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Dangerous Liaisons:
A Theory of Threat Relationships in International Politics
by
Thomas Schmalberger, Ph.D.
Why was the Cuban Missile Crisis a crisis? How can we generally distinguish a crisis situation from other situations that are not crises? What would one need to change in order to avoid a crisis? What would one need to do in order to peacefully resolve it? And what would have to happen for war to break out? These are the questions that Dangerous Liaisons tackles with a novel methodological approach that enters into and reconstructs the lifeworld in which policy makers experienced and dealt with the Cuban Missile Crisis. To reconstruct the rules by which policy makers interpret new information and design responses as a situation unfolds yields a better understanding of international crises in general, and of the Cuban Missile Crisis in particular, because it maps more closely onto the context in which policy makers operate. In addition, such an approach lends itself for the systematic and rigorous development of counterfactual scenarios in which a virtually unlimited number of alternatives can be explored. These provide insights not only into how the Cuban Missile Crisis could have been avoided, resolved differently, or conversely led to war, but also into the more general dynamics that characterize international crises. To maximize the potential of alternative scenario construction, Dangerous Liaisons translates the rules that constitute the lifeworld of policy makers into a computer simulation of the Cuban Missile Crisis that helps to explore empirical puzzles about this crisis, to test hypotheses about international crises more generally, and to train and educate informed users in the art of crisis prevention and resolution.
Assumptions
Three main assumptions are at the basis of Dangerous Liaisons:
- First, international crises are social phenomena that are collaboratively created and resolved. This collaboration is enabled by a set of social rules that inform participants how to interpret the other's actions, and how such actions can and ought to be responded to. Whereas the application of these rules to specific situations creates specific crises, the set of rules applies to crisis situations in general. The Cuban Missile Crisis is thus merely a concrete instance of the more general phenomenon of international crises.
- Second, the social nature of rules makes them contingent on the cultural and historical context in which they are used. Dangerous Liaisons focuses on a group of American policy makers, and thus on a culture that operates on rules that are different from the rules of other groups that are outside the immediate policy making circle or from another historical period. Yet, since these rules can generate different and often opposing interpretations they can account for all interpretations that this group of policy makers considers possible.
- Third, the identification and applicability of social rules requires a detailed empirical analysis to ensure their validity, and thus to guarantee that the cultural and historical context is adequately taken into account.
Beyond existing crisis research
Dangerous Liaisons goes beyond the existing literature on international crises in that it provides an empirically grounded theoretical account of what international crises consist, how they are created, unfold, and are resolved. Existing work has mostly stopped at defining a crisis as a situation in which a threat to the national security, the possibility of war to break out, and time pressure exist. It is unclear whether these indicators are necessary or sufficient conditions for a crisis situation, and we are therefore unable to determine exactly under which conditions they do or do not characterize a crisis. Moreover, the problem of uniquely identifying a crisis is simply pushed back one step, for we still need to account for how a threat to the national security is created and what it consists of, how possibilities are created of which some might lead to war, and how time pressure is created in the course of a situation. The methodology developed in Dangerous Liaisons is not only able to explain the creation of threats, possible courses of action, and time pressure but also to specify the conditions under which some threats do or do not create a crisis, the conditions under which possibilities are created that include war as well as the avoidance or resolution of crises, and the conditions under which time pressure is created or avoided.
Methodology
The methodology developed synthesizes some of the latest achievements in sociology, linguistics and artificial intelligence into a general approach to study state interactions in a systematic, rigorous, transparent, and context-sensitive manner. At the basis of the methodology stands the notion of turn-taking, that is, the sequential ordering of social interactions. The adjustment and coordination of turns into a sequence involves four sets of rules:
- First, a turn is a concrete instance of a certain type of action that can also be expressed differently. For instance, military assistance can be provided in different ways. But the typical features that they have in common allows to identify all of them as military assistance. We speak of essential features when we refer to those that all instances of a turn have in common regardless of the context in which they occur, and we speak of contingent features when we refer to those features of a turn that are context-specific. Hence a first set of rules specifies the essential features of a turn and their possible modification with contingent features .
