevitable, large scale violence is not. The descent into violence of potentially violent inter-group conflicts is preventable, if the appropriate responses are made in a timely, usually an early, fashion by appropriate actors. More realistically, preventing at least some of the more difficult and violent of conflicts from erupting fully is possible, at

successor to a project of the Internal Conflicts Commission, headed by Kumar Rupesinghe, of the International Peace Research Association. See K. Rupesinghe and M. Kuroda, eds, Early Warning and Conflict Resolution, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992; and Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, eds., Early Warning of Communal Conflicts and Humanitarian Crises, a special issue of the Journal of Ethno-Political Development, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1994); and Alker, Gurr, Rupesinghe, op. cit.

least in a reformed international system where significant new efforts are directed toward that goal.⁵ The fuller, history-based sharing of this recognition would be a significant enrichment of the historicity of global society.

Preventability implies some notion of a phased conflict history: retrospectively, some type of interventions are seen to have been possible at some, probably early, phase of particularly violent conflicts, so that the trajectory of the conflict might not have been so disastrous. The challenge is to make such discoveries prospectively and get effective and timely responses to them. The key idea of looking for feasible and efficacious points of intervention—trying, for example, to avoid violent disruptions—points to the necessity of constructing virtual histories, counterfactual trajectories in which certain actions are contemplated and their trajectory-relevant impacts evaluated.

To develop this notion of actual and virtual phased histories, and a possibility space within which they might occur, we looked to the idea of situated interaction grammars, of multi-agent simulations with multiple possible trajectories, differently interpreted.⁶ Narratives or chronologies sensitive to the perspectives of multiple participants were necessary for the grounding of such grammars in relevant experience. Delineating possibly divergent historicities in such narratives—including what might have been less violent ones—could not, of course, be done without recognizing that local conflicts interact with larger global conflicts and global developments.

The CEWS coding of multi-phase conflict trajectories. Let me now illustrate how the CEWS analytical team has proceeded.⁷ Inspired by demonstrations of cross-

⁵ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, United Nations, New York, 1992, was particularly important in crystalizing international, multi-disciplinary support for a project with this focus. On the same theme, more recently see the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict's self-published final report, Preventing Violent Conflict, Washington, D.C., 1997.

⁶ Multi-phase conflict histories and alternative trajectories are the focus of L.P. Bloomfield and A. C. Leiss, Controlling Small Wars, Knopf, New York, 1969; the related CASCON information retrieval and exploration system is detailed in L. P. Bloomfield and A. Mouton, Managing International Conflict, St. Martin's, New York, 1997. See also Alker's Rediscoveries and Reformulations, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996, for conflict-oriented examples of interactive grammars.


⁷ The design of our approach is principally the work of Thomas Schmalberger, synthesizing Alker's earlier writings on conflict prevention and the approach developed in Schmalberger's dissertation study of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Compare the two relevant websites: Schmalberger's <http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~thomass/> and the CEWS website at the Center for International Studies, USC: <http://www.usc.edu/dept/LAS/ir/cis/>.

culturally sensitive approaches to mapping conflict trajectories⁸, ours has been a graphically oriented, grammatical approach⁹. The CEWS approach is illustrated in our graph for the Guatemala conflict in Figure 1 below, whose general features we shall review before giving them a more concrete and particular reading. Approximately 20 of these preventively-oriented, annotated conflict graphs are publicly available on the CEWS website. The “contested historicities” in this example—both the different trajectory perspectives and the joint “transformative rewritings of the past” indicated by the large horizontal braces—are richly suggestive of the possibilities for reconstructing time inherent in the CEWS approach.

⁸ Kumar Rupesinghe, ed., *Conflict Transformation*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1995, and Johan Galtung, *Peace by Peaceful Means*, Sage, Newbury Park, CA, 1996 were particularly suggestive multi-cultural studies of peacemaking processes that helped us proceed.

⁹ Figure 1 is based on Luis Alberto Padilla’s unpublished CEWS paper, “Peace Making and Conflict Transformation in Guatemala,”(for lengthy excerpts see the CEWS website); Schmalberger proposed the first draft of this figure, and corroborated its main features with a Zurich interview of Padilla. Our discussion and the Figure are from H. R. Alker, T. Schmalberger, A. Blum, A. Schjolset, “Testable Understandings of Structured Histories,” presented at the February 19, 1999 meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C.

The Case of Guatemala



How should we describe such conflicts? Our initial research organizing ideal suggests that conflicts go through different phases, assessments of which might vary depending on whether an observer or participant perspective is employed. As synthesized from the relevant literature and the contributions of project members, we use a 6 phase, sequential, “ideal type” model, recognizing that no inter-group conflict need go through all of these phases, and that some of them might be repeated, in new episodes:

- Phase 1: Dispute Phase
- Phase 2: Crisis Phase
- Phase 3: Limited Violence Phase
- Phase 4: Massive Violence Phase
- Phase 5: Abatement Phase
- Phase 6: Conflict Settlement.

