Phase definition :

• Phase 1: Dispute Phase
• Phase 2: Crisis Phase
• Phase 3: Limited Violence Phase
• Phase 4: Massive Violence Phase
• Phase 5: Abatement Phase
• Phase 6: Conflict Settlement
  

Defining Characteristics of Conflict Phases
 

More detail about CEWS coding procedure ............................................

Implementation of the CEWS Research Program
 

The CEWS research project aims at providing "a positive, interdisciplinary, social scientific response to the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali's 'An Agenda for Peace'" which includes also that the expertise of practitioners and social scientists concerned with conflict early warning and preventive actions be brought together. (Report on the Inaugural Meeting of the Steering Committee of the CEWS Research Programme, p.1) The scientific study of conflict, its management and resolution is often removed from the experience of practitioners who are involved in these activities. Conversely, the expertise of practitioners is often not recorded and examined for a more general conceptualization of conflict management upon which a more effective anticipation of violent conflicts, and training and implementation of mediating efforts are based upon. (Report, p.5) The CEWS research program is thus situated at the intersection of academic research and policy formulation and aims at making a contribution to both. At the meeting of the CEWS Steering Committee in London in 1995 a number of general guidelines were agreed upon that inform the implementation of the CEWS Research Program.
 

1) A general concern was expressed regarding the mostly de-contexualized scientific inquiries into the creation and resolution of conflicts. A simple categorization of mediation efforts into successful and failed ones is unable to conceive of conflicts as being embedded in other conflicts, and is therefore also unable to capture the context of any given conflict. The resolution of a conflict can be regarded as a success if looked upon in isolation. However, if the deeper roots of the conflict continue to exist, the attribution of success and failure becomes more intricate. "The big story about complex, protracted communal conflicts is often one of several years, or decades in length - repeated failures in one or two phases, followed by surprising, often sudden successes, the results of complex interactions of processes at different levels, with overlapping but different participants, stakes, and time spans." (Report, p.7) The notion of conflict transformation is able to address the complexity of conflicts in that it captures "the reality that protracted conflicts are more often transformed to new stages in a possibly cyclic process" (Report, n.2, p.7). By adopting the notion of conflict transformation, the CEWS research program is required to conceptualize how conflicts are embedded in underlying conflicts, and thus how mediation efforts relating to a conflict affect or are contingent upon the conflict in which it is embedded. However, conflict transformation refers to two related but conceptionally distinct aspects of conflicts. On the one hand, conflict transformation is used to describe the transition of one conflict phase to another. This implies that conflict is conceived of as a structured interaction between groups whereby the structure consists of a certain number of phases. Various combinations of conflict phases produce different conflict trajectories and thus describe different conflict cycles. On the other hand, conflict transformation is used to describe the re-interpretation of conflict histories. This implies that conflict is conceived of as symbolic interaction between groups whereby the symbols constituting the conflict can be re-arranged and produce different understandings about its phase structure, including what the conflict is about, when and by whom it was started, and what it requires to be resolved.
 

2) A related aspect is that the context in which conflicts unfold are often different depending on the parties' perspectives. In fact, the different conceptions of what a conflict is about can be at the root of a conflict, and can represent significant obstacles for its resolution. However, multiple perspectives are different from conflict transformations in the second sense in that each perspective can be conceived of in terms of conflict phases that can be re-arranged, i.e. a conflict trajectory can be re-interpreted in each perspective without needing the agreement of other participants to the conflict. The importance of multiple perspectives relates to the claim to recognition and/or legitimacy entailed in them, for the dominant interpretation of a conflict also determines the identity of the participants, and the possibilities for escalation, abatement, or resolution. As evoked at the CEWS meeting in London, "the empowerment of local actors as 'architects, owners and long-term stakeholders' in a sustainable peace process ... are particluarly suggestive about reliance on local cultural resources and a multi-level approach to peace-making, including grassroots, regional/sectoral leaders and top leadership." (Report, n.3)
 

3) Both senses of conflict transformation as well as multiple perspectives hint at the possibilistic conception of conflict that the CEWS Reseach Program has adopted. The combination of conflict stages into conflict trajectories enables to explore which other possible combinations can exist to produce different conflict trajectories. Similarly, the re-interpretation of past conflict phases is triggered by the formation of new oppositions that give rise to new possibilities for altering the trajectory of a conflict. Finally, the existence of multiple perspectives implies that several interpretations qua conflict trajectories are possible, and converging different perspectives appears to be an important aspect of conflict mediation. Hence, the very questions underlying the CEWS Research Program are what-if questions that require the exploration of an option space in which possible trajectories can unfold and in which mediators can attempt to prevent some options from being actualized and to contribute that other options are actualized. Gaming and the development of simulations and scenario-building is based on a long tradition and has been most usefully employed in teaching and training. (See also Report, p.8)
 

