

# Prevention Successes and Failures: Peace-making and Conflict Transformation in Guatemala

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## Introduction

One of the main goals of the *conflict early warning systems* (CEWS) research project is to provide knowledge about the causes and determinant factors of successes and failures in conflict prevention and conflict management and resolution. In this paper we will use the theoretical framework of authors like Johan Galtung, Ted Robert Gurr, Kumar Rupesinghe, Ronald Fisher, John Paul Lederach and others in order to analyze the nature of the peace process in Guatemala with special attention to the peace making and conflict transformation phenomenon, and also to the prevention of potential conflicts in the near future.

The Guatemalan peace process can be characterized as being essentially a *peace making process*<sup>1</sup> with the mediation of both (in different stages) an internal mediator or “conciliator” (the Catholic church) and an external mediator –“moderator”- (the United Nations). The process had the aim to put an end to violence and solve-transform an internal armed conflict. Concerning the conflict itself, we assert that the Guatemalan conflict is intrinsically of ideological and political nature, with roots in the violent US intervention in Guatemala (1954) aimed to overthrow the democratic and legally elected government of president Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán perceived by Washington at that time as a “communist” government mainly because of the agrarian reform (that affected US owned plantations and corporations) but also because of its nationalist and modernization policies.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, according to this view the Guatemalan armed conflict was essentially a political and military conflict between the state and an insurgent movement (the *Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity or URAIG*) and therefore it fits Kumar Rupesinghe's definition of intrastate conflict between government and other parties “who are either victims or unequal parties to the conflict.”<sup>3</sup> Therefore, we can assert that the Guatemalan conflict was simultaneously external and internal, that is to say, that the insurgent movement represented an ideological and nationalist response to the violation of national sovereignty and to the national trauma generated by the U.S. intervention in 1954, and at the same time it was a conflict over governance and authority, because it also expressed popular demands for democracy and political participation.

Consequently, the Guatemalan conflict can be considered not only as an ideological conflict in the sense that it was a result -or negative side effect- of the cold war extrapolated to Guatemala - mainly by decision of the U.S. administration in the context of the witch-hunt of the times of McCarthyism- but also as a conflict over democracy and governance. In other words, it was a *revolutionary war between the insurgents and the government aimed at displacing the authoritarian regime imposed by the U.S. intervention of 1954 through guerrilla warfare*.<sup>4</sup>

Thus other causes of the conflict -and clear issues for its resolution the absence of democracy and of the rule of law, together with illegal repression through “disappearances,” extra-judicial killings, torture, human rights violations and with the ban of all leftist parties, popular organizations and trade unions are also fundamental causes of the conflict, and therefore, clear

issues for its resolution. The fact that the issue- of democracy, and governance was included in the agenda of negotiations between the URNG and the government (as it was stated in the *Framework Agreement* of April 1991 signed in Mexico City) is a clear demonstration of this proposition.

More than forty years were necessary to end a conflict started basically by political ignorance, misperceptions and misunderstandings, as well as economic spurious and short sighted social (Guatemalan) an corporate (foreign) interests. Thirty years of guerrilla warfare and hundreds of thousand deaths, with its flow of destruction, refugees, backwardness and obstacles for economic and social development was not a small affair for the Guatemalan people, or just another *low intensity warfare* as the U.S. military and strategy experts used to call the conflict in the eighties. It was a real national and social tragedy, a catastrophe that provoked a wave of violence of such a magnitude that devoured an entire generation of Guatemalans.

Could the conflict have been prevented? Could it have been avoided? How can be explained that in spite of the general situation of crisis and almost of “state failure” that the country endured at the beginning of the past decade<sup>5</sup> it was impossible to realize or to prevent what was going to occur, especially regarding the mass killings of Indian peasants and the large scale mobilization of the indigenous population both as guerrilla combatants and as “civil patrols” or soldiers in the army troops.<sup>6</sup>

Another theme of concern is related to the peace process both in its recent past and regarding the future: What lessons can we derive from the development of the peace process inaugurated by the Central American Peace Agreements of Esquipulas in 1987 and the subsequent (1991) negotiation process in Guatemala?

As it is well known, the Guatemalan peace process finally reaches an end with the signature of the *Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace* subscribed in Guatemala City on December 29, 1996: in this paper we will describe the peace process as an example of successful conflict resolution with the mediation of the United Nations.<sup>7</sup> What are, therefore, the main features of the peace process?

First, as we have already stressed, the conflict was ideological and political but it also had a Mayan indigenous or ethnic component. That means that even if it is true that the Guatemalan armed conflict can not be qualified as an ethnic war, or ethno-political conflict,<sup>8</sup> the indigenous population was not solely involved in the conflict but suffered the most terrible wave of violence since the times of the Spanish invasion, the so called “conquista” (conquest) in the XVI century and the majority of casualties and civilian victims were among them.<sup>9</sup> That is why in the negotiations agenda the item of indigenous rights was included.

Consequently, the explanation for one of the main agreements of the peace process, the *Agreement of Identity and Rights of the Indigenous Peoples* is associated with the fact that both parties were conscious that the situation of the indigenous peoples was not only a fundamental issue of the peace process; but moreover, a mechanism of prevention of conflict, and somehow, also an instrument of *early warning for potential ethnic conflict in the near Guatemalan future*. Furthermore, the issue was one of the most crucial points of the negotiations (it took more than one year to reach an agreement), even if the parties were not supposed to be legitimated to speak on behalf of the Guatemalan ethnic groups.<sup>10</sup>

Another important feature of the Guatemalan peace process is that it is closely related to the Central American peace process: without the Esquipulas agreement of 1987 there could have not been a peace process in Guatemala. The general situation in Central America at the beginning of the eighties was one of conflict and crisis: both the FNLN and the URNG in war against their governments in El Salvador and Guatemala while the “contras” (armed and financed by

Washington) were fighting against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, with the support of Honduras. Mexico, assisted by the “Grupo de Contadora” (Colombia, Venezuela and Panama) tried hard to find a negotiated solution through the Contadora mediation effort, that failed at the last minute when Honduras -under the White House pressure- rejected to sign the “*Acta para la Paz y la Cooperación en Centro América*”.

The Esquipulas Accord was the result of a summit meeting of the five Central American presidents convoked by the Guatemalan president Vinicio Cerezo, who was democratically elected in Guatemala in 1985 and took office in January 1986. The first meeting was held in Guatemala the same year, the second took place in Guatemala city, in August 1987, and the result was the signature of the “Esquipulas II Peace Accord”. The Accord decided a procedure for negotiations in order to achieve peace through political means. The overriding characteristic of the peace agreement that the Central American presidents agreed not only to address the *causes of conflict* as an essential element of the negotiations, but that they also agreed to promote both *democratization* and *sustainable development* as a fundamental mean for both conflict resolution and *peace building*, using the term in the sense of Galtung “overcoming the contradictions at the root of conflict formation.”<sup>11</sup>

Furthermore, the Central American presidents agreed to request the presence of the United Nations as facilitator, mediator, conciliator and, in sum, key actor in the regional peace processes.<sup>12</sup> This was an outstanding resolution if one recalls that this sovereign decision was made in the context of the confrontation between the US and the USSR, as well as under circumstances in which Washington was trying to overthrow the Sandinistas government in Nicaragua and did not like -at all- the idea of a peaceful conflict resolution that could have consolidated a revolutionary government perceived in the White House as a client of Moscow and Havana. Another interesting trait of the agreement is the fact that the direct appeal to the United Nations is far from the regional schema of the Organization of American States (OAS) privileged by the U.S. foreign policy and, besides, it signified a call for the UN intervention in conflicts of an essentially internal nature, which is against the prescriptions of paragraph 7, article 2 of the UN Charter.

Finally, it is also important to mention that in Central America the peace process is the result of the democratization process. In other words, the settlement of armed conflict was possible because democratic regimes were established. That means that even if the nature of the democratic regimes was incomplete, or “in transition”, or under army vigilance (or of the Sandinista Front in the Nicaraguan case), democracy lays the basis for peace and not the opposite.

In the following pages we will describe the most important events of the Guatemalan peace process, including the historical roots of the conflict, we will analyze the nature of third party intervention, the nature of the agreements and their importance for the future in terms of the peace building process and of the prevention (early warning) of potential future violent conflicts.

## **Historical Roots of the Armed Conflict in Guatemala**

The Central American republics are old independent states. In 1821 the independence from Spain allowed the establishment of the Central American Federal Republic until 1838, when the federation was dissolved and the five unitarian states of the republics of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica came to life. The federation could not subsist because of the rivalry among national oligarchies (the struggle among *liberales* and *conservadores*), divorced economic and commercial interests within the regional elites, and the constant intervention of

foreign powers such as the United States and Great Britain using the well known practices of *divide ut impera*.

The primary interest of both powers in the region, at that time, was the construction of an interoceanic canal using the San Juan river and the Great Lake of Nicaragua as an interoceanic water way.<sup>13</sup> William Walker, an American “soldier of fortune” led a military expedition to Nicaragua and took possession of the country, where he stayed several years until his defeat (and subsequent death by shooting) by a Central American army under the command of the Guatemalan *Marshall* (mariscal) Zavala. In the meantime the British continued to consolidate their possessions in the Atlantic (Caribbean) coast of Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. They forced the Guatemalan government to give up Belize by the way of signing a “treaty of boundaries” (1859) in order to legitimize the occupation of the Guatemalan territory known afterwards as “British Honduras”.