How are these individual conflict phases identified in concrete cases, in a way that allows us reasonably to explore their counterfactual trajectories? What should analysts look for? Following Lincoln Bloomfield’s lead and Alker’s earlier work on UN Charter-based precedent logics¹⁰, Alker suggested building a data base of historically observed trajectories, from which plausible possibilities (and relevant practical precedents) might be inferred from appropriately similar cases. Schmalberger’s complementary suggestion, building on Saul Kripke’s approach to constructing possible worlds and his earlier study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, was to identify conflict phases in terms of their necessary features, their constitutive “essences”. If such namings are indeed constitutive of the conflict, these Kripkean essences would have to hold true in accessible possible worlds. Additional, contingent features of the conflict phases might vary, historically enriching our sense of trajectory-changing possibilities.

What makes up a conflict, in its different phases? Which properties or features are continually present, even when varying? Which features define a conflict, remaining present in the defensible construction of alternative, perhaps less violent,

¹⁰ See the discussion and citations in Alker’s “Emancipatory Empiricism: Toward the renewal of empirical peace research,” Ch. 10 of his *Rediscoveries and Reformulations*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1996.

conflict trajectories? The key variables we hypothesize as constituting different conflict phases are: parties and their opposed claims, the parties' phase-linked expectations of possible subsequent (and past) conflict phases, and the occurrence and level of violence. An important, contingent conflict variable is the state of identity-recognition by conflicting parties. These variables come out of the literature and our chronologies or narratives. They combine information on deeds, on actions and behaviour, and history-interpreting expectations; in a way, our approach to conflict historicities is an operationalized conflict hermeneutics.

Let me spell out a bit more what we have in mind. Conflicts are clearly defined by the inconsistent, incompatible or opposed claims (and aims) of the different sides or parties, the issues involved. Our focus has been on "disputes" of the inter-group sort where normal, non-violent conflict resolution processes cannot be assumed. At an earlier point in our study, we treated recognition or non-recognition relationships as essential to issue definition; currently we see these as contingent, but important features, among others, of conflict dynamics.

Additionally, we see the parties' social expectations about future developments, their sense of history, as definitive or constitutive of such conflicts. Thus we add to our constitutive characterization of a dispute phase the to-some-extent socially shared expectation that it might go into a subsequent "crisis" phase. In a "crisis," sporadic violence, and the expectation of the possibility of worse bloodshed are present; contemplated possible developments include the subsequent systematic use of violence, of a limited or unlimited sort.

When a conflict is in a violence-lessened abatement phase, there is the recognition of the possibility that it may lead to a new and more serious outbreak of violence than the sporadic violence which might still be going on. The notion of an abatement phase differs in emphasis from Bloomfield and Leiss' "post-hostility phase" in that it is recognized empirically that "talk and fight" may be going on at the same time. But abatement clearly involves the diminution of violence levels, when they are compared to the earlier phases of the conflict and the possibility of a subsequent settlement being reached.

The third conflict-constituting variable has already repeatedly been mentioned; it is the level of violence in those conflicts, conceived of in a more or less, roughly

ordinal, fashion. As in Michael Lund's image of a multi-phase life history of a conflict mountain,¹¹ one could talk about the movement toward more violent phases as a going "up". Moving lower "down" would be moving toward less violence, i.e. abatement. In our website's color codings of phase transitions we accept this kind of ordinal imagery, but in the monochrome figure of the present paper we just use phase numbers associated with early and later stages of an ideal-typical violent conflict which heats up and then cools down.

The lower phase positions in the figure refer to different, post- abatement conflict episodes (with different actors, issues and situations). The repeated tendency for government and opposition to disagree on the phase description of a conflict reflects the different historical consciousnesses they embody. "Protracted conflicts" have several recurrences, or episodes, which we grammatically specify as post-abatement transitions. They can often be assumed to be embedded in larger, overlapping systemic contexts: for example, Guatemalan and southern African conflict resolution possibilities were deeply affected by resolitional transformations in the larger Cold War systemic context in which the corresponding local conflicts were embedded. Our historically-theoretically constructed situational grammars allow as well divergent perspectives on several of these phases, but not every phase needs to be gone through. Abatements and/or settlements can come after crises, or more sustained violence levels.

Conflict trajectories like those of Figure 1 above are, in general, multi-perspective trajectories; they suggest and allow situation-sensitive conflict characterizations. Importantly, they can be treated as knowledge-encoding frameworks, and further annotated with additional information about the events, actions or variables associated with key phase transitions. In a more complex representation, later annotations, including the results of explorations of intervention possibilities, can be overlaid on earlier ones.

