University of Southern California
School of International Relations

Dr. Peter Rosendorff

Associate Professor
School of International Relations & Department of Economics
Von KleinSmid Center, 341
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0037
(213) 740-3529
bpeter@usc.edu
Personal Web page: http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~bpeter/

Professor Rosendorff teaches courses in international political economy including international trade theory and policy, the economics of trade and monetary policy, and the politics of the world economy. Professor Rosendorff's research examines the linkages between domestic politics and institutions and international economic policy. His published work in the political economy of trade policy brings the methods of inquiry of modern economics to questions more traditionally posed by many IR scholars.

HONORS, AWARDS AND RESEARCH FUNDING

  • College Faculty Development Awards, University of Southern California 1999 - 2005
  • Principal Investigator, National Science Foundation, 1997-1998.
  • Fellow, College Award for Research Excellence, University of Southern California, 1997-1998 and 2001-2002.
  • Fellow, Zumberge Faculty Research and Innovation Fund, University of Southern California, 1993-1995 and 1999-2001.
  • Ph.D. Awarded with Distinction, Columbia University, 1993.
  • Research Fellow, Center for the Social Sciences, Columbia University, 1989-1992.
  • President's Fellow, Columbia University, 1986-1989.
  • Senior Bursar, University of the Witwatersrand, 1984-1985.
  • Bursar, Human Sciences Research Council, Johannesburg, South Africa, 1984-1985.

Journal Articles

  • Rosendorff, B. Peter and Charles M. Cameron, "A Signaling Theory of Congressional Oversight," Games and Economic Behavior, 1993, 5:44-70.
  • Rosendorff, B. Peter, "Voluntary Export Restraints, Anti-Dumping Procedure and Domestic Politics", American Economic Review, 1996, 86(3): 544-561.
  • Milner, Helen and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Trade Negotiations, Information and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups." Economics and Politics, 1996, 8(2): 145-189.
  • Milner, Helen and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Democratic Politics and International trade Negotiations: Elections and Divided Government as Constraints on Trade Liberalization," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1997, 41(1): 117-147.
  • Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies and International Trade Negotiations," American Political Science Review, 2000, 94(2): 305-322.
  • Rosendorff, B. Peter, "Choosing Democracy," Economics and Politics, 2001, 13(1): 1-29.
  • B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen Milner, "The Optimal Design of International Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape," International Organization, 2001, 55(4): 829-857.
  • Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Replication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade", American Political Science Review, 2002, 96(1):167-69.
  • Mansfield, Edward, Helen Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements," International Organization, 2002, 56(3):477-514.
  • Rosendorff, B. Peter and Todd Sandler, "Too Much of a Good Thing? The Proactive Response Dilemma", Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming.

Chapters in Books

  • Rosendorff, B. Peter, "Endogenous Trade Restrictions and Domestic Political Pressure" in Robert C. Feenstra, Gene M. Grossman and Doug Irwin, eds., The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Essays in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.
  • Milner, Helen and B. Peter Rosendorff, "A Model of the Two-Level Game," in Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
  • Milner, Helen and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Appendix: A Model of the Two-Level Game," in Helen Milner, Interests, Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997.
  • Milner, Helen, B. Peter Rosendorff and Edward D. Mansfield, "International Trade and Domestic Politics: The Domestic Sources of International Trade Agreements and Institutions" in Eyal Benvenisti and Moshe Hirsch, eds., The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation, NY: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming June/July 2004.
  • B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen Milner, "The Optimal Design of International Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape," in Barbara Koremenos, Duncan Snidal and Charles Lipson eds., "The Rational Design of International Institutions", Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. (Reprint of [7] above).

Book Reviews

  • Rosendorff, B. Peter. Review of Allan Drazen's "Political Economy in Macroeconomics", Journal of Economic History, 61(1): 245-247, March 2001.
  • Rosendorff, B. Peter. Review of Daniel W. Drezner's "Locating the Proper Authorities", Perspectives on Politics, forthcoming, 2004.

Manuscripts

  • Rosendorff, B. Peter and Barbara Koremenos, "Compliance Provisions: Information, Electoral Accountability and Democracy", 2004.
  • Rosendorff, B. Peter, "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Design of the WTO's Dispute Resolution Procedure," 2003, under review.
  • Rosendorff, B. Peter, "Democracy and the Supply of Transparency", 2003, under review.
  • B. Peter Rosendorff, "Do Democracies Trade More Freely?" 2002.
  • Epstein, David and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Separate Powers and the Political Economy of Resource Dissipation," 2001.

Education

Ph.D. (Economics, with Distinction), Columbia University, New York
M.Phil., Economics, Columbia University
M.A. Economics, Columbia University
B.A. (Honours), Economics, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
B.Sc., Mathematics, University of the Witwatersrand.