The war of Augusto Cesar Sandino against the U.S. intervention and occupation of Nicaragua in the 20's and the US intervention in Guatemala in the 50's are two historical examples of the “big stick” policy that Washington applied to Central America in those years, partly because of the economic interest of US corporations with investments in agriculture (banana plantations), communications (railroads, telegraphs) and electricity, and partly because of geopolitical reasons.

In the case of Guatemala the restoration of democracy in 1944 allowed the access to power of a nationalist young generation with the will to modernize and develop the country. Presidents Juan José Arévalo (1945-1951) and Jacobo Arbenz (1951-1954) did a lot of work in that direction especially in the field of education, health, welfare (social security was established at that time, the first code of labor was enacted), and public works. Arbenz wanted to compete with the US owned monopolies in railroads and electricity, so he decided to build a road to the Caribbean sea (“la carretera al Atlántico”) and also a national maritime port (Santo Tomás de Castilla) and the construction of a hydroelectric power plant as Jurún Marinalá. He also enacted an agrarian reform law that affected the interest not only of Guatemalan landlords but also of the *United Fruit Company* (UFCO), a U.S. agricultural corporation that - for the bad luck of the Guatemalan government - among its legal advisors had both- the U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles and the CIA director, his brother, Allen Dulles, and also among its share holders were both John Moors Cabot (assistant Secretary of State) and Henry Cabot Lodge (U.S. Ambassador to United Nations).<sup>14</sup> If we add the strong nationalism and ideological rhetoric of the leftist politicians, the influence of the small Guatemalan communist party within the government, and the international context of cold war and U.S./USSR confrontation, we have all the ingredients for the explosive cocktail that broke out the so called “Guatemalan revolution” of the period 1944-1954.<sup>15</sup>

Therefore, the invasion of the country by a small military corps under the command of colonel Carlos Castillo Armas in June 1954 was just a smoke curtain in order to prepare the conditions for the *coup d'état* organized by the U.S. ambassador John D. Peurifoy. Only two military gestures marked the nationalist reaction of the army: the battle of Gualán, on June 1954, and the attack and defeat of the Castillo Armas' so called “liberation army” by cadets of the military academy (“Escuela Politécnica”) on August 2, 1954. Afterwards an authoritarian government was established, the leftist parties were outlawed, hundreds of people went to exile and others, less fortunate, were killed or imprisoned, and, of course, the agrarian reform law was repealed. The communist party became clandestine and started to organize a resistance movement. In November 1960 a group of young army officers decided to rebel against the government of general Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes. The rebellion failed, but as a result of the events, links of collaboration were

established with the leftist clandestine movement and the first guerrilla organizations initiated their actions.<sup>16</sup>

The first stage of the Guatemalan revolutionary war, during the 60's, is clearly influenced by the Cubans, particularly by the ideas of Ernesto "Ché" Guevara, as they were divulged by the book "Revolution in the Revolution" written by the French intellectual Régis Debray, about the guerrillas as a sort of "core" (*foco*) for the revolution. The FAR and the MR13 operated with this strategy in the oriental region of Guatemala, in *Sierra de las Minas* and in Izabal, but they were defeated by the army in a ruthless and bloody military campaign during the years 1967-1970. This campaign was accompanied in the cities by a wave of terror against real or suspected communist leaders or leftist intellectuals and by the operation of death squads- in charge of political assassinations and "disappearances" of people.

The survivors of the military and terrorist campaign of the 60's reorganized the guerrillas for a second stage of the revolutionary war in the mid 70's as "political and military organizations" that appeared in the western highlands, in the northern Petén province and in the central volcanic range-southern coastal lowlands with two new organizations: the guerrilla army of the poor (EGP: ejército guerrillero de los pobres) and the people in arms organization (ORPA: organización del pueblo en armas), and one surviving entity of the first stage: the FAR or rebel armed forces (fuerzas armadas rebeldes). In this new stage of the war the insurgents decided to establish their strongholds in the indigenous region of the country (the eastern region and mountain range *Sierra de las Minas* used by the FAR at the first stage is, by the contrary, a *ladino* region); they established a geographical distribution for military operations: EGP in the northwestern highlands and lowlands (ixcan), ORPA in the central volcanic range and FAR in the northern lowlands and with a more complex military strategy based in the ideas of the Vietnamese general Nguyen Vo Giap about the extended popular revolutionary war or *guerra popular revolucionaria* that must be deeply rooted in the people as the main actor of the revolution and as *conditio sine qua non* for the triumph and access to power. These three organizations together with the communist party (the PGT o *partido guatemalteco del trabajo*) coaligated in 1982 in order to form the *Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca* (URNG: "National Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity").

The URNG's strategy for this second stage of the war was successful in the sense that the guerrillas looked for and obtained a massive support for their military effort and that they also succeeded in organizing thousands of people through popular organizations as the *Comité de Unidad Campesina* (CUC: Peasant United Committee) or the *Comité Nacional de Unidad Sindical* (CNUS: National United Committee of Trade Unions) and even the students movement both at the national University of San Carlos and at the level of secondary public schools. The URNG also obtained support of an important number of priests and religious people mainly linked to the Catholic church and of all sorts of NGO's and organizations in the United States, Canada and Western Europe.

However, in the military field, the URNG was not capable to resist the monstrous and ruthless military campaigns of 1981, 1982 and 1983 that we have already mention when quoted the book of Yvon Le Bot, and that had as principal trait the cruel attack against the civilian population in order to "remove the fish from the water" as the Guatemalan military used to say at that time, in a cynical parody of Mao's well known expression "the guerrilla moves within the people as the fish in the water".

## The Peace Process and the Nature of Third Party Intervention

As a result of the military stalemate provoked by the Army's counter insurgency campaign the URNG decided to change its strategy and emphasized the political action especially abroad. It is not clear if at that time the insurgents were genuinely committed to a negotiated settlement of the armed conflict but in any case their political discourse and actions were addressed in that direction. With the help of activists of the so called "Solidarity Committees with Guatemala" that were established in North American and Western European countries since the beginning of the eighties, they started a well organized campaign searching for political support and financial assistance.

Non governmental organizations, cooperation agencies and even governments expressed their sympathy for the rebels. Rigoberta Menchú, daughter of a well known peasant and indigenous Guatemalan leader who died during the assault of the police forces at the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City (1980) won the Nobel Peace prize, and this rallied a wave of support and solidarity from the indigenous peoples all over the world. With the support of Amnesty International and other international human rights organizations Guatemala was included in the agenda of all the international organisms dealing with human rights.

### *The Stage of Pre-negotiations and the Role of the Internal Mediator: 1990-1994.*

At the national level the democratization process started in 1986 and the peace processes opened by Esquipulas in both Nicaragua and El Salvador continued to exert pressure on the Guatemalan government in order to open bilateral talks with the rebels as it was the case with the *sandinistas* and the FNILN. but the army refused arguing that the Esquipulas accord stipulated negotiations with the "legal" opposition not with armed rebels. Nevertheless, as a result of the Esquipulas agreement a *Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación* (CNR: National Commission on Reconciliation) was established. As chairman of the CNR was appointed monsignor Rodolfo Quezada Toruño, a roman catholic priest, bishop of Zacapa who received the official title of "conciliador" (conciliator).

After having a meeting with the insurgents in San José de Costa Rica in 1988 and with the support of the process of consultation that he had with different sectors of the civil society in the years 1988 and 1989 (the *national dialogue*) Monsignor Quezada decided to initiate a round of "preliminary-negotiation" talks with the URNG and thanks to the good offices of the government of Norway, a second meeting with the rebels took place in Oslo in March 1990. As the government still refused to have contact with the rebels, Monsignor proposed a mechanism that was a real innovation for third party intervention in peace processes: these preliminary negotiation talks were held with representatives of different sectors of the civil society: leaders of the legal political parties, entrepreneurs and businessmen, religious priests and church members, trade union and popular organization leaders, scholars and professors from the academic community. The URNG accepted the mechanism and in March 30, 1990 was signed the "Basic Accord for the Search of Peace by Political Means" (*Acuerdo Básico para la Búsqueda de la Paz por Medios Políticos*).

As a consequence, five meetings were held in this manner: the first meeting, between the LJRNG and the legal political parties took place in Spain (at El Escorial) in June 1990, and it was followed by a meeting with representatives of the "private sector" -business and corporations- in Ottawa (Canada) on September 1<sup>st</sup>, 1990. A third meeting, this time with representatives of the religious sector took place at the end of the same month in Quito (Ecuador). Finally, guerrillas and

representatives both of popular organizations and trade unions and of the academic community gathered in Mexico at the end of October 1990 in the towns of Metepec and Atlixco. As a result of this conversations, important issues were discussed and some relevant understandings reached. For instance, in the “Escorial Agreement” -signed by representatives of the URNG and of the political parties - both sides recognize the need to initiate a process of constitutional reforms and to promote popular participation in order to make institutional changes aimed at social justice, the respect of human rights an “independent development”, social welfare and so on. Also the URNG stated that they would not oppose the presidential elections (held in November 1990 and January 1991) and also stated their willingness to refrain from acts of sabotage during the electoral process.

