

Theories of War

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Class Meetings:	M W 2-3:20pm	Email:	profmanning@yahoo.com
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This seminar will introduce you to a selective yet substantial portion of the extensive and contested literature on the origins and conduct of war in the contemporary international system. The theories of war we will explore, and become fluent with, will focus primarily on the first and third levels of analysis – the outbreak of war stemming from psychological factors and from variance in key dynamics and attributes of the international system. Over the course of the fifteen week semester, you will be introduced to about one dozen different theoretical approaches to the study of this complex phenomenon. In addition to the traditional literature from the fields of Diplomatic History and International Security, we will also draw upon several fields within Psychology in order to understand the complex phenomenon of war in the contemporary age.

Any class on the theories of war must necessarily omit some very important scholarship. Rather than touching upon a few theoretical approaches and filling the rest of the schedule with historical narratives on specific wars – each of which is complicated enough to spend half a semester on – this course endeavors to introduce you to as many of the leading theoretical contributions in our field and leave the historical narratives to your own independent research papers. The rationale behind this decision is that by the time you have reached your current level of training, you will have been introduced to many of the more prominent wars in the modern era but the same cannot be said about theories of war. Each war is unique and yet there are some important continuities. Learning about different theories and how to construct your own will empower you to be able to explain and understand future wars without having to risk making very faulty analogies so common in the media and among government officials (e.g., “The Iraq War is just like Vietnam...” – which it most assuredly is not, despite some surface similarities).

As a 400-level course, the nature of our meetings will be similar in style to graduate seminars. You will be expected to read each assigned reading carefully and arrive at our meeting prepared to engage the readings and one another in a respectful, sophisticated and enlightening manner. Many of our meetings will begin in a traditional lecture format but shift into a discussion-based format for the collective enlightenment. I am quite prepared to drone on for the forty-five hours we will spend together this semester but such a pedagogical style, education researchers have shown repeatedly, is significantly less enlightening and fulfilling for all involved. In short, you will get out of this course what you put in to it.

For those attending graduate or law school in the near future, you will find the expectations and requirements significantly greater than your undergraduate years. The required readings for *each course* may exceed 500 pages *each week*. Many graduate courses only have a research paper, some have several in the same semester, with no midterm examinations. I am providing this forewarning not to scare you away from pursuing an advanced degree, only that you will be at a severe disadvantage if you wait until then to start “picking up your game”. I will not be assigning 500 pages of reading each week and 60% of your grade will be determined by means other than your research paper. Still, I will hold very high expectations for each one of you, regardless of whether you will be attending graduate school or enrolled in this course because you wanted to learn about war. As you are attending one of the nation’s elite research universities, you will be held to the same standards as your contemporaries at Harvard, Stanford and MIT. Do not take this as a scare-tactic or a ‘warning’ – take it as a challenge to rise to the level your professors and this University know you are capable of attaining. According to USC, the following letter grades signify the following descriptions of your scholarship:

- A signifies “outstanding” work
- B signifies above average work
- C signifies *average* work
- D signifies below average work
- F signifies unsatisfactory work

Below you will find more details on the research paper assignment, but for now suffice it to say that it is a very significant portion of your grade and should be approached in a serious, energetic manner. It is unlikely that you will earn a high score on this paper if you do not begin early in the semester. When I sit down to read and evaluate your research paper, I will anticipate the kind of paper one would be able to write in the course of two or three months.

Constituent Elements of Your Final Grade:

10	Attendance, Effort and Participation	A-	90	92	C	73	76
20	Midterm Examination	B+	87	89	C-	70	72
30	Final Examination	B	83	86	D+	67	69
40	Research Project *	B-	80	82	D	63	66
	(see description below)	C+	77	79	D-	60	62

Required Readings: Course reader will be available at the Magic Machine (UV). *Any supplemental reading assigned will, unless otherwise noted, also be considered required reading.* There are no required textbooks for this course. Instead, you will need to purchase the course reader and download all articles listed with “Jstor” at either our course website or www.jstor.org. Many of the seminars will only have a relatively short article (25-40 pages in length) that you must read prior to our meeting. Whereas many 400-level courses assign more and longer readings, I have decided to limit the assigned readings so you can read each carefully, take good notes on them and come to our seminars *fully prepared to discuss analytically* the topic and assess the author’s theoretical contribution to the study of war.