Even more dramatically, Figure 1 raises at its end the possibility of rewriting or transforming history. Perhaps this is where our hermeneutic approach to conflict historicity is least positivistic, and most socially dialectical. Dr. Padilla's

¹¹ Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, US Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 1996, Figure 2.1, "Life History of a Conflict".

interpretation emphasizes this truth: truth and reconciliation commissions should foster revised historical versions of what the conflict was about, versions that can be shared as an ongoing basis of the continued society that has lived through that conflict. And rewriting their sharable history (condemning external subversions of democratic governments) turns out to have been part both of a new opposition's redefinitions of its purposes ("democratic" government" more than "socialism") and the subsequent social-contract-making in the settlement phase of the Guatemalan conflict's third episode.

The CEWS encoding of Padilla's Guatamala narrative. This last remark brings us to a more concrete reading of Figure 1. This conflict had both domestic and international aspects; various civil-war-like episodes embedded in the larger Cold War. Fuller understanding of some of these episodes results from embedding these differences in the residues of an even earlier conflict, the conquest and colonialization of much of the New World by the "Conquistadores". Neither of these predecessor conflicts is explicitly pictured in the figure, but their background relevance is supported by Padilla's narrative and could easily be pictured in a more complex version of the figure, or by dotted lines at the top, suggesting layers of conflict embedding (rather than the phony statistical "independence" of different episodes or phase transitions).

Padilla's expert version of the Guatemalan conflict treats 1951, the election of a nationalistic, leftist government committed to agrarian reform, as a particularly important starting point.¹² This "initial" conflict episode moves into a crisis phase when monopolistically employed (i.e. unused) agricultural land belonging to American fruit companies is nationalized by the Arbenz government. An extremely effective coup d'état organized by the US Ambassador, John Peurifoy, evicts Arbenz and puts Carlos Castillo Armas in power, creating a new political situation (episode) and different key players. While the government maintained for some time that this new situation was not a civil war, the insurgents (and their successors in a subsequent

¹² It has been project practice to "validate" or "test" phased graphical reinterpretations of CEWS project experts, many of them from the regions being studied. Although this procedure helps correct for ethnocentric biases, it postpones the deeper issue of how these expert versions of the conflict, developed within CEWS guidelines, might themselves be made more adequately truthful.

episode) saw themselves as already in such a civil war, which eventually reached a high level of violent repression. While the rebels are not successful militarily, the situation does eventually develop in a way less favorable to the government because of growing international protests about human rights violations associated with campaigns increasingly directed against indigenous populations.

At the beginning of the end of the Cold War, the rebels redefined their identities and presented their cause as one of democracy and Human Rights. The intervention of a number of mediators includes those from nearby Latin American states and the Catholic Church. The abatement/peace process eventually reaches a remarkably comprehensive stage wherein several different components of a social compact are negotiated with considerable transnational and international assistance. National historicity appears to have been at least partially defined in terms of a newly shared reinterpretation of the illegitimacy of the US intervention into a democratic Guatemalan political process. The unwarranted subversion of democracy theme plays especially well internationally in a post-Cold War era. With imperfections, what has been produced at last is a partially reunited society capable of more realistically determining some aspects of its own future under a new social contract.

CEWS' approach to retrospective analysis and future studies. How can we compare, synthesize and make forward-looking inferences from this and other conflict accounts, many of which are less "successful" than the Guatemalan case? Our current approach to retrospective and prospective exploration of alternative trajectories relies on an inventory of three-phase sequences, from which we are building what might be called "text grammars" of phase-transition possibilities. Grammar is after all a set of rules suggesting in a contexted or decontexted way actions and responses. Different contingent features of various phases—the type of conflict, for example – and judgments of precedentially relevant similar cases enter into these procedures have been used in our abductive, context-sensitive mode of transition rules development. From these, Schmalberger has written an elementary, data-based CEWS Sequence; it is downloadable from the CEWS website.

For the Guatemalan case, such an analysis of our other graphs implied, what Dr. Padilla has also asserted, that non-intervention at the beginning of the crisis would have been the single most important way of limiting the enormous bloodshed of this

protracted conflict. We don't yet have a routinized way of bounding or projecting the creativity of different parties' self-redefinitions, as occurred on both sides of this case; but a review of similar cases can help suggest the variety of, and the conditions for, these kinds of conflict transformation.

In a similar fashion, other cases can be retrospectively analyzed. Moreover, disciplined projections of possible/plausible future phase-transitions can be made for an emerging conflict whose early phase history is known. When richly annotated with transition-evoking events, actions or situational contexts and changes, inter-linked sets of these figures approximate, we believe, the precedentially organized memories of seasoned conflict managers, mediators and preventers.