- Second, the essential features of a turn determine the range of possible turns that are typically used as responses. For instance, military assistance provided by one country can be responded to with observation, protest, or an embargo by another country. Each of these turns are again typical in the sense that they can be expressed in different ways. The range of possible responses is determined by the essential features of the preceding turn and adjusted to the specific context by its contingent features. This fit between turns assures the continuously consistent unfolding of interactions. Thus, a second set of rules determines the range of possible responses to a preceding turn taking into account its contingent features.
- Third, particular combinations of turns produce transformations in the sense that an earlier interpretation of what the interaction was about is superseded by a new interpretation. For instance, the provision of military assistance was previously believed to strengthen the defense of the recipient country. But the intrusion of its armed forces into neighboring territory transforms the earlier interpretation into one where an armed intervention was prepared. Thus, a third set of rules determines the possible combinations of turns that produce re-interpretations.
- Fourth, turn sequences have a beginning and an ending which demarcate one type of interaction from others. For instance, a disagreement over the provision of military assistance to a country unfolds in a different sequence than a crisis over the same issue. Consequently, a sequence characterizing a crisis can unfold in different ways and over different issues but still be recognized as a crisis. Only if the beginning is avoided or an ending is achieved, different sequences unfold that are not a crisis. Hence, a fourth set of rules specifies when a turn sequence enters and exits a crisis situation.
The formulation of rules and their subsequent formalization into a computer simulation is the result of a systematic comparative analysis of governmental records. Policy makers learn about other governments' actions from reports, memorandums, and cables. They discuss possible interpretations and courses of actions in policy papers and notes, and record their conversations on tape or minutes. Policy makers from different governments communicate also in written exchanges or keep records of their conversations. Governmental records are therefore more than primary sources; they are the expressions of what policy makers do. Moreover, in their exchanges policy makers make explicit the rules by which they come to understand another's action to mean this as opposed to something else; they spell out the conditions under which certain responses are possible and others are not; they explain when new events call for a re-interpretation of an earlier interpretation; and they make clear when they find themselves in a crisis. Hence, the rules that are formalized into a computer simulation are not only logically consistent so as to allow the simulation to work, but also empirically consistent so as to map closely onto the way policy makers operate in a crisis situation. To make this consistency explicit, the computer simulation indicates at every step the rules that are being evoked. These rules are explained in a sub-program and can be accessed on-line. These explanations contain also exact references to the locations in documents which can also be directly accessed on-line. Hence, the potential of such a computer simulation derives from using an insider's perspective in order to explore the possibilities that this perspectives provides in a transparent and reproducible manner.
Dangerous Liaisons exploits this potential in three ways.
- First, the logical and empirical consistency of the computer simulation does not tolerate any misfits that can easily be overlooked if huge amounts of data are to be systematically examined. The resulting interpretation is thus more accurate in the sense that it is consistent with both, its internal logic as well as with the interpretation of participants.
- Second, the consistency of the computer simulation establishes logical equivalences that are empirically grounded and which can be used to develop counterfactual scenarios. Counterfactual scenarios are indispensable for a better understanding of the actual crisis, for without a contrast to alternatives no judgments can be made, and no lessons can be drawn from the actual crisis.
- Third, the generation of counterfactual scenarios allows not only to answer important what-if questions that go one node off the actual branch but to explore entire conflict trajectories. This can be regarded as the generation of comparable cases that serve for the discovery of more general patterns that have applicability well beyond the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Empirical findings
The essence of the Cuban Missile Crisis
As a result of this analysis it could be shown that the Cuban Missile Crisis was not about missiles but about the deceptive way in which they were introduced. This finding could be further corroborated with various counterfactual scenarios in which deception and thus the crisis could have been avoided. Deception required that nuclear missiles were introduced secretly and in contradiction to previously made assurances. To avoid contradictory assurances would still leave secrecy, and the secret introduction of nuclear missiles would still leave a surprise that would have put the US on the defensive. Hence, a crisis would still have been created, although it would have been different in certain respects from the actual Cuban Missile Crisis. However, if both, contradictory assurances and secrecy are avoided, the introduction of nuclear missiles could have proceeded without the creation of a crisis.