Research Paper: Although you will have considerable latitude in determining the specific focus of your semester research project, it must be consistent with the themes of this course. You will need to make a firm decision on your topic by **27 September** at the latest, at which time you will email me a 150 word research abstract. In your research abstract you should obviously identify the topic of your research and state clearly your initial sense of what theoretical approach you will be take. Any significant changes to the contents of this abstract must be approved by me. No significant changes will be allowed after **16 October**. The final version of your research paper will be due before you leave for Thanksgiving break, i.e., on **22 November**. This paper must not exceed 22 pages, including executive summary, text, bibliography, maps and charts. An “A” paper could well be only 17 pages and one who turns in a 20 page paper could easily earn a “C” – i.e., length of paper is not necessarily highly correlated with the grade you receive.

The research paper must focus on the causes, avoidance, conduct or termination of a specific war (or in the matter of war avoidance, a confrontation/crisis). The research paper must be significantly more than a historical narration of the selected war. Research papers that do not formulate, develop and test/apply well-constructed theories of war are not acceptable.

You need to conduct rigorous, independent and substantial *library* research. While you are allowed to use articles and books assigned in this course, it is absolutely required that you go well beyond the required readings. Moreover, internet sources, even those from “reputable” sites must be kept to a bare minimum. The internet can be a very useful tool for “preliminary searches”, i.e., when you have selected a topic and want to ensure that there are sufficient sources, type in several manifestations of your paper topic into the Amazon.com or www.jstor.org search engine, write down the titles of these books and head for VKC Library. In some cases you may need to request inter-library loans through the reference librarians, so you will need to start early in order to leave time for the requested books to arrive. At least 75% of your research citations must come from books, academic journals, memoirs, biographies, primary sources (e.g., government documents, transcripts of NSC meetings, intra-governmental memoranda, letters between foreign leaders, post-operation reports). In addition to the primary sources available in the VKC Library, you are encouraged to search the websites of the presidential archives (e.g., www.jfklibrary.org) as many of these libraries are making de-classified documents available for free downloading.

Research Presentation: Each student will give a 10 minute “mini-lecture” during a five session period towards the end of the semester (01 November though 15 November). The ten minute limitation will be strictly, but reasonably, enforced. *You must not “read” your presentation!!!!* Outline your presentation in any style you prefer but one standard option is provided below. A randomized schedule of presentations will be drawn on 30 October, so everyone must be prepared to present on **01 November**, even though you might not be presenting until 15 November. If you will be unable to attend seminar during any of these sessions, you must notify me prior to 30 October. If you are assigned to be the oral critic and find yourself absolutely unable to attend seminar that day, you must make arrangements with a classmate who has not already served in that capacity. If you are assigned to provide a written critique (see below for description of these two roles) and are unable to attend that day, you must email your review/critique to him/her *and* to me by 2pm that afternoon.

Each student will receive one written critique and one oral (in-class) critique of his/her research. The written critic must be provided a full copy of your rough draft by **30 October**. For this critic, your rough draft is *required reading*. He/she must read it carefully and provide a 2-3 page critique of its theoretical contribution, style and analysis, concluding with expanded bullet points of how you might strengthen your paper. A copy of this written critique must be turned in to me at the same time the reviewer presents the critique to the researcher on the day of his/her presentation. The in-class reviewer will base his/her comments, challenging questions and suggestions on the presented research – i.e., he/she will be critiquing the theoretical coherence of your argument or the strength and validity of your analysis/findings, not the presentation itself. Each student will have one opportunity to serve in the role of written critic and one opportunity to serve as an in-class critic/reviewer. The researcher must carefully attend to the two critiques when revising the paper prior to submission on 22 November. Thus, you should consider the research presentation as an opportunity to get feedback on your theoretical interpretation and thereby improve the quality and soundness of your research. The research presentation constitutes 20% of your research grade. The presenter is strongly encouraged to take notes on the critique and ask for clarification from the critics immediately after class while all is fresh.

Outline for your ten minute research “mini-lecture”

I. Introduction

You will want to quickly establish your foundation – what is the war you studied and who were the major combatants. This section should be about a minute, two at most.

II. General Theory

Introduce the principal theory you used to study/analyze your case, being sure to cast it in the generalized form (saving application to the next section). For example, “When leaders are confronted by an international crisis, they can be expected to experience profound emotion and/or stress. These affective phenomena, psychologic research has found, can dramatically alter the decisionmaking behavior of leaders from the “normal” range of the pre-crisis environment.” Some of you may use the same theory to explain different cases. Do not worry about the two or three of you sounding repetitive.