Our multi-perspective historical frameworks are designed to help improve and institutionalize the operationally oriented, practical memories of long-living peace-making and peace-building organizations. These are especially important bearers of the historicity of global society. Relevant institutional histories can similarly be seen in quasi-evolutionary terms as evolving grammars of alternative possible trajectories.

II

In a fascinating recent account of the influence of complexity and chaos theory on contemporary military strategy, Michael Dillon and Julian Reid argue that strategy is a form of "oracular intelligence". They suggest that contemporary concerns with contingent relational modes of being productive of emergent "bodies-in-information" are better satisfied with metic than thematic (predictive telling or narration), or even polis-focussed phronetic (practically reasoning) human capacities.¹³ Metic intelligence, or "cunning," was classically thought to be a property of animals as well as of humans, an ability to read and interpret signs in nature, to trick or deceive opponents, to turn their strengths into weaknesses, foresightfully to resolve problems and escape difficulties.

¹³ Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, "Metis and the Problematic of Hypersecurity," paper presented at the February 1999 conference of the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C. Their internal citations importantly include Stephen Toulmin's writings about foresight, M. Detienne and J. P. Vernant's discussion of classical Greek "cunning intelligence", and D. Lane and R. Maxfield's Santa Fe Institute-distributed discussion of foresight, complexity and strategy, RAND Corporation studies, and M. De Landa's study of artificial intelligence and war.

Let me begin the commentary part of this dialogue carrying some of Dillon and Reid's insights into the domain of violence-ameliorating conflict early warning research, where "failing states" and emergent, post-modern political-economic forms correspond quite nicely to the vulnerable, relationally-constituted "living assemblages" that Dillon and Reid also focus on. Although they connect their reflections both to Greek and Chinese classics, I, and Mushakoji, will offer some remarks on an ancient, still influential, East Asian tradition of oracular intelligence.

Some corresponding East Asian temporalities. The introduction of evolutionary metaphors socio-historical, institutional development at the end of the last part suggests a missing temporality in the mixture of virtual/imaginary/ideal and socio-historical times or trajectories that we so far have been discussing. Dillon and Reid's metic perspective does likewise. This third kind of time might be called "natural time" or "ecological time," and distinguished from socio-historical and imaginary times. One might even include imagined disasters as part of the virtual/imagined world of heaven (and, by implication, hell).

Indeed, ancient Chinese commentators on the I Ching clearly had three worlds, and three time frames in mind. Writing two thousand years ago, Yang Hsiung even revise the dichotomous straight and broken lines composing I Ching divination hexagrams into a trichotomous set of line options: an unbroken line correlated with Heaven, a once broken line symbolizing Earth, and a twice broken line, "symbolizing Man as one of the triadic realms, living between Heaven and Earth".¹⁴ The sage used divination to comprehend and adjust to changes in a complex, changing world, to find the Tao, the Way, the Decree, the content of the Mysteries composing and shaping the world:

Looking up to contemplate the [starry] images, looking down to view [earthly] conditions, the sage examines human nature and comes to know the Decree. He seeks the origin of beginnings and sees the final outcome. The Three Reigns [Heaven-Earth-Man] share the same

¹⁴ The Elemental Changes: The Ancient Chinese Companion to the I Ching, The T'AI HSÜAN CHING of Master Yang Hsiung, texts and commentaries translated by Michael Nylan, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1994, p. 8. The book consists mainly of 81 named and interpreted tetragrams, 4-lined figures, whose component lines are interpreted above according to the Method of Divination explained on pp. 20-23.

standard;..... the Mystery is what seeks to take the correspondent parts of All-Under-Heaven and string them together. It stitches them together according to their category. It prognosticates about them according to their norms...¹⁵

An harmonious, hierarchical order can be obtained when the sage (Man) virtuously constructs his life on “All-Under-Heaven” (Earth, with its natural norms and actualization tendencies) in accordance with the mandates of Heaven. But time, which “refers not only to the interlocking cycles of yin/yang and the Five Phases [defined in terms of colors, elements, directions and seasons], ... also covers the individual cycle of each phenomenon.”¹⁶

The three times/realms present here enrich the virtual/ideal/awful time of desirable/avoidable futures, and the moral-historical constructions of one’s life and domain, with the times, phases and tendencies of a structured natural world. Oracular intelligence is praised, against a context of uncertainty and ceaseless changes. Ambiguities of randomly generated tetragrams (or hexagrams) need to be cunningly interpreted by diviners anxious to maintain their positions against a background of acute, situational knowledge. And most impressively, component elements of historical changes are strung and stitched together, as if by patterned weaving designs, a fecund matrix of regulated practices from which, 1900 years later, would spring Hollerith punched cards, programmed computers, and Chomskian grammars of generative rewrite rules.