4) The CEWS Research Program aims at building a bridge between academic conflict resolution studies and practical conflict resolution efforts. This bridge is to be built on previous research and practical experience in order to demonstrate how knowledge cumulation can be achieved on the academic and the practical side, while being mutually beneficial. Many elements of conventional approaches to conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict transformation can be synthesized into a coherent analytical framework that is "built around the idea of a possibly repeating, multi-stage conflict cycle" (Report, p.5). Central to such a framework is the notion of conflict phases which has been used with slight variations by most scholars working in the field of conflict management/resolution. The cumulation of practical conflict resolution efforts can be achieved by collecting narratives about different conflicts, in different geographical areas, from different authors. The collection of this material is not only useful for the establishment of a context-sensitive database for conflict mediation efforts, but it also represents the primary material to which the analytical framework developed by the CEWS Research Program is applied.
 

A Tentative Outline of an Analytical Framework of Conflict
 

The major aspect which we have adopted from the existing literature on conflict management/resolution is that conflict is structured in distinct phases. Yet, no agreement exists regarding the number of phases and their defining characteristics. The existing literature captures conflict transformations in the sense that one conflict phase moves to another conflict phase, and examines different conflict trajectories. However, the transition from one conflict phase to another has remained unexplored, and we thus cannot determine what accounts for a phase shift.⁽¹⁾

At this stage we are also unable to systematically examine conflict transformations in the sense of re-interpretations of conflict trajectories. The existing literature on conflict management/resolution is silent about this phenomenon, and we will have to look elsewhere for support. Discourse analysis that uses insights from linguistic theory proves to be a worthwhile avenue. Similarly, the possibilities for different conflict trajectories that multiple perspectives produce or exclude are understudied in the existing work on conflict management/resolution, and we have to base our thinking on other bodies of literature. Discourse analysis proves again a promising avenue.
 

In our discussions we have extracted a number of aspects that still needs to be synthesized into a coherent analytical framework. The phase structure we have agreed upon consists of six phases that can be combined in different ways. We have identified expectations, levels of violence, and recognition as defining characteristics of conflict phases. Expectations are usually not an indicator for the distinction of conflict phases in the existing literature. However, we argue that expectations are not only defining characteristics of conflict phases but also establish the connection between phases. We therefore provide an explanation for how conflict phases are positioned vis-a-vis each other which adds a first important contribution toward situating a conflict within its respective context. The occurrence and level of violence is a key defining characteristic in most of the existing literature. Our use of this indicator is motivated differently, however. We are not interested in distinguishing conflict phases by the number of casualties but we are rather interested in identifying how the use of violence is characteristic for particular conflict phases. For instance, the sporadic or incidental use of violence can produce more casualties than the regular and systematic use of violence, and yet, the regular and systematic use of violence suggests that the conflict has reached a level where forms of violence have become permissible or justifiable which could not have been justified at an earlier point. By focusing on the use of violence as opposed to the quantification of violence we make another important step toward a more contextualized treatment of conflicts. Finally, the importance of claims for recognition and legitimacy are included in some works on conflict management/resolution but not in those using phase structures. However, claims for recognition and legitimacy are not only always involved in conflict situations but they are very often at the root of the conflict itself. Also, the claim and denial for recognition and legitimacy is often at the basis of multiple perspectives on a conflict and successful conflict mediation needs to take account of these competing claims. By including claims for recognition and legitimacy we are able to address how the identity of participants in a conflict is defined, and how this definition affects the phase structure of a conflict.
 

Based on these explanations we can begin to spell out the key concepts of what is to become the analytical framework for the CEWS Research Program. In what follows I will describe the six phase conflict structure on which we have agreed including the various modifications we have made in the course of our discussions. This includes a further modification which derives from my attempt to develop systematic coding procedures for the three indicators: expectations, use of violence, and identity. My proposal rests on the use of these three indicators as essential properties of conflict phases with which we can uniquely identify each phase as a particular combination of expectations, use of violence, and identity.
 

The six conflict phases are:

Phase 1: Dispute Phase
Phase 2: Crisis Phase
Phase 3: Limited Violence Phase
Phase 4: Massive Violence Phase
Phase 5: Abatement Phase
Phase 6: Conflict Settlement
 

Phase 1: Dispute Phase

A dispute phase differs from a violence phase (regardless of whether low-level or high-level) by the absence of violence. It differs from the conflict settlement phase by the absence of a resolution of opposing claims. While these distinctions are fairly obvious, the difference to a crisis phase and an abatement phase, on the one hand, and to other forms of disputes, on the other hand, are more intricate.
 