III. Applied Theory

This section should summarize the application of the general theory to explain your case. Place your observations in the context of this theory and show how the application of this theory helps to “solve the mystery” of why nations X and Y went to war, for instance.

IV. Conclusion

This relatively brief section should provide you an opportunity to assess the validity of the theory, suggesting areas/problems that remain unanswered because they fall outside the scope or focus of the theory. Suggesting ways that you could improve the theory or perhaps noting that the theory was inadequate for the task would be a good idea.

Monday, 21 August

Introduction to the course and each other

On this, the first day of the fall semester, we will preview the themes and objectives of IR 402. Given that this is a small seminar-style course which requires active participation and the collective facilitation of deeper understanding about the causes of war, each student will introduce him/herself and state his/her interests. Every student will have his/her picture taken so as to allow me to learn your name and relate to you as “Emma” rather than “student #13”. *Failure to have your picture taken by 28 August will result in the loss of 5 points.*

Wednesday, 23 August

Introduction to war in all of its glorious manifestations

What is this phenomenon we refer to as war? What conceptual or empirical parameters must be set before we can systematically and fruitfully study war? Many scholars try to adhere to the standard of 1000 battlefield deaths before one can classify the conflict as a “war”, but under this definition some conflicts we refer to as “wars” would not qualify. What about civilian deaths? Is it best if we simply use descriptive modifiers (e.g., limited, civil, world or proxy war) to categorize the thousands of conflicts in order to make any real sense of this phenomenon? At what point does the number of modifiers make the general category meaningless? Are the wars of the nuclear era significantly different than the wars of the 18th century? That is, has the phenomenon of war evolved or remained fairly consistent across the centuries? This afternoon’s seminar will take a first cut at developing a sophisticated understanding of war in all of its glorious manifestations.

C.R. John Vasquez. 1993. Conceptualizing War. In *The War Puzzle*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pages 14-50.

Monday, 28 August

Framing, testing and applying theories of war

If we are to accomplish our objective of developing and testing various prominent theories of war, we must first understand the core notions of theory development in International Relations. The readings assigned for this seminar may not be the most colorful and fascinating readings we will consume this semester but the principles the authors have to share with you and our discussion this afternoon will be very important over the course of the semester and certainly with respect to your research paper. Throughout the course, seriously reflect upon the authors’ theories, evaluating them on how well or how poorly they adhered to the principles outlined in the assigned readings.

C.R. Stephen Van Evera. 1997. Hypotheses, Laws and Theories. In *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Pages 7-48.

C.R. Kenneth Waltz. 1979. Laws and Theories. In *Theory of International Politics*. Reading: Addison-Wesley. Pages 1-17.

Wednesday, 30 August

Levels of analysis

You may have already been introduced to the levels of analysis framework, but this categorization scheme is of such great importance that it is essential you have a firm grasp of its purpose and objectives. As you will see over the course of the semester, the phenomenon of war is so complex that in order for scholars to have any hope of studying it systemically and rigorously, we need to establish some order in the cacophony of empirical data. The causes of war are many so compartmentalizing them into three levels of analysis will greatly assist you in understanding and explaining why certain wars broke out and also be on the look out for disturbing changes in key first, second or third level variables now and in the future.

[Jstor](#) J. David Singer. 1961. The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations. *World Politics* 14.1 Pages 77-92.

[Jstor](#) Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack. 2001. Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In. *International Security* 25:4 Pages 107-146.

Monday, 04 September

Labor day – class will not meet this afternoon

This weekend would be a good time to spend some time in the library in order to select the war you wish to examine in your research paper. The decision to use a given theory can come later.

Wednesday, 06 September

Perception, misperception and war

One may justifiably criticize the Bush administration and the U.S. intelligence services for sounding the alarm about the phantom “weapons of mass destruction” in Iraq prior to the invasion in March 2003, but when approached in a more thoughtful manner, a manner more appropriate for learned individuals, a more sophisticated analysis becomes possible. Why was the U.S. “surprised” by Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941? Why did Stalin order the “silencing” of those high-level intelligence officials warning of a German attack on the USSR in June 1941? Perception is at the very core of how humans (and by extension nation-states) behave towards one another. Today’s and the next seminar are dedicated to exploring the cognitive causes of war. Exploring how leaders think, process information and construct a “definition of the situation” will be critical steps in your understanding of the “causes” of war.