From the Ottawa meeting with the **private sector** (CACIF: the leading entity of agricultural, commercial, industrial and financial organizations) in September 1990 there was no joint communiqué, but both sides recognized the need for a peaceful solution of the armed conflict, and the LIRNG -according with the CACIF declaration- expressed willingness to respect “human liberties”. The meetings with the religious, labor, popular and academic sectors held in Ecuador and Mexico produced interesting joint communiqués that emphasize the need for a political negotiated solution to the armed conflict and respect for human rights, democratization, economic and constitutional reforms. Besides, representatives of these sectors called for a “direct dialogue between the URNG, the army and the government”. Jorge Serrano Elías, a former member of the National Commission of Reconciliation who signed de Oslo Agreement was elected president of the republic in January 1991: he was the only candidate who stated his willingness to initiate a direct dialogue between the URNG and the government without conditions.

What was the role played by Monsignor Quezada? Was he a conciliator or a mediator? How can we assess his performance? All the meetings were convoked and chaired by the Bishop of Zacapa, who acted officially as a “**conciliator**” with the following duties on the basis of the **Oslo Agreement**:

“.... to propose initiatives to the parties to arrange for and maintain dialogue and negotiation actions, making this a dynamic process, and to summarize converging and diverging positions which may arise between the parties. He will have the authority to propose initiatives and solutions for them with the purpose to be discussed and agreed upon, and to perform all of those duties which ensure the correct fulfillment of his commission”

It is interesting to note that afterwards, when direct bilateral negotiations between the URNG and the Government were initiated and the Mexico Agreement was signed (in April 1991), the duties of the conciliator according with the Oslo Agreement were ratified and besides it was added that:

“As part of this context, it is also the duty of the conciliator, in addition to those contained in other paragraphs of this document to: a) call the meetings which have been agreed on; b) to be the keeper of documents produced as a result of the meetings and to issue certified copies of them to the parties; c) appoint his advisors, and d) provide for breaks during the meetings...”<sup>17</sup>

From the perspective of theory, it is clear that the intervention of Monsignor Quezada was not reduced to the role of a simple conciliator. He acted as a real *mediator*.<sup>18</sup> In this sense, it is

interesting to note also that his intervention can be qualified as one of an *insider partial mediator*.<sup>19</sup> As we know, both impartiality and neutrality have been recognized as essential to every successful mediation effort. Yet, recent research work underlines the fact that the emphasis on impartiality comes from the inability to realize that mediation is a really structural extension of bilateral negotiations.<sup>20</sup> In this sense, it is perfectly possible to see the mediator as a sort of “assistant” or facilitator of negotiations, so to see him as an “impartial outsider” does not reflect what has occurred in reality. That means that in certain special cases the influence-persuasion role of the mediator is better attained not when he is “impartial” and lacking ideological biases but rather when the mediator has resources -leverage- which one or both contenders value as positive. Evidently, in the case of Monsignor Quezada both contenders valued as positive -at that time- his condition as a Bishop of the respected and influential Catholic Church, even if the Guatemalan Church historically has not been impartial and has had bias for the oppressed and the poor or for the powerful and dominant depending on the historic period and the political *balance of power*.<sup>21</sup>

### *The United Nations Intervention: the Role of the Outsider Neutral 1994-1996*

In the Oslo agreement was also decided to ask for the presence of the United Nations as observer and to be “guarantor” of the fulfillment of the agreements. The UN Secretary General appointed Mr. Francesc Vendrell as observer to follow up the process. What kind of assessment we can do concerning the results of this first stage of negotiations? Undoubtedly it was a very important and useful, even if we take into account the 2 years of stagnation. At the beginning of the 80's the armed conflict in Guatemala was in the stage of “search for mutual destruction”,<sup>22</sup> and by April 1991, thanks to the process opened by Monsignor Quezada and the National Commission on Reconciliation, the government and the URNG decided to initiate a process of direct bilateral negotiations of peace. The signature of the Mexico agreement fixed the procedures of the negotiation, the role of the mediator and of the UN observer, and opened the way for the signature of the *Queretaro Agreement* on the issue of democracy and democratization. Unfortunately, as we will explain later on, the negotiations were blocked during the discussion of the human rights issue and it was impossible for the mediator make the parties transcend the incompatibilities. From July 1991 until January 1994 no further agreement was reached.

What kind of factors were determinant for this situation? In part it was the nature of the issue. As we have pointed out in other articles,<sup>23</sup> the success of a mediation process is linked to the type of issues which seem feasible in a given conflict, and, in the case of Guatemala, it is important to take into consideration the fact that the ideological nature of the conflict was transformed in the middle of the eighties from an ideological conflict to a conflict on governance and democracy.<sup>24</sup>

This *conflict transformation* phenomena was the consequence of an evolving international and internal context. In the international field the collapse of communism and the fall of the Soviet Union was a determinant factor. In the internal arena it was the struggle for human rights, as well as the support and solidarity from democratic countries of North America and Europe, that were decisive in the change of mentality and attitude of the guerrilla commanders, who changed their Marxist- Leninist ideology for a democratic and pragmatic approach. Thus the importance assigned to human rights and to the rule of law as a fundamental issue for conflict resolution and the displacement from ideology to the issue of security.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, it seems quite clear why for both the government and the guerrillas a different kind of mediator was needed. A mediator *with*

*muscle*<sup>26</sup> -with more leverage- that could be in capacity to offer guarantees for *security* and respect for human rights.

The so called “Framework Agreement” of January 1994 provided for this change in the third party model of intervention, and from the insider partial the schema moved towards the *outsider neutral* -the United Nations- and, by request of both parties Boutros Boutros Ghali appointed monsieur Jean Arnault who played a decisive role in the peace process for three years and now is the chief of the United Nations Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA).

### *Other Types of Third Party Intervention: The “Group of Friendly Nations” and the Civil Society Assembly (ASC)*

The Guatemalan peace process was innovative also in the new types of third party intervention that it produced. The idea of the *Group of Friendly Nations* was probably the result of the different kind of participation that they have had in the recent past concerning the peace process: the United States, for instance, changed its role after the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the cold war. From a cold war warrior the White House became an advocate of peace<sup>27</sup> thus facilitating its participation in the group. Traditionally Mexico has been interested in a peaceful settlement of the Guatemalan armed conflict by its condition as neighboring country with more than 1,000 kms. of borders, because of the presence of more than 50,000 refugees in Chiapas, Tabasco and Quintana Roo and the presence of the Guatemalan guerrilla at the frontier zone and because of the fact that they had their headquarters in Mexico City. Venezuela and Colombia were in the Group due to their participation in the *Contadora Group*.<sup>28</sup> Spain and Norway were the European member of the Group: Spain was interested in the peace process not just by cultural reasons but also because of tragic facts as the assault and burning of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City in 1980 and of the support for the first attempt of direct bilateral peace talks between the URNG and the government in a meeting held in Madrid in 1988 and the ulterior meeting of *El Escorial* in the pre-negotiations framework. Finally, Norway is a country with a very important policy of support for peace making all over the world, and also expressed the well known permanent policy of the Nordic countries in human rights and peaceful conflict resolution.

Concerning the *Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil* (ASC) it is another interesting third party intervention because the actor (the “assembly”) was a direct result of the “Framework agreement to continue the peace talks” signed by the URNG and the government in January 1994 after more than two years of deadlock. In that opportunity both parties agreed to call upon the United Nations to change the role as observer for the role of “*moderator*” -in fact a *mediator with muscle*- as we have seen before- but also they decided to keep Monsignor Quezada Toruño at the peace process as chairman of a consultative body where all the civil society sectors that participated in the pre-negotiation talks organized by the CNR in 1990 had representatives.<sup>29</sup>

In this paper, we are not in capacity to make an assessment of the participation of this two important third party actors in the peace process, but in general terms, we do think that their intervention was positive and valuable.

## **The Nature of the Peace Agreements**

Another interesting feature of the Guatemalan peace process is that the parties agreed to negotiate on a very complex list of agenda items, and that most of them were “substantive matters,” that is to say, both parties agreed to negotiate those issues concerning the causes of the conflict: the absence of democracy and of the rule of law; the human rights violations; the kind of role that the army must play in a democratic society; the strengthening of democratic institutions and civil democratic authorities; the economic, social and agrarian inequalities and problems; the recognition of the indigenous people cultural identity and rights and the need for constitutional and legal reforms. These items received priority, which meant that the so called “operative items” chronologically were situated at the end: the cease fire and demobilization of the guerrilla. That is why the negotiations took such a long time, since April 1991 until December 1996, more than five years. In the following pages we will summarize the contents of each agreement.

*Agreement on the Procedure for the Search of Peace with Political Means (Mexico, April 26 1991)*

The negotiations were opened by this agreement, that was the result of the first direct meeting between the URNG and the Government.<sup>30</sup> The parties decided the contents of the agenda, which was divided in substantive and procedural issues, to be discussed in a chronological order: substantive issues first (democracy; human rights; refugees; truth commission; indigenous rights; economic, social and agrarian situation; role of the army; strengthening of civil authorities and institutions; constitutional reforms) and procedural issues afterwards (cease fire, demobilization of the insurgents and their rejoining of legal life). They also agreed in the nature of functions to be fulfilled by the mediator (called “conciliator”) Monsignor Rodolfo Quezada Toruño and those of the UN observer. They decided not to abandon unilaterally the negotiation process and to appoint the conciliator as the only person authorized to give information for the media and make official statements of the process that was going to be carried out in a “discreet” and “private” manner, despite of its “public” nature.