Inoguchi’s phased histories of national/governmental life. Because it further illuminates the different ways phased histories of international conflicts, as well as the It is only one of three cases he studied, in a powerful dissertation suggestive of a more general, culturally sensitive, scientific and judgmental way of discussing hegemonic rises and declines.¹⁷

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 343.

¹⁶ Ibid, p. 7.

¹⁷ Two recent, noteworthy accounts of the modern era in terms of the rise and decline of successive hegemonies are: Giovanni Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, Verso, London, 1994; and Torbjorn L. Knutsen, The Rise and Fall of World Orders, Manchester U. Press./St. Martins, New York, 1999.

TABLE 1: THE JAPANESE TRY FOR GLOBAL POWER AND REGIONAL HEGEMONYPhase 1: INITIAL SUCCESSES(1868-1908)

National Integration	Meiji leadership as continued by <u>genro</u> politics
Territorial independence/consolidation	Containment of impact of Perry's unequal treaties; Western coercion in 1850s
First significant expansions (colonial and otherwise)	1874 Taiwan Expedition; Korean interventions 1867, '75, '81, '85; victories in China 1894/5
Other successes (including articulation of world order vision)	Victory in Japanese-Russian War 1904/5; Anglo-Japanese Alliance 1908, T. Soho's call to assume "The Yellow Man's Burden"

Phase 2: MAXIMAL EXTENSION

Territorial extent	Colonization of Manchuria, Taiwan, Korea, ex-German colonies in Asia
Political-military influence	Treated as Asian great power at 1922 Naval Conference
Economic Extent	Leading industrial role in East Asia, dependent on US/UK co-operation
Socio-cultural extent	Asia for Asians, anti-colonial ideal, goal of equality with the West. Adaptions to Chinese norms have transitional significance

Phase 3: RESISTANCE AND DECLINE

Significant reversals or humiliations	Growing Chinese anti-imperialism since Revolution of 1911; failed intervention with Allies vs Bolshevik Revolution; world depression, frustration of 1922 London Naval Treaty limitations
Reality assessment gaps	Misperception of nationalist bases of Asian american resistance; ignoring of intelligence estimate of US strength in a long war
Other evidence of decline	Breakdown of integrative, effective party politics and gov't; resource dependencies; popular discontent

Phase 4: IRREVERSIBLE DECLINE: WORLD ORDER CONSEQUENCES

Dramatic terminations	Japanese suicidal plunge into destruction by WWII; unconditional surrender
Residual degree of unification and independence	
Residual roles within a new order	Possibility of economic recovery in American dominated world

contemporary relevance of Yang Hsiung's prognostic cosmology, I would like to conclude with a review of Takashi Inoguchi's treatment of Japan's try for regional hegemony in the first half of the Twentieth Century (summarized in Table 1 above).¹⁸

Inoguchi starts with a 4 line East Asian literary form, read downward, rather like Yang Hsiung's tetragrams. Analytically respecified, this form breaks political rise and decline "scripts" into four phases: initial successes, maximal extension, resistance and decline, irreversible decline (plus world order consequences). His three-century account of the Ch'ing Dynasty's rise and fall starts with the metamorphosis of barbarian conquerors into civilized rules of the Middle Kingdom. The decline is identified in a crucial and fascinating third theme/phase in which the inability to win leads to rulers' "self-deception, ritualistic supremacy and the avoidance of reality." But I shall focus here instead on the analytically specified account of Table 1.

Inoguchi's scripted account covers the period in Japanese history from the Meiji Restoration to the tragic (partly self-induced) defeat of Japanese militarism in WWII. It attempts (and tests with extensive historical information) a unified, schematic story of this period, the shaping of Japanese historicity. After Perry's coerced "opening" of Japan to Western trade was limited in its effects, one sees a period of significant Japanese expansion taking place. Particularly important are early Japanese successes in the Japanese-Russian War, the Japanese - Chinese wars for the precedents they set. The Japanese-British alliance signals their incorporation into the European Great Power system. Ironically, one of their ideologues called for the assumption of "the yellow man's burden"! Then one sees a period of maximum expansion in the Japanese invasions of the mainland of East Asia, followed by phases of resistance, decline, and irreversible catastrophe in WWII. Corresponding to a more general sketch of the reasons and causes for key turning points, the Table sketches several "reality assessment gaps" contributing to this outcome, corresponding roughly to the kinds of explanatory annotations we presented all too briefly in Figure 1.

¹⁸ Takashi Inoguchi, *Faiko Taiyo no hikaku kenkyu: Chugoku, Eikoku, Nihin* (A Comparative Study of Diplomatic Style: China, Britain, Japan), Tokyo, 1978. An earlier, English language version of this analysis is his *Wars as International Learning: China, Britain, Japan*, Ph.D. Dissertation, MIT Department of Political Science, 1974. The analysis is represented in H. R. Alker, Jr., T. J. Biersteker, T. Inoguchi, "The Decline of the Superstates: The Rise of a New World Order?," paper presented at the July 15-20, 1985 meeting of the International Political Science Association, Paris. The bulk of the thesis and book is a series of 20 or so multi-perspective case studies of key points within the time period covered, testing the "fit" of the simplified scripts mentioned here.