[Jstor](#) Jack Levy. 1983. Misperception and the Causes of War: Theoretical Linkages and Analytical Problems. *World Politics* 36.1 Pages 76-99.

Monday, 11 September

Perception, misperception and war

[Jstor](#) Robert Jervis. 1988. War and Misperception. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18.4 Pages 675-700.

Wednesday, 13 September

Emotion, psychological stress and war

The study of war, inquiries into the causes of armed conflict between nation-states, explorations into the conduct and termination of wars have been dominated by diplomatic historians and political scientists with little scholarly interest in the influence of emotion. It is too hard, perhaps even impossible to rigorously study such an internal, transitory psychological phenomenon and propose, let alone test, the validity of the hypotheses relating discrete emotions or psychological stress with decisions of war and peace. Several scholars, including I, have periodically questioned this bias against emotions and other “less than rational” drivers of human behavior. The next few sessions will have us marching against the grain and seriously considering what is a commonsense proposition for many laypersons – it is consequential whether a leader is consumed with anger, paralyzed with fear, shaking with anxiety or frenzied with frustration. Your own self-reflection should lead you to realize that when you are experiencing these unique emotions, you think and behave differently than when experiencing one of the other emotions. Why a nation went to war against another most assuredly is not 100% dependent upon the fact that President X was angry, but one would be in denial of human nature to suggest that his or her anger was of little or no significance in such a fateful decision.

Jstor Neta Crawford. 2000. The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships. *International Security* 24.4 Pages 116-156.

WEB Andrew Manning. 2006. When the going gets tough: Propositions on stress, appraisal and coping in international crises. *Manuscript*, to be presented at the International Studies Association (West) annual conference, Las Vegas, Nevada, 27-30 September.

Monday, 18 September

Emotion, psychological stress and war

No new readings will be assigned for this afternoon’s seminar.

Wednesday, 20 September

More time on the couch: psychoanalytic theories of war

When Albert Einstein proposed a meeting of the prominent intellectuals after the First World War to find a solution to this horrible scourge of international life, he contacted Sigmund Freud. The first reading for this afternoon’s seminar is their written correspondence. Psychoanalytic perspectives on questions of war and peace may have become marginalized from the mainstream of our field but seeing as how the dominant theories and prescriptions have not found a cure to this human malady, perhaps it is time to reconsider this alternative perspective.

C.R. Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud. Exchange of Correspondence on War. In William Evan, ed. *War and Peace in an Age of Terrorism*. Boston: Pearson. Pages 208-215

C.R. William Caspary. 1993. New Psychoanalytic Perspectives on the Causes of War. *Political Psychology* 14. Pages 417-446.

Monday, 25 September

Anthropological and psycho-biological theories of war

What if aggression is deeply rooted in human nature, that we are somehow predisposed to resort to violence when we feel wronged, when we feel our “vital national interests” have been unduly threatened? If this is the case for humanity, then one should not be criticized for feeling somewhat pessimistic about the future. In fact, one would wonder why he/she should spend time studying IR to learn about war when our time might be better spent studying anthropology or biology. Does Berkowitz’s chapter challenge the traditional Freudian assertions successfully? What common conclusions/implications for public policy do Berkowitz and Mead share?

C.R. Leonard Berkowitz. 1990. Biological Roots: Are Humans Inherently Violent? In Betty Glad, ed. *Psychological Dimensions of War*. Beverly Hills: Sage Pages 24-40.

C.R. Margaret Mead. 2002. [1940]. Warfare is Only an Invention—Not a Biological Necessity. In Richard Betts, ed. *Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments on Causes of War and Peace*. Second edition. New York: Longman. Pages 165-169.

Wednesday, 27 September

Research paper

I will be presenting my latest research at an academic conference, thus will not be facilitating the seminar this afternoon. You are expected to read Marc Trachtenberg’s chapter and spend the afternoon getting significant progress done on your research paper.

C.R. Marc Trachtenberg. 2006. Writing it up. In *The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Pages 183-197.

NOTE: Research Paper Abstract must be emailed to me today!