*Agreement of Querétaro (Mexico, July 25 1991)*

This agreement concerns essentially the meaning and implications of a democratic regime that must be based on the rule of law, respect for human and indigenous rights, social justice for all citizens and on the subordination of the military to civil authorities. Democracy is qualified as “functional” and participative and both parties agreed on the importance to suppress “for ever” the political repression, the electoral fraud and illegal manipulation of elections. They also agreed in the need to promote citizen participation in the elaboration, execution and assessment of government policies.

*Framework Agreement to Resume the Negotiations between the Government of Guatemala and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (Mexico, January 10 1994)*

After a deadlock that lasted more than 2 years the parties decided to resume the negotiations and, as a novelty, they decided to call upon the United Nations to be the “moderator,” of the peace talks thus deciding also to exclude Monsignor Quezada as “conciliator,” but, at the same time

asking him to chair a new entity integrated by civil society representatives, which was organized as a consultative body for the negotiating parties and finally received the name of “*Assembles de la Sociedad Civil*” -ASC- (Civil Society Assembly). The Assembly was structured with representatives of the social sectors that participated in the meetings of the pre-negotiation process held according to the Oslo Agreement of March, 1990, that is to say the political parties, the religious sector, the private sector, the popular and trade union organizations, the academic community and so on. The parties requested the Assembly to discuss the substantive issues of the agenda (from the agenda item 2 to 7 of the 1991 Mexico Agreement) in order to transmit to the UN “moderator” its views and recommendations in the understanding that it was not compulsory for the parties to accept it or not. Also it was agreed that once signed, each URNG-Government accord must be sent to the Assembly for its ratification, with the purpose of giving it the character of “national commitments.” Another innovation of the Framework Agreement is the decision to call upon the governments of Colombia, Spain, the United States, Mexico, Norway and Venezuela in order to constitute a “*group of friends*” of the Guatemalan peace process with the aim to give the necessary support to the UN moderator in view to speed up the process and to give it “security and firmness,” acting -at request of the parties- as “witnesses of honour” at the signature of the agreements, which -by the way -they did only at the signature of the final peace agreement held in Guatemala City last 29 of December, 1996.

#### *Calendar Agreement (Mexico, March 29 1994)*

The calendar agreement fixed the schedule for negotiations that were supposed to be finished the same year: in May 1994 was going to be discussed (and signed) the agenda item “resettlement of the population uprooted by the armed confrontation”; in June the theme “identity and rights of the indigenous population”; in July: “social and economic issues and the agrarian situation”; in August the item “empowering of civil society and the role of the army in a democratic society”; in September: “basis for the reincorporation of the URNG to political life and the definitive cease fire”; in October: “constitutional and electoral law reforms”; in November: “chronogram for the implementation, fulfillment and verification of the agreements” and finally in December: “signature of the final agreement for a firm and lasting peace and commencement of demobilization.” The agenda items were scrupulously respected by both contending parties but instead of one year, the negotiation process took three years, so the final agreement was not signed in December 1994, but in 1996.

#### *Comprehensive Accord on Human Rights (Mexico, March 29 1994)*

Human rights was a crucial issue of the peace process. The negotiation of this accord took more than two years and it provoked -along with the attempt of a coup *d' état* by former president Jorge Serrano in May 1993- the paralyzation of the negotiations for almost six months in 1993. The accord contemplates measures for the strengthening of national human rights institutions, policy measures against impunity in cases of human rights violations, a governmental commitment to dismantle the *death squads* and the depuration or “cleansing” of criminal personnel within the security forces; guarantees for the liberties of free movement and free association (against the obligatory enrollment of peasants in the paramilitary counter - insurgent militias or “civil patrols”

and the military check points in the country side); measures against forced and discriminatory recruitment of indigenous people for military service, compensation or indemnification for the victims of human rights violations; respect for the non combatant civilian population rights, and - the most important decision- the UN verification of the provisions and clauses of the Agreement, that allowed the installment since November 1994 of the UN mission for Guatemala, called MINUGUA.

*Accord for the Resettlement of the Population Uprooted by the Armed Confrontation Oslo (Norway, June 17 1994)*

This accord has important provisions concerning the guaranties for a safe resettlement of both internal (in the northwestern mountains and in the lowlands of Ixcán an Petén) and external refugees (in the Mexican states of Chiapas, Tabasco and Quintana Roo) as well as for the economic development and social welfare of the returned people.

*Accord for the Establishment of a Commission in Charge of the Historical Clearing up of Human Rights Violations and Crimes that Provoked the Suffering of the Guatemalan Population (Oslo, June 23 1994)*

This accord refers to the so called “truth commission” who has the mandate to investigate the human rights violations and crimes related to the internal armed conflict since its beginnings in the 60's until present. After a 6 months research (that can be extended for another 6 months) the Commission must produce a report. Despite the fact that the Commission has no authority to initiate criminal prosecutions the report will be published and MINUGUA has the right to verify the work of said Commission who is already integrated by three distinguished persons: Ms. Otilia Lux de Coti (a popular organization's leader), Mr. Alfredo Balsells Tojo (a jurist) and Dr. Christian Tomuschat (a German jurist and professor, former UN Human Rights Commission special representative for Guatemala).

*Accord on the Identity and Rights of the Indigenous Population (Mexico City, March 31st 1995)*

This is one of the paramount agreements of the Guatemalan peace process because, as we have already mentioned, its main purpose is absolutely preventive of any possible future ethnic violent or armed conflict. The Accord is divided in several sections and clauses, among them there is recognition of the Mayan cultural identity, the struggle against discrimination, the rights of the indigenous women, the commitment to respect the international law -especially the ILO Covenant 169 on indigenous peoples and the international covenant for the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Regarding the cultural rights several clauses are related to the native languages, to the spirituality and religion, to the temples, sacred places and ceremonial centers, etc. An especial section of the Accord deals with educational reform with emphasis in the strengthening of the national program for bilingual and intercultural education and the use of mass media. Concerning the traditional structure of power of the indigenous communities, the agreement establishes the need to respect the customary law and to strengthen the financial resources of the indigenous

municipalities. Other paragraphs of the agreement are related to the democratic representation of the indigenous in the political system, the right to the land and the restitution of communal lands, the organization of the paritarian commission that will deal with the educational reform and so on and so forth.

*Accord on the Social and Economic Issues and on the Agrarian Situation (Mexico City, May 6 1996)*

This is one of the more complex agreements and it required a very long negotiation process because of the opposition of the powerful CACIF, the leading organization of the so-called “private sector”. The accord is divided in a number of sections and clauses: democratization and participative development, empowerment of the citizens and of their participation at local, communal, municipal and regional level; women's participation; social development; education and training, educational expenditures, health expenditures; administrative decentralization; social security; lodging; financial programs, employment, economic policy, rural development, investment and production projects, cadastre and the establishment of an especial fund for the acquisition of land; reform of the taxation system etc.

*Accord on the Strengthening of Civilian Authorities and on the Role of the Army in a Democratic Society (Mexico City, September 19 1996)*

The accord is addressed to the reform of the State and to the empowerment of the organizations of civil society. Regarding the State reform and modernization, several provisions deals with the judiciary system, the parliament, the public administration with emphasis in the security agenda: the police forces, the army, the military and social service, the intelligence and information services, the profesionalization of public servants, etc. Other clauses are referred to the empowerment of civil society: social participation, strengthening of the “Development Councils” - especially the Local Development Councils-, promotion of women's participation and organizations. Concerning the paramilitary militias called “civil patrols” the agreement establishes its dismantlement as well as the reduction of army troops and military expenditures. Also the Accord decided the liquidation of the military police, a professional army corps, and also the limitation of the armed forces functions to external security and defense.

*Accord on Constitutional and Electoral Law Reforms (Stockholm, Sweden, December 7 1996)*

Several reforms to the Constitution were agreed as a consequence of other accords, for instance, new constitutional norms will be required to establish the indigenous languages as official or to guaranty the respect for the Mayan religion and spirituality; also there are reforms on the structure of the congress of the republic (Parliament) and the judiciary power-, new norms have to clarify the role of the armed forces, the security forces and the police; the restructuring of electoral laws etc. This accord summarize these reforms.

## *The Procedural Accords*

The following are the procedural accords of the Guatemalan peace process: the Accord for the definitive cease fire, signed in Oslo (Norway) on December 4, 1996; the Accord for the incorporation of the URNG to legality signed in Madrid (Spain) on December 12, 1996 and the Accord of a chronogram for the implementation, fulfillment and verification of the peace accords signed in Guatemala City on December 29, 1996.

### *Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace (Guatemala City, December 29 1996)*

This was the final Peace Accord. It has a list of fundamental principles and concepts and declares the entry into force of all the agreements of the peace process. It has also an acknowledgment to the “Grupo de Países Amigos” and to the “Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil.” The Accord was signed at the National Palace in Guatemala City and the then Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros Ghali is one of the witnesses of honor, together with the Central American presidents, the Mexican and Venezuelan presidents Ernesto Zedillo and Rafael Caldera.