Much more could be said about Inoguchi's contribution, but I note here that a more ecologically timed account for such hegemonial accounts could be attempted in a Braudelian manner.¹⁹ You may remember that in his book about Mediterranean civilization he begins by talking about the tectonic plates whose movement created the Mediterranean. By my co-author I am reminded that ecologically Japan is slowly sliding into the big trench off its coast. Of course, in an ecological time there is a much greater time span, but all the stated historical developments, including more recent demographically-technologically stimulated expansions²⁰, are embedded within it.

Thus an amplified version of Inoguchi's scripted histories has at least three times: an historical/cultural time; a natural/ecological time, and a virtual time – containing the imagined world order trajectories that the key actors strive for, as well as the imagined goals of those less frequently mentioned heroes who have attempted to mediate Japan's violent conflicts in terms of a virtual history with more bearable, less violent outcomes.

Now I give way to my esteemed collaborator. His thoughts suggest to me redescribing the CEWS project as: retelling Rashomon stories of rapes, lies and videotapes in the interest of a more peaceful world.

KINHIDE MUSHAKOJI

I will continue on from Hayward's presentation, starting with three brief remarks. First, I would like to tell you why I joined his project -- the CEWS project. I have been trained in, and then I became dissatisfied by, the normal American Political Science positivistic approach. I was therefore greatly drawn by Hayward Alker's hermeneutic approach.

Secondly, I would like to come back to Bloomfield's, Lund's and CEWS' schemes of a conflict with a mounting and descending phases. I am very much

¹⁹ See, inter alia, Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, 2 vols., Harper & Row, New York, 1976.

²⁰ On the imperialistic and later non-imperialistic expression of Japan's demographic-technological "lateral pressure," see Nazli Choucri, Robert North and Susumu Yamakage, The Challenge of Japan before World War II and After: A study of national growth and expansion, Routledge, London, 1992. Japan's performance is put into the perspective of the other great powers of the period in this, and other books by Choucri and North.

interested in such conceptions because just now I am in a mounting phase of a cold. In Chinese medicine one does not get the same medicine when their cold is in a yin phase, rather than in a yang phase. And so this kind of a phase approach seems very close to what I take to be a Chinese cultural dimension.

The third point is about narratives. The idea that reality has only one story is something I cannot believe. It really is too simple-minded; the fact that Schmalberger and Alker have an approach that preserves some of the ambiguity in their narratives is very important.

Ambiguity-preserving retellings of the Rashomon story. And this is where I would like to turn to the Rashomon aspect of such accounts. Actually it was not myself but Hayward Alker who insisted on my talking about Rashomon, which is a Kurosawa movie based on two Akutagawa stories.²¹ I will not give you the whole story because of the lack of time, but it is a story about a woman who travels with her husband, and is raped by a robber in a bamboo forest, after the robber has tricked and tied up the husband. Well, there is also an onlooker who observes what is happening.

All their subsequent narratives of what happened are different. For the woman, the robber tied her husband to a tree and she was raped in his presence. She decides that she has to kill her husband because, having been raped, she has to become the wife of the robber. She cannot have two husbands, so she kills her husband. Now for the robber the story is different: he is asked by the raped woman to kill her husband, so he unties the husband, duels with him, and kills him after a tough and fair fight. But the husband has a different story. He commits suicide because he cannot tolerate his wife's being raped.

Now the idea that Rashomon suggests to me is that in various situations one has various conflict accounts. For example, in a situation like a bamboo forest, one lacks clarity of information; the situation is inherently ambiguous. And I would like also to mention that the present global economy, with its compression of time and space, is also a kind of a bamboo forest. It is just the other way around in terms of speedy, accurate message transmissions, but it is the same thing in terms of ambiguity.

The Rashomon situation, if treated by a Human Rights activist, will be presented in a completely different way. It is a typical case of violence against women and you have to judge the rapist.

But in a real situation of conflict like Bosnia, you cannot just arrest Milosevic and the other perpetrators, then end the conflict. You have a situation where you have two different narratives. You have the NATO narrative which is a very rational calculated one. And there is a Milosevic narrative, which probably has a longer durée in terms of the history of Serbia. While not going further into the details, the only thing I would like to stress is that in the case of the Rashomon story there is a very important emphasis on different stories told in terms of imagined, or virtual time.