Monday, 02 October

False optimism and the rush to war

The economy is growing strongly, one’s popularity is well in the range of assured re-election and the armed forces look formidable and well-equipped. Your neighbor, the nation whom your people have held a long deeply-held animosity towards is, in contrast, in a relatively weak position economically, domestically and militarily. The potential gains from conquest are substantial and your generals assure a quick, decisive victory. Three months into the campaign you find both sides deeply dug in with no end in sight. What went wrong? Perhaps one explanation is the dangerous sense of optimism one feels when optimistically viewing one’s chances as significantly greater than one’s adversary. The parallel between the above scenario and the invasion of Iraq should lead you to attend to the readings and this seminar with a skeptical yet inquisitive mind.

C.R. Geoffrey Blainey. 1988. *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press. Pages 35-56.

Wednesday, 04 October

Falling poll numbers.... let's invade Canada!

Years ago there was a somewhat amusing movie entitled “*Wag the Dog*” which depicted the president declaring war on Albania in order to divert attention from a potentially devastating sex scandal just prior to the election. In nearly every conflict when the nation’s finest young men and women don their battle fatigues and grab their rifles, the nation rallies behind the president and his poll numbers seem to go up markedly and many citizens are more than willing to give him “the benefit of the doubt” during the crisis. Is it a diversion, grabbing the public’s attention away from a failing economic plan, civil strife, poor leadership and other problems or is this assumed relationship between use of force and “rallying ‘round the flag” merely a myth?

C.R. Jack Levy. 1989. The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique. In Manus Midlarsky, ed. *Handbook of War Studies*, Boston: Unwin Hyman. Pages 259-288.

Monday, 09 October

Review of the course thusfar

This is an open seminar to be used if (1) we are behind schedule or (2) you feel the need to review the theories of war thusfar examined.

Wednesday, 11 October

Midterm examination

Bring two LARGE blue books and two blue or black ink PENS. Under no circumstances should you use one of those small blue books or complete an examination in pencil. Write legibly and answer each question thoroughly. While this examination will not be written until just before the 11th of October, it is likely that the format will be short-answer questions, perhaps a few fill-in-the-blank questions, definitions and perhaps one longer essay.

Monday, 16 October

Systemic/structural causes of international conflict

By this point in the semester it should be quite obvious to you that there are many, perhaps too many, proximate and distal causes of armed conflict between sovereign states. After considering the influence of psychological phenomena, it is now time to consider one of the most insightful approaches to war – the belief that the dynamics within and the structure of the international system are two of most powerful explanations for why nations have go to war.

Jstor Kenneth Waltz. 1988. The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*. 18. 4 Pages 615-628.

Jstor Patrick James. 1995. Structural Realism and the Causes of War. *Mershon International Studies Review* 39.2 Pages 181-208.

Wednesday, 18 October

Power transition and hegemonic theories of war

The distribution of power is forever in flux, with some states growing, others stagnating and still others falling behind in the struggle for power. When the hegemon is overtaken by a challenger or when a great power struggles with another to maintain its lead is war more or less likely? Does it matter *who* the powers in question are, what kind of relationship – trade, diplomatic, military – they had prior and the transition? Assuming history will remain consistent that the US will someday be overtaken by China, e.g., are we to expect a war to occur at that time?

[Jstor](#) Robert Gilpin. 1988. The Theory of Hegemonic War. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18.4 Pages 591-613.

[Jstor](#) Woosang Kim. 1992. Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo. *World Politics* 45.1 Pages 153-172.

Monday, 23 October

Offense, defense and the likelihood of war

When technological advances in military hardware or developments in strategic thought favor significantly the offense over the defense, some believe the likelihood of escalation and war are higher than when defense is dominant. This prominent theory is a favorite of those who seek to explain the onset of the First World War. Looking at the world situation today, is offense or defense dominant? Can the US or its adversaries alter the balance unilaterally or collectively?

[Jstor](#) Stephen Van Evera. 1998. Offense, Defense and the Causes of War. *International Security*. 22.4 Pages 5-43.

Wednesday, 25 October

Alliances, balancing and bandwagoning

Now that the Soviet Union is resting peacefully in the dustbin of history and the US reigns supreme over the international system, alliance cohesion in some cases is showing signs of decay. Why do some nations seek close alliance with the major military power while other similarly positioned states seek coalitions to balance against the dominant nation-state or empire? Why are balancing or bandwagoning decisions made and what are the implications for the potential and perhaps actualized threat of war? This seminar is not intended to explore directly the causes of war but rather how and why nations align with others to deter war and domination.

[Jstor](#) Brett Ashley Leeds. 2003. Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes. *American Journal of Political Science* 47.3 Pages 427-439.