## **Conclusions**

If we go back to the title of this chapter: “prevention successes and failures: peace making and conflict transformation in Guatemala,” as well as to the questions regarding the need to acquire knowledge about the causes and determinant factors of successes and failures in conflict prevention and conflict management and resolution, it seems evident, in historical retrospective, that the case of Guatemala is a clear example not only of failure to prevent a major internal conflict but of the incapacity of a great power to understand and to deal with a small independent country in its immediate periphery, or, in different terms of the US inability to manage concrete conflicts with the kind of approach and methodology that should have been appropriate, for instance, the UN *peace making* approach.

In other words, the armed conflict unchained by the US intervention in 1954 against the democratic and legally elected regime of Jacobo Arbenz demonstrated that the use of the world level (geopolitical) bipolarity approach to analyze and elaborate policy actions addressed to concrete situations in other countries -different than the strategic contender- was dangerous and erroneous. In order to contain an absolutely unreal take over of “communism” (and of the Soviet Union) in Guatemala, Washington played the sorcerer's apprentice liberating forces impossible to control afterwards, evil forces that sowed the seeds of discord, violence and civil war in the country.

Equally pernicious for Guatemala was the US interpretation of complex national political facts and processes with the Manichean lens of ideology: communism vs. anticommunism, especially if this kind of lenses are applied to a non industrialized, agrarian country, with almost no working class at all, struggling to modernize both its economic and political systems, who was “guilty” of suffering the influence of a small group of communist intellectuals as the major source (and explanation) of the political conflict with a US government, then ruled by officials with

personal interests in the US corporations established in Guatemala during those years, and, that later - that same decade - quitted the country .

All the minor problems provoked by the agrarian reform could have, been resolved through negotiations, and the relatively “major” problem of the influence of the communists in president Arbenz's cabinet could have been easily solved, if not with negotiations, at least with financial assistance for the legal moderate opposition parties in order to give them the means to win the 1956 scheduled elections. That, of course, in the hypothesis that a foreign policy based in the principles of the American constitution, international law and democracy could have prevailed in the US policy maker's perceptions (and decisions), which seems rather difficult in the light of the study of their biographies, because it illustrates a curious entanglement of ideology with personal interests in personages as John Foster Dulles (US Secretary of State), Allen Dulles (CIA Director), John Moors Cabot (Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs) and Henry Cabot Lodge (US Ambassador to the United Nations at that time, former Massachusetts senator, the UFCO's headquarters place).

Therefore, the use of violence to “solve” the “Guatemalan problem” was not just a wrong US foreign policy decision -and a major failure of the bilateral US foreign policy,<sup>31</sup> which engendrated the monstrous cycle of three decades of insurgency and counter-insurgency in a context of violence, terror and military dictatorship, it was also, intrinsically, an unintelligent decision that showed the incapacity of the US Central Intelligence Agency to understand the real Guatemalan situation and the complex social and political processes underlying the Arbenz measures of economic modernization and social welfare, as well as its inability to manage the conflict adequately. All these facts have been demonstrated with scientific evidence in the historical works of Stephen Kinzer, Stephen Schlesinger, Susan Jonas, Richard Adams, and Piero Gleijeses (among others ) that we have quoted at the initial pages of this paper.

We would have imagined that after the 1954 experience in Guatemala, the Cuban experience, as well as the Vietnamese, Iranian, Dominican and so on so forth, the US government would have not incurred in the same kind of mistakes and erroneous policies. Unfortunately, the same error was made again at the beginning of the eighties in Central America, with the persistence in the policy of military solutions for Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala without considering the fact that those conflicts were essentially of social and political nature.<sup>32</sup> This is why, at the same time that we can argue that the overall US foreign policy towards the region in the eighties was a clear example of failure, we can also conclude that the sovereign decision of the five Central American countries to start a serious *peace making* effort with the support of United Nations -due to the Esquipulas Peace Accord signed in Guatemala in 1987 - is an interesting case of successful conflict resolution, mainly because the peace accords are the result of a very innovative and unique negotiation process, especially in El Salvador and Guatemala, as we have underlined in this paper.

Concerning the situation of the Central American region at the times of bipolarity and of the East-West conflict there are some major conclusions that we can reach: first of all, the US policy towards Central America at the times of the Cold War is a case of major failure of the power politics realistic paradigm of international relations, based in considerations of the balance of power, as it was recommended by outstanding theorist of the epoch as Hans Morgenthau or George Kennan. It happens as if the realistic paradigm's macro- approach was not appropriated to fit in the small scale conflicts of the region, that required the kind of micro- approach finally - and fortunately - used by the Central Americans themselves: peace talks with an agenda that addressed the real issues: poverty, human rights violations, absence of democracy; backwardness and absence of a modern economic system, insecurity and absence of the rule of law.

Consequently, Esquipulas II and the peace agreements signed by the Central American presidents in 1987 are a good example of the success and efficacy -in a concrete historic situation- of the peaceful conflict resolution approach embedded in chapter VI of the UN Charter, or, in other words, of the idealist- Wilsonian paradigm, opposed to the *balance of power* realist paradigm. As we have pointed out in other papers, that means that “..the United Nation's peace making and peace building efforts, particularly in Central America, are among its outstanding accomplishments... (the lesson is) that this type of UN work must be emphasized and, simultaneously, that the corresponding techniques and procedures must be improved and developed through education and training.”<sup>33</sup>

Another important conclusion concerns the relatively new phenomenon of UN, intervention in internal armed conflict: in our point of view, the Central American case clearly demonstrates that UN intervention in internal armed conflicts both as mediator and as monitor of the peace accords in order to verify the fulfillment of the agreements is a fundamental role of the UN that, as we have already mentioned, must be enhanced and promoted in the future. In other words, *peace making* - peace through negotiation and mediation- and *peace building* –peace through development and democratization- must be emphasized in internal armed conflict resolution.

The Central American example demonstrates that the “idealist paradigm” techniques can be as effective (and certainly less expensive) than those inherent to the mechanisms of *peace enforcement or peace keeping*.<sup>34</sup> Particularly for weak and small countries the use of the principle established by article 2 paragraph 3 of the Charter (“*all member states shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered*”) can be used in both internal and international conflicts, and furthermore, it is a very useful tool not only to recover peace but also as a mean to strengthen national sovereignty face to world powers.

Concerning the Guatemalan internal armed conflict, the longest and more difficult to resolve of the region, the peace process can be seen as an interesting theoretical case of analysis in peace research precisely because it is a success story of peace making and conflict transformation. The explanation for this success is- linked to three major points: a) the political opening and the democratization process initiated in 1986; b) the pragmatic (unintended) “contingency approach” used by both parties in the negotiation process<sup>35</sup> that allowed the intervention of all sort of parties: both *insider partial* and *outsider neutral* mediators (however, we must recall that they were called: “*conciliator*” and “*moderator*” in two different and clearly defined stages of the peace process), as well as the third party *consultations*, with actors like “the group of friends” and the “civil society assembly”, without forgetting the pre negotiation talks with different social sectors from June to October 1990, and 3) the decision to include substantial issues (causes of war, structural violence) in the negotiations agenda instead of just dealing with the so called “procedural issues” of cease fire, legal reincorporation to political life (the “amnesty” issue) and the demobilization of the insurgents.

Finally, it should be stressed again that Guatemalan internal armed conflict was essentially of an **ideological and political nature**. In the eighties massive involvement of the indigenous population added the social ingredient but it never became an ethnic conflict. Thus, the *Accord of Identity and Rights of the Indigenous Peoples* can be seen as an instrument of early warning and conflict prevention: the recognition of the indigenous rights to their language, identity and culture is a mean to prevent ethnic struggle for cultural rights in the near future. Consequently, the assessment about the efficacy of that Accord can not be done in present times, it depends on its implementation what will be said in the future.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> We use the *peace-making* concept in the sense of Boutros Boutros Ghali (“between the tasks of seeking to prevent conflict and keeping the peace lies the responsibility to lay to bring hostile parties to agreement by peaceful means. Chapter VI of the Charter sets forth a comprehensive list of such means for the resolution of conflict...” *An Agenda for Peace*, New York, 1992, p.20) therefore, essentially a negotiation process with third party intervention (good offices, conciliation, mediation).

<sup>2</sup> Concerning the US intervention in several books and articles can be consulted, among them: Gleijeses, Piero (1991) *Shattered Hope. The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954*. New Jersey & Oxford: Princeton University Press; Schelesinger Stephen & Kinzer Stephen (1983) *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala*, Garden City, New York, Doubleday; Schlesinger, Stephen (1978) “How Dulles Worked the Coup d’Etat” in *The Nation*, October; and Jonas, Susanne (1991) *The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads and US Power*, Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford: Westview Press.

<sup>3</sup>The concept of ideological conflict is used by Kumar Rupesinghe (1992) “The Disappearing Boundaries Between Internal and External Conflicts” in *Internal Conflict and Governance*, New York: St. Martin Press, pp. 1-26.