In virtual time you have the different possibilities of different stories. Thus the story of the raped woman is one, the story of the rapist is another, and the story of the husband is yet another. I thought I was going to be very embarrassed at how to explain this plurality. But yesterday the esthetic dimension was brought in, so I think that I can just mention that the three stories are different narratives not related to truth, or to justice, but to guilt. For the woman, the best, the nicest story is for her to kill her husband. For the husband it is that he would commit suicide. And for the robber rapist he has to liberate the husband, have a duel and then kill, after a fight, a manly fight. So, each of them has an esthetic narrative of the situation. So, to be brief, I would like only further to mention that there is a non-rational—not irrational, but non-rational—way to find out what the different narratives are.

The I Ching as grammar, lexicon and oracular intelligence. This is where I am brought to the Chinese origin of the Japanese Rashomon story. Simplifying things, in this regard I would mention the Book of Changes, the I Ching, a book which is considered generally to be a kind of good fortune teller book, but which has a much deeper meaning in it.²² It is a kind of grammar, plus a lexicon, and a series of commentaries about how to interpret and use it. Also, it prescribes the way to face a

²¹ For the script, the sources, and reviews, see Akira Kurosawa, director, Rashomon, Donald Richie, ed., Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 1996.

²² A popular English language translation has been The I Ching, or Book of Changes, translated from the Chinese into German by Richard Wilhelm and rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes, introduced

certain narrative, or a certain event, depending on its narrative. Hayward likes calling this oracular intelligence.

And this is where I must tell you briefly about the composition and interpretation of hexagrams. Divination or oracular intelligence using the I Ching is based on the situation-specific interpretation of newly generated hexagrams, and their




Figure 2: The I Ching Hexagram for Peace

component substructures. Each hexagram has six lines, either of Yang or of Yin, so you have a combinatorial set of 64 possible hexagrams. Yang is the positive side, Yin is the negative side. The positive Yang is represented by a firm, unbroken line, and Yin is represented by a broken, more yielding or receptive line.

In Figure 2 I show you the most propitious hexagram which is called T'ai, or Peace. This hexagram may be described in terms of two trigrams, one beneath the other. Sometimes the lower trigram is taken as the "inner" element of change, and the upper one is seen as the outer aspect. In a peaceful state on the bottom you have Yang, Yang, Yang, an inner trigram symbolizing the Creative, or Heaven; and on the top you have an outer Yin, Yin, Yin, a trigram signifying the Receptive, Earth. The opposite arrangement is called P'i, Standstill or Stagnation. Peace and harmony are said to result from the Receptive moving downward and the Creative moving upward, from

below. Stagnation is seen as the combination of Heaven moving farther away from an Earth sinking further into the depths.

This dynamic sensibility is very different from the Western concept of stability. Normally one might think of the Earth, as the heavier thing, belonging at the bottom. But in this philosophy it is just the other way round; peace is conceived of dynamically, dialectically, functionally. The IChing is a book of changes, and change is part of everything. Thus you have history as a grammatical sequence of situated hexagrams, each constructed by different functions or aspects.

Now another way of interpreting the lower and upper trigrams or triads making up each hexagram is in terms of the symbolic significance of the different locations of their individual lines. Recalling Hayward's related discussion of Yang Hsiung's tetragrams, this approach treats each trigram as containing three perspectives, that of heaven, the earth and the human. Using a more conventional arrangement, I have presented the relatively stagnant first and second episodes of the CEWS Guatemala coding in Figure 1 as in Table 2 below. The top line of the two triads in Figure 2 (and the left in Table 2 below) refers to the heavenly. The bottom line and the far right of the table refer to the human, to Man. The Earth is in the middle, between Human and Heavenly perspectives.

In this interpretation, the Heavenly perspective, sometimes referred to as that of the altar or the system, is likely that of a global totality, what nowadays might be called "the International System" in International Relations. The Human, or inner aspect of a trigram might be that of a nation, a single person, the raped woman, or whatever. Now the interesting thing about particular situations under this interpretation is that they are composed by heavenly, earthly and human aspects.

Table 2 re-presents Figure 1 according to this approach. It is about the Guatemala situation. I have put three sides, perspectives or aspects in the Table: that of the overall system, of the government, and of the rebels. In the first two episodes, the heavenly/system's pattern is that of the Cold War. I interpret the earthly aspect to refer to the geostrategic (or the ecopolitical) situation. In Guatemala, one finds the rebels in the mountains and the government in the plain. The government wins