[Jstor](#) Stephen Walt. 1985. Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. *International Security*. 9.4 Pages 3-43, especially 3-26.

Monday, 30 October

Arms races and the rush to war

When adversarial nations enter into an arms race – conventional or nuclear – is the likelihood of war heightened? Many scholars over the years believe ever-increasing stockpiles of arms push nations to transform their antagonism into belligerency once they have accumulated more arms than their principal adversary or have gained a significant leap in strength, e.g., when the U.S. developed and deployed multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles on their nuclear missiles years before the Soviets mastered this technological feat. War, of course, did not break out between the superpowers in the early 1970s, but one would be premature in dismissing the arms race theory for there are many instances when general war did follow an exhaustive and impassioned arms race, e.g., the First World War. What is the essence of this theory – could arms races and war be caused by a third variable – i.e., is their relationship spurious? What policy implications might flow from this theory's confirmation or disconfirmation?

Henk Houweling and Jan Siccama. 1981. The Arms Race-War Relationship: Why Serious Disputes Matter. *Arms Control* 2. Pages 157-197.

From Wednesday, 01 November through 15 November students will present tentative findings and theoretical frameworks. This component of the course is elaborated extensively above. Come prepared to present your research on 01 November. Each day we will have 4-5 research presentations (10 minutes each).

Monday, 20 November

Why Goliath loses to David....

The Soviet Union invaded the relatively minor power of Afghanistan in 1979. Nearly ten years later she cut her losses and brought her troops back home. Several years prior, the United States retreated from its long bloody engagement in Vietnam. Over two centuries ago, the world's most dominant power (Great Britain) acknowledged defeat to the poorly equipped rebels of the Continental Army. If superior manpower and superior weaponry have long been considered the keys to military success, why do we see clearly dominant powers be defeated by weaker, often poorly trained or coordinated and equipped nations or insurgencies?

[Jstor](#) Ivan Arrenguín-Toft. 2001. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. *International Security* 26.1 Pages 93-128.

[Jstor](#) Andrew Mack. 1975. Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict. *World Politics* 27.2 Pages 175-200.

One of the principle beliefs driving the Bush Doctrine and the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Iran in the near future?), is the notion that the spread of democracy, especially into troubled regions like the Middle East will usher in a millennia of peace and commerce. Democracies, it has been shown many times, tend not to fight or engage in acute international crises with other democracies. What about when the newly formed democracy, like Iraq, is weak, surrounded by adversaries and desperately trying to suppress an aggressive insurgency? While we are unlikely to come to any definitive answers, acquiring deeper knowledge and understanding of this prominent theoretical debate will assist you significantly in understanding the current direction of the United States and several of her key allies.

[Jstor](#) Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder. 1995. Democratization and the Danger of War. *International Security* 20. Pages 5-38.

[Jstor](#) Andrew Enterline. 1996. Driving While Democratizing. [Followed by Mansfield and Snyder's response to his critique] *International Security* 20. Pages 183-196, 199-207.

The last war fought between major powers concluded over sixty years ago. This fact, coupled with many fearing a US-USSR apocalyptic confrontation during the Cold War that never, despite expectations, materialized, led some distinguished scholars in our field to make the bold suggestion that major power war was a thing of the past, never to be revisited again. Certainly they are not suggesting war as an institution has been made obsolete, but general wars similar to the world wars of the 20th century are unlikely to occur again. If major power war is obsolete, will *Theories of War* be handed over to the History Department? If these scholars are right, what are some "real world" implications and ramifications for IR theory in general?

[Jstor](#) John Mueller. 1998. The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World. *International Security* 13.2. Pages 55-79.

[Jstor](#) Carl Kaysen. 1990. Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay. *International Security* 14. Pages 42-64.

As a fitting topic for the culmination of this semester long excursion into the causes of war, we will spend this afternoon examining the causes of peace. Are there lessons to be learned that can be applied to the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Can the cessation of hostilities be managed in such a way as to ensure the subsequent peace will be enduring and beneficial to the former belligerents?

[Jstor](#) Berenice Carroll. 1969. How Wars End: An Analysis of Some Current Hypotheses. *Journal of Peace Research* 6.4. Pages 295-321.

[Jstor](#) Tansa George Massoud. 1996. Review Essay: War Termination. *Journal of Peace Research* 33.4 Pages 491-496.

[Jstor](#) William Fox. 1970. Causes of Peace and Conditions of War. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 392. Pages 1-13.