Avoiding the Cuban Missile Crisis
Based upon the same logic one can also explore different ways in which the deployment of nuclear missiles could or could not have been responded to differently. At the time of the crisis and later, the American administration was criticized for not contacting the Soviet leadership in private. With the help of the computer simulation one can determine that such an approach would not have been plausible. A private approach would have required that Khrushchev be trusted although he had just been discovered to have deceived the American administration. A private approach would thus not have been equivalent to the action it would have been a response to. However, a systematic comparison across all instances reveals that from a number of possible responses the one is selected that achieves the best fit to the other's action. The best fit to the deceptive deployment was a blockade because it was itself secretly planned and deceptively executed. Moreover, a blockade could produce the same humiliation as the deceptive deployment of missiles. A blockade was therefore the best fitting response. The simulation of a private approach to Khrushchev shows that it would fail on all these accounts. Instead of humiliating Khrushchev he would be allowed to withdraw in dignity. Instead of deceiving him, he would be trusted. Instead of making secret plans against him, he would become a secret sharer. The simulation confirms what the American administration had feared at the time, namely it would be humiliated and be considered a coward precisely because it would not have responded in an equivalent manner.
Lessons from the Cuban Missile Crisis
Dangerous Liaisons explores numerous other scenarios to test some of the lessons drawn from the Cuban Missile Crisis and to draw new ones. It demonstrates that, contrary to some recommendations made in the aftermath of the crisis, an earlier or greater display of resolve would not have avoided the crisis but instead created a crisis earlier. Contrary to some observers it shows how international organizations can be instrumental in the mediation and resolution of crises. In one scenario, the United States is regarded as the aggressor because it could not obtain the legitimation by the Organization of American States. And in a number of other scenarios the United Nations is shown to have mediated successfully a resolution of the crisis. Finally, a number of scenarios explore the possibilities what the Cuban Missile Crisis is remembered for most: namely the outbreak of war, especially nuclear war. Based upon these scenarios the practice of decision making, escalation, and deterrence is shown to work differently than the most popular theories predict.
On reasoning and decisions
Many existing theories assume that decisions and actions are made to maximize outcomes. The analysis in Dangerous Liaisons finds, however, that they are made to fit best the action to which they are a response. The decision to impose a blockade instead of launching an airstrike can be explained as a better fit to the deceptive shipment of missiles, and is consistent with the arguments put forward by policy makers at the time. To arrive at this conclusion one needs to separate the responses considered at the time and not, as many scholars have done, to conflate them. The blockade was a response to the Soviet deception whereas the airstrike was a response to the preparation of missile sites in Cuba. Because the crisis was about deception an equivalent response was needed. The blockade was planned just as secretly, and executed just as deceptively as the Soviet shipment of missiles. Moreover, it produced the same humiliation that the Soviet deception had produced. An airstrike or any of the other options considered could not prodcue this fit. Although Dangerous Liaisons does not explain the decision making process it proposes a way of how to study it so that it maps more closely onto the way policy makers make decisions.
On escalation
Also the notion of escalation needs to be reconsidered, for it does not capture the way in which policy makers conceive of it. Traditional theories of escalation are based upon the notion of a ladder by which the stakes in a situation are raised in steps. Dangerous Liaisons proposes a view on escalation that is based upon equivalencies. This view might appear to be counterintuitive but it captures the reasoning of policy makers. According to them an escalation would be triggered when the US launches an airstrike on Soviet missile sites in Cuba. This action would be responded to by the Soviet Union with an equivalent attack on American missile sites in Turkey. Not only is the Soviet attack equivalent to the American action, i.e. an airstrike as opposed to an invasion, but also the target is equivalent, i.e. missile sites as opposed to airfields. The Soviet attack is flown from the Soviet Union so that an equivalent American response is an airstrike on Soviet military installations on Soviet territory. This in turn creates an equivalence based upon which the Soviet Union would launch an attack on the United States. Thus, if one is interested in avoiding or limiting escalation one can use a simulation to explore which actions can be taken that avoid the establishment of certain equivalencies.