<sup>4</sup>The guerrilla warfare became of “small scale type” after the army’s military offensives during the years 1982 and 1993, if we use the terms of the paper of Esty, Goldstone, Guff, Harff et al.: *The State Failure Project: Early Warning Research for the US Foreign Policy Planning*, (paper with the proceedings of the Workshop on Risk Assessment and Crisis Early Warning Systems, held at the University of Maryland, November 1996).

<sup>5</sup> The conflict was exacerbated by the guerrilla armed struggle that - between 1979-1983 - took the form of a large scale an intense civil war with thousands of deaths mainly among the civil indigenous population at the central and western highlands, all this in the middle of a regime crisis with massive human rights violations.

<sup>6</sup> Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr include Guatemala in table 1 “Victims of Genocides and Politicides since World War II” in their article: *Victims of the State: Genocides Politicides and Group Repression since 1945*, in: Estudios Internacionales, revista del IRIPAZ, Guatemala, No. 6, julio-diciembre de 1992, pp.96-119. The authors point out that “...the essential quality of all these episodes is that the state or dominant social groups make a concerted, persistent attempt to destroy a communal or political group, in whole or in part. We distinguish between two types of episodes. In genocides the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their hiercharchical position or political opposition to the regime and dominant groups”. Indeed, both kinds of group repression were used in Guatemala, especially during the period 1979-1994: genocide against indigenous communities suspected of the guerrillas in the countryside by the mere fact of being indians (“..‘guilt’ is established not by action or association, but is assigned to all those who share the defining ascriptive characteristics”), and politicides against the leftist-marxist opposition (especially against intellectuals, students, professors, trade union or popular leaders in the urban areas). However, the figures of victims presented at the Harff & Gurr’s table are underestimated. (30,000 to 63,000 victim for the period 1963-1994), because, for instance, only for the period 1981-1983, we can quote different figures: “ The statistics are staggering. Over 440 villages were entirely destroyed; well over 100,000 civilians were killed or disappeared (some estimates including those of top church officials, range up to 150,000); them were over one million displaced persons (I million internal refugees, up to 200,000 refugees in Mexico - Inforpress 1988c, 107-110; Americas Watch and BPHRG 1997, 73ff.; church and UN sources)”. Jonas: Op. Cit. p.149.

<sup>7</sup>It is interesting to recall that president Jacobo Arbez tried to obtain the intervention of the United Nations in 1934 in order to find a solution for the interstate conflict with the United States. Washington did not accept the Guatemalan request on the grounds that it was a matter for the regional organization, the OAS. The US exerted political pressure on England and France in order to obtain the abstention of both countries. Only four delegates voted for Guatemala at the Security Council on June 25, 1934: the USSR, Lebanon, Denmark and New Zealand. Cf. Gleijeses: Op Cit. pp.329-332.

<sup>8</sup>Ethnic wars or ethnopolitical conflicts are related with *identity conflicts* (Kumar Rupesinghe). The concept of “ethniopolitical conflict” is used by Ted Robert Gurr in his book: *Minorities at Risk. A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*, US Institute of Peace Press, 1993.

<sup>9</sup> To have an idea of the kind of repression and violence at the indigenous areas, we will quote the following description of a French scholar. “...concrant ses troupes dans les hautes terres l’armée avait dégarni l’Ixcán fin 1981. Le répit fut de courte durée. En février 1982 trois cents soldats environ réinvestissaient la zone par l’est, et progressant de village en village sans rencontrer de résistance, sèmaient la mort et la désolation sur leur passage. Le plus souvent la population alertée, parvenait à s’enfuir. Les villages étaient alors systématiquement pillés et détruits, le bétail abattu, les maisons

et les édifices (écoles, magasins, hangars, églises) brûlés. On assista là aussi à un sauve-qui-peut désordonné, à une fuite extrêmement mal préparée par la guerrilla. Parfois, mal informés, mal orientés, incrédules ou trop confiants, les colons restaient sur place. Ils étaient impitoyablement exterminés. Ainsi, à Cuarto Pueblo- La Unión, comme pour se venger du revers subi un an auparavant, l'armée s'acharna pendant trois jours sur la population, faisant quelques trois cents victimes. Le 14 mars 1982 les habitants de Cuarto Pueblo étaient réunis comme tous les dimanches pour le marché et pour les offices religieux. Le bruit courut que les militaires avaient été vus la veille près du rio Xalbal. Mais n'avaient-ils pas la conscience tranquille et les papiers en règle ("Pourquoi fuir si nous ne sommes redevables de rien?"). Pourtant à neuf heures du matin, après qu'un hélicoptère eût survolé la place, certains pressentirent que quelque chose se préparait et se cachèrent. Un demi-heure plus tard, lorsque les soldats surgirent de divers côtés, ouvrant le feu, lançant des grenades sur les groupes rassemblés, une partie des habitants réussit encore à se sauver. Ceux qui ne purent ou ne voulurent pas s'enfuir furent massacrés trois jours durant. Des villageois, embusqués dans la forêt, assistèrent, sans pouvoir intervenir, aux tortures, aux viols, et aux tueries. Les soldats partis, ils revinrent dans le village transformé en charnier... De 1981 à 1983, des dizaines de hameaux et villages, la très grande majorité dans les communautés indiennes, ont été détruits et leur population massacrée partiellement ou entièrement. Plusieurs dizaines de milliers de personnes ont péri et des centaines de milliers ont été déplacées...L'armée, qui donne la chiffre de 440 hameaux et villages détruits, en rend responsable la guerrilla. En réalité la quasi totalité des massacres ont été perpétrés par des militaires ou des para-militaires. De son côté, l'un des principaux dirigeants de la guerrilla, estime "à plus de 35,000 morts" le nombre des victimes du conflit dans les années 1981-1983..." Le Bot, Yvon: *La Guerre en Terre Maya. Communauté, Violence et Modernité au Guatemala*, Editions Khartala, Paris, 1992, pp.202-207. Figures and information about this terrible period in the history of Guatemala can be found also at several reports of the epoch (1980-1985), among them the reports of Amnesty International, the Inter American Commission for Human Rights, the special rapporteur of the United Nations Human Rights Commission the Vicecount Colville of Culross, and also cf. Falla, Ricardo: "*Massacres de la Selva. Ixcán, Guatemala (1975-1982)*" Editorial Universitaria, Guatemala, 1992, and *Las Masacres en Rabinal: Estudio Histórico Antropológico de las Masacres de Plan de Sánchez, Chichupac y Rio Negro*, Equipo de Antropología Forense de Guatemala, EAFG, Guatemala, 1995.

<sup>10</sup> At the negotiation table there were no representation whatsoever of the indigenous people. Only after the *Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil* (ASC: "civil society assembly") was created in January 1994, a "Mayan sector" was able to present its views, later channeled through the ASC to the negotiation parties.

<sup>11</sup> Galtung, Johan: *Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict Development and Civilization*; International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Sage Publications, London, Thousand Oaks & New Delhi, 1996, p.103.

<sup>12</sup> The Equipulas Peace Accord is at the one of four United Nations missions in Central America: ONUCA and ONUVEN (Nicaragua); ONUSAL (El Salvador) and MINUGUA (Guatemala).

<sup>13</sup> In 1950, a maritime transportation agency organized the trips to the North American far west embarking passengers at New Orleans towards Nicaragua, from them they traverse the San Juan river and the "Gran Lago" and then, after a short span by road, they were embarked to California by ship through the Pacific Ocean. The trip was safer and less weary by comparison with the traverse of the deserts of the mid west and the dangerous indian territory.

<sup>14</sup> Susan Jonas gives the following explanation: The United States could not tolerate the Guatemalan Revolution for several reasons. First, the Arbenz government regulated existing US interests there and threatened prospects for future investments. In the post-war era of capitalist expansion, US investors (and the US government which was heavily influenced by these interests) were unwilling to accept any regulations or to work with revolutionary nationalists governments. The Eisenhower administration (1953-1960) was heavily influenced by UFC with do Dulles brothers both members of UFC's law firm, and UFC itself played a significant role in orchestrating support for the intervention. The overthrow of Arbenz is one of the clearest examples in modern history of US policy being affected by the direct ties of public officials to private interests: Jonas: Op. cit. pp.31-32.

<sup>15</sup> Notwithstanding, our point of view is that the main historic responsibility for the events of 1954 lie on the US government not just because of the fundamental reasons of principles (the violation of the UN Charter, the ideals of the American constitution and the American peoples democratic ideology) but also by pragmatic reasons, because there was no real need to "solve" the conflict through military means. If both the Guatemalan ruling economic class and the Eisenhower administration could have waited for the elections programmed for the year 1956, they could have had a democratic solution with the election of a more "conservative" Guatemalan administration, as it was the case in the Nicaraguan elections of 1990, when Daniel Ortega was defeated by Violeta Chamorro. Therefore, it is clear that the US government overreacted by ideological reasons and by the pressure of corporations like UFCO and the personal interests of the Dulles brothers and State Department officials like John Moors Cabot and Henry Cabot Lodge.