TABLE 2: THE CASE OF GUATEMALA IN TRIADS

<u>Heavenly Patterns</u> <u>International System</u>	<u>Earthly Patterns</u> <u>Geostategy</u>	<u>Human Patterns</u> <u>Power Group Dynamics</u>
<u>Episode 1:</u>		
Overall Cold War & US intervention	Land control by army support	Strong army, unorganized people
Government Pro-US favorable	Control of core areas	Tight army control
Rebels Unfavorable	Possibility of liberated zone in mountains	Growing popular dissatisfaction
<u>Episode 2:</u>		
Overall intensification of Cold War Polarization	Polarization between Cities & rural regions under Government and Rebel controlled guerilla strongholds	Polarization between pro- Government & pro-Rebel opinion
Government Favorable	Military supremacy without possibility to control guerillas	Increased need of suppression of anti- Government groups including indigenous groups
Rebels Unfavorable but hope for better future	Military defeats leading to develop political support in Government dominated areas	Organizing popular movements facilitated by Government military violence
<u>Episode 3:</u>		
Overall ending Cold War World trend: democracy and human rights	The political awakening of people changes the geo-strategic military map	The emergence of third party able to mediate
Government Still favorable but increasingly difficult in view of the loss of unconditional US support	Military victories prove to be unable to break the stalemate political control of all regions	Impossibility to ignore national, regional and international religious, political and UN third parties

Rebels Increasingly favorable late and post- Cold War trends	Impossibility to gain military or political control in all areas but formation of ally groups everywhere	Impossibility to ignore national, regional and int'l religious, political and UN third parties
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SIGNING OF NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT

Overall International support for Democratization	Difficulty caused by uneven development and contradictions remaining strong in some backwards regions	Assassinations and arrests generated by old oppositions, armed forces. New difficulties obstructing full implementation of the new social contract.
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Different conflicts episodes evolve in quite different directions, but there is nonetheless an eventual stalemate because they cannot expel the guerillas, who seem to be created anew after each defeat, in terms of the people, the pattern of human relations. In the later episodes, one gradually sees a third group of actors who are coming in, who are making the government less stable, and one also finds actors who are acting as a third party. So, gradually you get into a phase or episode where serious negotiation becomes possible.

Now, this is a kind of triadic analysis which is based on the Book of Changes and I would like to tell you that the same thing is done by a distinguished political economy specialist of today, Professor Robert Cox, who is also having his own triad -- ideas, interests, and institutions -- which respectively correspond to the Heaven, Earth, and Human patterns of the I Ching. His triad is based on Gramsci's concept of hegemony, a kind of human relations pattern based on different groups coming together. It has an infra structure which is the relations of power and interests, and then there is a set of hegemonic ideas constituting what is possibly true or approach; these correspond to the heavenly patterns in the I Ching. Thus the I Ching can have a Gramscian interpretation; I am just presenting this possibility.

Inoguchi's scripted history reinterpreted. A related set of points I would like to make concern my good friend Inoguchi's scripted analysis of the Japanese situation, as summarized schematically in Table 1 above. Inoguchi is looking at it from the

Japanese side, but one can also look at the same events from a Chinese perspective. The initial success of Japan is the final failure of China. There was a Sino-Japanese war, and by losing the Sino-Japanese war, it was the end of the Ch'ing dynasty. So if you look at it from the Japanese side it is a Westernized Japan imitating the West having a regional hegemonic rule which failed, but then Japan joined the United States and changed - from China was the suzerain of Japan at the beginning; at the end the United States is the suzerain of Japan.

More generally, one can see this as a change of suzerainty. You may ask questions why I am saying that, but this is way the Chinese look at Japan. Japan was a tributary country at the beginning, which was not really paying tribute as it should. And in the end we joined the Americans against the Chinese. So, one can have a completely different narrative from the point of view of China. And, as reflected in my question to Professor Jaguaribe on the first day of this meeting, I have the impression that now China is re-emerging, that the Pax Sinica is coming out.

This emergence is not in the standard narrative of the modern state. It has a completely different historical dynamics where the overseas Chinese are part of the new emerging China. So China is not just a territorial state; it is a larger group of nationals who are helping each other. This is a re-emergence of something which has been forgotten or occluded, occulted in a sense by colonialism. China's reemergence is occurring in a post-colonial situation.

Globalization and occluded narratives. Just to conclude, I would like to stress the fact that, practically, all the conflicts which are taking place now, are in similar situations. In Kosovo, for example, the conflict is occurring along the former border between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire. And in Africa, there was a pre-colonial Pax Africana which failed. Patterns of empire, suzerainty and inter-polity order were forming in and around Ghana and other kingdoms when the order/disorder that they represented was destroyed with the slave trade and colonialism. In East Asia, the problem of North/South Korea, especially of North Korea, is part of the re-emergence of the Pax Sinica.

Thus the point I would like to make is that we need to read again, to go back to the hidden and occluded narratives of all these empires and “paxes”. The contemporary global political economy has transformed, as well as integrated interstate relations. But globalization, the compression of time and space, is also forcing these occluded realities to come back. And this is where we need an analysis in terms of their heavenly patterns, their earthly patterns and their human patterns.