On deterrence
Since escalation is an important element in theories of deterrence, they also need to be reconsidered. The dilemma of nuclear deterrence is that nuclear war is tried to be avoided by threatening it, which casts doubt on the credibility of the threat. Making a nuclear threat credible requires that the use of nuclear weapons is understood to be a plausible alternative. A threat that is not plausible implies that the projected response does not fit the action it reacts to. To make a threat more credible requires that actions be taken that make the projected action fit better. However, this leads to a self fulfilling prophecy because when the use of nuclear weapons is the best fit to a previous action, it will be enacted for this very reason. The prescription of nuclear deterrence theory is thus very dangerous.
The practice of nuclear deterrence works differently, however. During the Cuban Missile Crisis both governments were anxious to avoid a situation in which the use of nuclear weapons would become a possible fit, let a alone the best fit. Contrary to raising the stakes by making their threats more credible, they tried to avoid that equivalencies be established that would trigger an escalation. They tried to get their missiles out of Turkey before they would attack Soviet missile sites in Cuba, because this would remove the equivalence based upon which the Soviets could retaliate. They did not react to the shoot down of a U 2 spy plane over Cuba to avoid that the Soviets would have to react in an equivalent manner. Both sides were afraid that they would steer a course on which the use of nuclear weapons would become the only response left. This implies that neither side considered the use of nuclear weapons to be a choice which runs counter to the very principle of rational choice upon which some of the most prominent deterrence theories are based. A major lesson to be drawn from the Cuban Missile Crisis - which after all is considered to be the case in which the world has come closest to a nuclear war - is that nuclear war is avoided by removing equivalencies.
On international crises
Finally, Dangerous Liaisons provides a new look at international crises that systematically incorporates threats to the national security, the possibility of war, and time pressure; the three defining elements of crises identified by the existing literature. International crises are conceived of as threat relationships, that is, a particular configuration of action sequences produces crisis-creating threats that persist, characterize, and constrain further interactions until they are either realized or undone. Not all threats create crises but only those that involve harm to the leadership, status, or prestige of a country. In the Cuban Missile Crisis they were instantiated by the deceptive deployment of Soviet missiles, and they were undone by a secret deal that involved the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in exchange for the withdrawal of American missiles in Turkey. Thus, the more general conclusion is that crisis-creating threats can be avoided if the leadership, status, or prestige of a country is not put to the test. Dangerous Liaisons provides the general framework to explore the conditions under which such threats are produced, but information of the specific context is required to determine exactly which actions can instantiate, or conversely, avoid them.
On threats
The notion of a threat relationship grows out of the general analytical framework that is based upon the very idea that any action gives rise to a range of possible responses. The mechanism by which war can break out has been identified as one of escalation that operates on the basis of equivalencies. The possibility of war can be avoided if those equivalencies are removed that allow retaliatory actions to be taken in equivalent places or by equivalent means. In the Cuban Missile Crisis they were military interventions in places equivalent to Cuba. What these equivalencies are in other situations depends again on their specific context.
On time
Since the general analytical framework of Dangerous Liaisons is intrinsically temporal in the sense that actions produce a range of possible responses as well as historical re-interpretations, time pressure can be explained as a function of possible responses that can be enacted before a certain action can be completed. However, the analysis has shown that time pressure is produced in many situations that are not crises, and that many instances in a crisis situation do not produce time pressure. Time pressure can generally be avoided if responses are planned well in advance but surprises due to discoveries or re-interpretations will continue to produce time pressure, but not necessarily crisis situations.
Next steps
Dangerous Liaisons can be extended in two ways. First by including more cases from different geographical regions and different time periods, the applicability of the general analytical framework grows wider and can cover more contexts. Second, by focusing on the fit between actions, a decision making model can be developed that explains the conditions under which certain responses fit better than others. Both extensions can be used as valuable heuristic devices for the development of policy recommendations as well as for training policy makers in crisis prevention and resolution.