<sup>16</sup> The army rebellion was addressed against the corruption of the Ydígoras administration but it also expressed the malaise within the army for events seen as a new violation of national sovereignty: at that time a military expedition

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was being organized and troops were trained in Guatemalan territory (in a private real estate: la finca "Helvetia") by the CIA in preparation of the invasion of *Bahia de Cochinos* against the Cuban revolutionary regime. It is easy to understand that Fidel Castro's ulterior support for the Guatemalan rebels is linked to these events. The guerrilla movement was organized with the name "Rebel Armed Forces" (in Spanish: "Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes" -FAR-) still one of the military organizations member of the URNG whose commander in chief, Pablo Monsanto, signed the Peace Accord of December 29, 1996 in Guatemala City. The first commander in chief of the FAR was former army officer Luis Turcios Lima, killed in 1967. Another guerilla group was organized in the 60s with the name "Movimiento Revolucionari 13 de Noviembre" (MR13) also by another former army officer: Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, who died in combat in 1970.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. Acuerdo de Oslo (March 1990) and Mexico (April 1991) in: IRIPAZ: *Cronologias de los Procesos de Paz: Guatemala y El Salvador*, Vols. I & II, Iripaz, Guatemala, 1992, pp. 56-58: 113-116.

<sup>18</sup> Ronald Fisher and Loreleigh Keashly proposed a typology of third party intervention in conflicts consisting of conciliation, mediation, mediation with muscle, consultation, arbitration and peace keeping. *Conciliation* "involves a trusted third party providing an informal communication link between the antagonist for the purposes of identifying the major issues, lowering tension and encouraging them to move toward direct interaction such as negotiation to deal with their differences. The important distinction is that the third party does not propose alternatives for sealing the dispute... Mediation involves the intervention of a skilled and experienced intermediary who attempts to facilitate a negotiated settlement to the dispute on a set of specific substantive issues. The mediator usually combines individual meetings involving each party's representatives with joint negotiating sessions, and uses reasoning, persuasion, the control of information and the suggestion of alternatives to assist the antagonists in finding an acceptable agreement. Cf. Fisher & Keashly (1991) "The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention," in *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 28 (1): p.33.

<sup>19</sup> The concept of "insider partial" is used by Wehr & Lederach (1992) "Mediating Conflict in Central America" in *Journal of Peace Research*, PRIO, London: SAGE.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. Jacob Bercovitch, Theodore Agnoson, and Donnette Willie (1991) "Some Conceptual Issues and Empirical Trends in the Study of Successful Mediation in International Relations" in *Journal of Peace Research*, 28(1), London: SAGE.

<sup>21</sup> In the colonial times, Fray Bartolomé de las Casas, a Dominican priest was the first defender of the and he succeeded in the establishment of the autonomous indigenous communities, that were under the benign control of the Church and not under the ruthless and despotic power of the so called *conquistadores* ("conquerors"). At the epoch of the US intervention in 1954 the Archbishop Rossel y Arellano acted as an ally of Washington and of the *soldier of fortune* Castillo Armas. By the contrary, in the times of the revolutionary uprising in the 80's, the Catholic Church was more or less aligned in the side of the insurgents, even if the Guatemalan clergy did not share the approach to social problems of the "theology of liberation" that prevailed in other Latin American countries, like Brazil, Colombia or Peru.

<sup>22</sup> Fisher and Keashly describe the stages of conflict escalation as discussion, polarity, segregation, and search for mutual destruction. Cf. Op. cit. pp.35-36.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Padilla, Luis Alberto (1994) "The Peace Process in Central America: A Comparative Analysis of Mediation in El Salvador and Guatemala," in Ed Garcia (ed.) *War and Peace: Essays of Conflict and Change*, Quezon City, Philippines: Claretian Publications, pp.87-99.

<sup>24</sup> Regarding the concept of "conflict transformation" it is interesting to quote Raimo Värynen "The transformation of conflict may be either intended or unintended. In the former case actors, rules and substance of the conflict are deliberately redefined in order to create better preconditions for instrumental political action to solve the disagreement... The unintended transformation process is usually a by-product of the broader social and economic changes which the actors have not planned and cannot avoid, but to which they have to adjust. The transformation perspective suggest that conflict resolution is not only a form to stepwise rational action in which the actors involved try to adjust their competing interests to each other. It is also associated with everyday and broader historical changes transforming the scope, nature, and functions of collective violence." Värynen (1991) "To Settle or to Transform? Perspectives on the Resolution of National and International Conflicts," in *New Directions in Conflict Theory, Conflict Resolution, and Conflict Transformation*, CISS & ISSC, London: SAGE, pp.6-7. Obviously, the Guatemalan situation that we are describing (the URNG's change of objectives at the beginning of the 90's) is a good example of "unintended" conflict transformation.

<sup>25</sup> Human rights and the rule of law are closely linked to security, and, in the perspective of a peaceful conflict resolution -and the transformation of the URNG from a military actor into a political actor- it is evident that "guarantees for security" (for the former combatants) became a crucial point to discuss and to resolve.

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<sup>26</sup> Mediation with muscle (or *power mediation*) is defined by Fisher & Keashly as a mediation in which a third party uses leverage or coercion “in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments. In a very real sense, the third party becomes a member of the negotiating nude and bargains with each party using carrots and sticks, to move them to a negotiated settlement. This form of mediation often kids to settlements which have future implications for the third party as a provider of continuing benefits and or the guarantor of the agreement” (Op. cit. p.33). It is easy to see the United Nations MINUGUA in Guatemala as both the provider of continuing benefits –in terms of international financial cooperation- and the guarantor of the agreements of peace.

<sup>27</sup> The Reagan administration was never convinced of the Esquipulas peace process. They even tried to avoid the signature of the Accord and for that purpose Secretary of State Schultz was sent to Guatemala at the last minute. Nevertheless, the Bush administration changed the US position and after the meeting of *El Escorial* between the political parties and the URNG (convened by National Commission of Reconciliation) that took place in Spain in May 1990, Bernard Aronson, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, sent a message of congratulations and support to Monsignor Quezada. Cf. *Cronologias de los Procesos de Paz*, Op. cit. pp.60-61.

<sup>28</sup> The Contadora Group was the result of a meeting held in the island of the same name in Panama's territorial waters. Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama worked hard as mediators between 1993 and 1985 in order to stop a US military direct intervention against Nicaragua that was feared in those years. Another interesting development of the Group was that it got the support of Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Peru that later became the “Grupo de Rio,” actually the most important permanent summit consultative mechanism for policy coordination and agreement of the all Latin American countries.

<sup>29</sup> Except for the powerful CACIF the business and “private sector” leading organization.

<sup>30</sup> Except for a meeting that took place in Madrid in October 1997 with no results at all, because the government wanted the unconditional surrender of the guerrillas. A few months after the meeting, the Guatemalan ambassador in Spain who organized the encounter, Danilo Barillas, who was also a prominent leader of the then ruling Christian Democratic Party, was killed by a death squad in Guatemala City.

<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, ironically the CIA's covert operation for Guatemala received the code name of “Operation PB SUCCESS” and -at the epoch- was presented by the US mass media as a success story and generally applauded by the American public opinion and the US political establishment of those years. It is only recently that this “official story” started to be reviewed at the academic community in the light of well documented and rigorously made historic studies. It could be interesting also to start working within the US bureaucracy in order to change the US official assessment of the Guatemalan “PB SUCCESS operation” which in fact was a real tragedy for the country.

<sup>32</sup> This policy was implemented by the Reagan administration under the name of “roll back in low intensity conflicts.” It is interesting to recall also that the “military solution” strategy is mainly based -as we have already mentioned- in the well known realist paradigm of international relations, which has been predominant in the US foreign policy since the beginning of the Cold War and it is quite different of the idealist and Wilsonian paradigm that informs the UN Charter (except for Chapter VII and the measures of *peace enforcement*). Cf Padilla, Luis Alberto (1995) “The United Nations and Conflict Resolution in Central America: Peace Making and Peace Building in Internal Armed Conflict” in *Estudios Internacionales*, revista del IRIPAZ, Guatemala, No. 12, pp.92-104.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p.93.

<sup>34</sup> In similar terms an American scholar wrote about the Salvadoran peace process that it “...created a precedent for mediation of civil conflict by the office of United Nations Secretary general. It was successful in that the proactive role developed by the mediator served to advance the process to a final accord ending twelve years of armed confrontation. However, the leverage wielded by the secretary-general's office throughout the negotiations rested on two pivots: the moral authority of the United Nations as a peace maker, and the unusual degree of international interest, especially on the part of permanent members of the Security Council, in ending the Salvadoran conflict” Burgerman, Susan Diane (1995) “The United Nations Secretary General as Third Party to the Salvadoran Peace Process” in *Estudios Internacionales*, revista del IRIPAZ, Guatemala. No. 12, p.119.

<sup>35</sup> “A contingency approach to third party intervention is based on the assessment that social conflict involves a dynamic process in which objective and subjective elements interact overtime as the conflict escalates and de-escalates. Depending on the objective -subjective mix, different interventions will be appropriate at different stages of the conflict. Rather than being limited to particular strategies by the assumptions that am made, the contingency approach challenges all parties to entertain a complex view of conflict, and to develop and adapt strategies from a range of options.” Fisher & Keashly, Op. cit., p.34.