We can distinguish a dispute from a crisis by the claims that are being made. Whereas in a dispute opposing claims do not call into question the legitimacy of one of the contenders, in a crisis the legitimacy of a contender is being challenged (i.e. in words and deeds). By legitimacy we are to understand the authority with which actions are justified to be permissible. By recognition we are to understand the acceptance of authority that endows actions with legitimacy. A dispute phase differs from other forms of disputes by the expectation of a crisis. For instance, disagreements do not fall within a dispute phase as long as the opposing claims made do not give rise to the expectation that as a next step one claim will be justified with the illegitimacy of the other claim, and thus the questioning of the other contender's authority. This implies that a disagreement is governed by "the rules of the game" which do not allow that the legitimacy of one of the contenders is called into question. However, if such a challenge becomes a possible expectation, also the "rules of the game" and thus the "game" itself is changed into an opening phase of what might lead to violent conflict.
 

We can distinguish an abatement phase from other conflict phases only with respect to the phase that is being abated. This implies that a dispute is abated if the opposing claims do temporarily no longer give rise to the expectation that the legitimacy of one of the opponents is challenged. Although the abatement of a dispute is indistinguishable from a disagreement if considered in isolation, the preceding dispute phase permits to identify a phase shift.⁽²⁾ Moreover, the abatement of a dispute phase differs from a settlement in that the opposing claims itself are not resolved but rather the way in which the claims are made has changed.
 

Starting from the dispute phase a conflict trajectory can lead to a crisis (Phase 2), an abatement (Phase 5), or to conflict settlement (Phase 6).⁽³⁾
 

Phase 2: Crisis Phase

A crisis phase is preceded by a dispute phase and cannot be at the beginning of a conflict. This follows from the previous discussion and is in agreement with the existing literature. A crisis phase differs from a violence phase (both, low-level and high-level violence) in that no or only sporadic or incidental violence occurs. This suggests that the use of violence is not yet regarded as the principal means to express, pursue, or contest claims. Sporadic or incidental violence merely indicates that the conflict has reached a stage where violence grows out of particular situations (e.g. riots, skirmishes across borders) or is planned and used only infrequently and only against individual targets (e.g. terrorist attacks, shoot-down of planes). However, a crisis phase is characterized precisely by the expectation that violence be used systematically on a limited or massive scale (Phase 3 or 4).
 

We can distinguish a crisis phase from its respective abatement phase by the temporary absence of violence as well as the temporary absence of expectations of systematic violence. In isolation, a crisis abatement phase is again indistinguishable from a dispute phase. However, the removal of expectations about the systematic use of violence permits to identify a phase shift.
 

From a crisis phase a conflict can lead to systemtic low-level violence (Phase 3), systematic massive violence (Phase 4), abatement (Phase 5), or conflict settlement (Phase 6).
 

Phase 3: Limited Violence Phase

A limited violence phase is characterized by the systematic use of violence. This implies that the use of violence has become a justifiable means to express, pursue, or contend claims which distinguishes this phase from a crisis phase. However, a limited violence phase differs from a massive violence phase in the way violence is used systematically. The limited use of violence implies that a contending party uses only part of its means of violence or uses its means of violence selectively in order to limit the number of casualties, and thus restrains itself from making more massive use of its violent potential. This self-restraint suggests that a more massive use of force would not be justified at this stage, although a more massive use of violence can be expected.⁽⁴⁾

Notice that contrary to previous conflict phases which had the expectation of the next conflict phase as a necessary defining characteristic, the expectation of a massive use of violence is not a necessary but a contingent characteristic for a limited violence phase; it is contingent on the specific context in which limited violence is used. For instance, during the Cold War a US intervention in Latin America was conceivable only on a limited scale - with the possible exception of Cuba. This definition of limited and massive violence allows to nicely address power differentials. What might be a limited use of violence for a Great Powers might be massive use of violence for a smaller power who has to bear the attack.
 

The abatement phase following a limited violence phase can be identified by the cessation of a systematic use of violence. However, sporadic and incidental violence can occur, e.g. a cease-fire that is not respected everywhere without being considered a violation of the cease-fire agreement.
 

From the low-level violence phase a conflict trajectory can move to massive violence (Phase 4), abatement (Phase 5), or conflict settlement (Phase 6).
 

Phase 4: Massive Violence Phase

A massive violence phase is also characterized by the systematic use of violence. This suggests that the use of violence has become a justifiable means to express, pursue, or contend claims which distinguishes this phase from a crisis phase. However, no restraints are put on the use of the available means of violence which distinguishes this phase from the previous one. Since our conception of a conflict phase structure is oriented around the most massive use of violence no other defining expectations can be identified. Rather, a massive violence phase is defined with respect to previous conflict phases and the massive use of systematic violence.
 