# Peace Accords Chronology

By  
Luis Alberto Padilla

Date	Place	Event & Actors	Content
08/06/87	Esquipulas City (first meeting in 1986) and Guatemala City (second meeting in 1987). The Catholic sanctuary of Esquipulas is a sacred place for all Central American peoples. The Esquipulas “Black Christ” sculpture is considered miraculous, so the sanctuary is also a pilgrimage place.	Esquipulas II Peace Accord. The five presidents of the Central American republics: Vencio Cerezo (Guatemala), Daniel Ortega (Nicaragua), Oscar Arias (Costa Rica), Napoleon Duarte (El Salvador), and José Azcona (Honduras). While the first summit meeting was convoked in 1986 by Guatemala’s president Vencio Cerezo, the president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, presented the peace plan and was honored that year with the Nobel Peace Prize.	After the “Contadora” failed mediation effort this is the first and paramount Accord that opened the peace process in Central America. It contents several agreements on issues as: democratization; free elections; cease of the support for irregular armed groups or insurgent movements; compromise of not use each country’s territory to attack other states; negotiations on security verification, control and armaments limitations; care for displaced persons and refugees; economic cooperation; democracy; peace and development; verification and international follow up (CIVS); calendar for the agreement’s execution, <i>establishment of national commission of reconciliation</i> .
10/07/87	Madrid, Spain	Guatemalan Government and Guerilla (URNG), meeting organized by the Guatemalan ambassador Danilo Barillas.	Among the main conditions presented by the Government to initiate peace talks are: 1) The guerilla should follow the Esquipulas Accord. 2) Peace talks would be possible only if the guerilla give up the arms and becomes a legal political party.
07/24/88	San Jose, Costa Rica	URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity) and CNR (National Reconciliation Commission) meeting. The CNR was chaired by the Catholic bishop monsignor Rodolfo Quezada Toruño.	Representative from the CNR and the URNG discuss issues on how to initiate the peace talks between the government and the guerilla.
08/05/89	Guatemala City	The assassination of Danilo Barillas Rodríguez, former Guatemalan ambassador in Spain and prominent leader of then ruling Christian Democratic Party (PDC).	It is believed that his views against the involvement of the ruling PDC party politicians in drug trafficking and/or the promotion of negotiations between the government and the URNG caused his killing.

11/07/88	Guatemala City	CNR's convoked to a National Dialogue with civil society (trade unions, political parties, other churches etc.) and the Government	Agenda: Economic, social, and political aspects of national interests are proposed by the CNR to different sectors: human rights, peace, democracy, and social justice.
01/20/89	Caracas, Venezuela	URNG proposes to initiate dialogue of peace through mediation.	URNG proposes the mandataries of Costa Rica, Spain, and Venezuela to act as intermediaries. President Cerezo did not agree to such a possibility, saying that the URNG must first accept the amnesty law enacted in 1987. The minister of defense, general Gramajo, said that a dialogue with armed rebels would mean recognition, which is unacceptable for the government.
03/30/90	Oslo, Norway	Oslo Agreement for the Search for Peace through political Means: CNR and URNG.	The National Commission of Reconciliation (CNR) and the URNG agree to initiate a process of dialogue with different sectors of the civil society.
06/01/90	El Escorial, Spain	The Escorial declaration. CNR organized the meeting with political parties leaders: Christian Democratic, Centrist union UCN, PAN (actually the ruling party), socialist (PSD), MLN, MAS among others and the URNG.	The commanders of the URNG the leaders of Political parties of Guatemala agree to start as soon as possible the measures that will permit to reach the Esquipulas peace process goals.
07/06/90	Asunción, Paraguay	Declaration of the OAS XX General Assembly of the Organization of American States OAS	Point 15: support for the process of dialogue initiated in Oslo between the URNG and representatives of the civil society; point 20 request the good offices of the Secretary general in the Guatemalan peace process.
09/02/90	Ottawa, Canada	URNG meets CACIF (Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations) with the CNR good offices.	In separate statements both parties ratified their political will to make all the efforts necessary in the search of peace.
09/28/90	Quito, Ecuador	Religious leaders meeting with the URNG. Representatives of the catholic Church Bishop's Conference; and of several Christian Protestant church representatives.	In a joint declaration both parties expressed their will of peace and recommended the government and the army to open political negotiations with the URNG.

10/25/90	Metepec, Puebla, Mexico	Metepec Declaration URNG meets with representatives of popular organizations, NGO's and trade unions, with the good offices of the CNR and Bishop Quezada Toruño.	The need of improving a representative, functional and participative democracy and to start a serious peace process to resolve the historic, political, social, and economic causes that gave origin to the confrontation. Both parties ask the Government and the URNG to initiate peace talks.
10/27/90	Atlixco, Puebla, Mexico	URNG meets with representatives of the Guatemalan academic community, cooperatives, small and medium corporations, managerial, and professional organizations.	
04/26/91	Mexico City	Accord on the procedure for the Search for Peace through Political Means (Mexico Accord); URNG and the Guatemalan Government with the mediation of the CNR chaired by Monsignor Quezada Toruño.	The Government and the URNG agree to start a negotiation. They fixed an agenda of substantive and procedural items and also decided that the agreements, its implementation, and execution would be verified by the CNR, the UN and any other international organizations both parties agree to designate.
07/25/91	Queretaro, Mexico	Queretaro Accord	Agreements on the process of democratization including: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The meaning of democracy.</li> <li>2. The need for the rule of law, respect for human rights, subordination of the armed forces to civilian authorities, respect for indigenous rights, respect for social and economic rights.</li> </ol>
01/10/94	Mexico City	Framework Agreement to Resume the Negotiations between the URNG and the Government.  Actors: URNG commanders, government officials and the United Nations representative M. Jean Arnault.	Both parties agreed to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Ask the UN Secretary General to designate a moderator.</li> <li>2. Ask the Catholic Church to designate Monsignor Quezada to chair a "civil sector assembly".</li> <li>3. Ask the governments of Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United States, and Venezuela to integrate a group of "Países Amigos" ("friendly nations").</li> <li>4. To meet again to consider a human rights agreement and a calendar of discussions in order to finish the peace process in December 1994.</li> </ol>

03/29/94	Mexico City	Comprehensive Human Rights Agreement. URNG, UN moderator and the Government.	Among other important issues, the Government and the URN agreed to ask the United Nations to send a special mission to monitor the fulfillment and implementation of the Accord.
03/29/94	Mexico City	Calendar Accord.  URNG/Government/UN	It establishes the calendar for negotiations as well as the precise agenda items: refugees; truth commission; indigenous rights; social, economic, and agrarian issues; the role of the army; URNG's legal reincorporation; cease fire; constitutional reforms; chronogram for the implementation of agreements.
06/17/94	Oslo, Norway	Accord for the resettlement of the population uprooted by the armed conflict.  URNG/Government/UN	Important provisions concerning the guarantees for a safe resettlement of both internal and external refugees as well as for economic and social welfare of the returned people.
06/23/94	Oslo, Norway	Accord for the establishment of a Commission in charge of the historical clearing up of the human rights violations and the crimes that provoked the suffering of the Guatemalan people.  URNG/Government/UN	Said commission should elaborate a report containing the results of done investigations and offer objective elements to realize and understand what took place during this period of time, and finish the impunity.
03/31/95	Mexico City	Accord on the identity and Rights of the Indigenous People.  URNG/Government/UN	Recognition of the Mayan cultural identity, it has provisions against discrimination, for the protection of culture and languages, sacred places and spirituality; recognition of customary law and traditional authorities, for the implementation of 169 ILO convention etc.
05/06/96	Mexico City	Accord on Social and Economic aspects and Agrarian Situation.  URNG/Government/UN	Democratization and participative development, empowerment of citizens and their participation at local, communal, municipal, and regional levels. Education, health, social and human development, economic measures etc.
08/22/95	Panama	Contadora Declaration.  Guatemala political parties	In meeting the Central American political parties, the Guatemalan political leaders agree to considerate the Peace Accord as state compromises and therefore to promote the necessary new laws or legal reforms.

09/19/96	Mexico City	<p>Accord on the Strengthening of Civilian Authorities and on the Army's Role in a Democratic Society.</p> <p>URNG/Government/UN</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reform of the Armed Force and reduction of military expenditures.</li> <li>• Reform of the intelligent services.</li> <li>• Cleansing of security forces.</li> <li>• Strengthening of civilian authorities through development councils, among other mechanisms.</li> </ul>
12/04/96	Oslo, Norway	Final Cease Fire Agreement.	Complete cease fire.
12/07/96	Stockholm, Sweden	Accord on Constitutional reforms and electoral Laws.	It summarizes the constitutional and legal reforms originated in the Accords.
12/12/96	Madrid, Spain	Accord establishing the bases for the URNG's incorporation to legal political activities.	Law on National reconciliation (Amnesty law).
12/29/96	Guatemala City	Accord of Chronogram for the implementation, verification, and achievement of the Peace Accords.	It establishes a calendar and also the schedule and other operative matters of the peace accords.
12/29/96	Guatemala City	<p>Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace.</p> <p>Actors: URNG, the Guatemalan Government, and the UN "moderator". As witnesses of honor several chiefs of State signed the Accord together with the UN Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali.</p>	Final declaration with a list of principles and fundamental concepts as well as the acknowledgement and gratitude for the third parties among them the "Países Amigos" (Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United States, Venezuela, and Colombia) the "Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil" and the united Nations.