Consequently, an abatement of a massive violence phase is characterized by the cessation of a systematic use of violence, although a sporadic or incidental use of violence might still occur (e.g. skirmishes during a cease-fire). A shift back to a more limited use of violence is not possible, although the conflict can reach this phase again after having traversed an abatement phase.⁽⁵⁾
 

A massive violence phase can move to abatement (Phase 5) or conflict settlement (Phase 6).
 

Phase 5: Abatement Phase

Abatement is defined as a temporary halt on specific conflict phases. An abatement phase is defined with respect to the conflict phase which is temporarily stopped to proceed which implies that the defining characteristics of the respective conflict phase have to be absent. This does not imply that abatement is equal to shifting back to a previous conflict phase. Abatement rather characterizes a phase in which the conflict is in limbo. Depending on the conflict phase that is being abated the conflict can resume in the same or in another phase including the use of more violence or the settlement of the conflict.
 

*After the abatement of Phase 1 the conflict can be resumed in Phase 1 or Phase 2, or it can be settled in Phase 6.
*After the abatement of Phase 2 the conflict can be resumed in Phase 1 or Phase 2, or Phase 3, or it can be settled in Phase 6.
*After the abatement of Phase 3 the conflict can be resumed in Phase 1, Phase 2, Phase 3, or Phase 4, or it can be settled in Phase 6.
*After the abatement of Phase 4 the conflict can be resumed in Phase 1, Phase 2, Phase 3, or Phase 4, or it can be settled in Phase 6.
 

Phase 6: Conflict settlement

Conflict settlement is defined as a resolution of the opposition that has characterized the conflict. At the end of the conflict this opposition does not have to be identical to the one which had started the conflict. Transformations can account for why conflict settlements are often about claims that are different than the claims over which the conflict was started. The settlement of a conflict settlement suggests that no renewed conflict is expected. This absence of expectations about conflict distinguishes this phase from an abatement phase. However, the settlement of a conflict can result directly from violent conflict phases only if one of the parties is defeated. In all other circumstances the settlement of a conflict has to proceed first through an abatement phase.
 

Conflict settlement can follow:

Phase 1 if first followed by Phase 5
Phase 2 if first followed by Phase 5
Phase 3 if first followed by Phase 5 or if one party is defeated
Phase 4 if first followed by Phase 5 or if one party is defeated
 

The defining characteristics of conflict phases are represented in Table 1. Notice the last row of the table which demonstrates how types of conflict can be derived from the defining characteristics of conflict phases.
 

Table 1: Defining Characteristics of Conflict Phases
 

The combination of the six conflict phases produces a limited number of conflict trajectories. These trajectories are graphically represented in Figure 1.
 

Figure 1: Possible Conflict Trajectories

Endnotes

1. An adaptation of Abelson and Schank's notion of state-action might be useful but will have to be explored in greater detail. In a first step I will check whether their notion is compatible with and adjustable to the notion of conflict phases. If successful, I will then apply the state-action notion to the available conflict narratives in order to check its feasibility and usefulness. In a last step I will check whether Harff's accelerator model is compatible with the revised analytical framework in order to test the extent to which her data can be used to complement conflict narratives.

2. Notice how this conception is context-sensitive. We do not argue that an abatement phase is identified because it follows chronologically another conflict phase making the chronological order the only defining characteristic of abatement. Rather we argue that the expectations of another conflict phase are temporarily removed which not only connects an abatement phase to its respective conflict phase but also specifies what is being abated.

3. This differs from earlier versions which allowed violent phases to follow directly from a dispute phase. However, the systematic use of violence without a preceding crisis is not only difficult to conceive but also runs counter to the established literature in which a crisis is regarded at the space between peace and war. One could argue that a phase structure should start only with a crisis phase but this would exclude our interest in exploring how crises can be avoided.

4. A limited use of violence tends to produce a lower number of casualties than a massive use of violence, although this does not need to be the case. I argue that the distinction between the limited and massive use of violence is analytically more satisfactory. Moreover, to speak of low-level violence - as we have done so far - has also a belittling. You recall that drawing a distinction within a violence phase was warranted in order to take account of situations which are characterized by military operations that caused a number of casualties that is considerably smaller than the number of casualties produced by other operations. Our interest is thus much more focused on the kinds of operations that produce casualties than on the number of casualties per se. Moreover, if we are interested in preventing great numbers of casualties we need to know the kinds of operations that produce these numbers. A number alone does not even tell us whether it reflects a low or a high level of violence.

5. A situation in which a full-fledged war shifts back to a limited war is as difficult to imagine as a situation in which full-fledged genocide shifts back to persecution. It appears that renewed violence on a more limited scale, (e.g. air strikes against Iraq after the Gulf War, or pogroms against Tutsis after the genocide) has to move through an abatement phase first.