

ECONOMIC BARGAINING THEORY AND PRACTICE

IR 550, Spring 2006
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Complete thru week 8

Frequent negotiations between governments, international organizations, companies, and other nongovernmental actors are central in determining what globalization and global governance mean for people. But what happens in these negotiations? What determines their outcomes? Could the negotiators do better? In this seminar you will study diverse theoretically-oriented research on the process of international negotiation over economic issues and will practice generating your own hypotheses and designing projects. Most of the analytical ideas studied and skills developed also apply to negotiations outside the economic realm. This is an arena in which to improve both theory and practice of international relations.

The seminar assumes prior study of undergraduate economics, the doctoral Politics and IR core curriculum, and IR 541. If you have not taken these prerequisites, please speak to the teacher. As you read, look for ideas you might use in your course project or later. The major assignment is to submit a research paper or advanced proposal at the end of the term. While this seminar is designed primarily for doctoral candidates, an MA candidate may opt to submit a different type of research paper. In the final grade, short assignments will be weighted 15% and the final paper 85%. Papers will be accepted up to one week late but penalized one letter grade. Supplementary readings are not required. To find periodical articles in full text on line, view the USC home page; at the bottom click Library Resources; on left margin click e-resources; on right margin click full text resources; search or browse for the title of your periodical; and search the database for the article. A network of researchers writing about this subject, with some of the latest papers, can be found at www.usc.edu/enn.

SCHEDULE OF ASSIGNMENTS

I. INTRODUCTIONS

1. 1/12 The negotiation analysis tradition

C. Jönsson. 2002. Diplomacy, Bargaining, and Negotiation. In *Handbook of International Relations*, 212-34 (on Blackboard). A convenient summary and assessment of accumulating results of the negotiation analysis research program. Note how it has defined the negotiation process.

Supplementary:

International Negotiation 9 (2004) and 10 (2005), 2 special issues on methods of negotiation research

R. Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld, and McKersie. 1994. *Strategic Negotiations: A Theory of Change in Labor-Management Relations*

J. Lax and J. Sebenius. 1986 *The Manager as Negotiator*

H. Raiffa. 1982. *The Art and Science of Negotiation*

Zartman, I.W. and M. Berman. 1982. *The Practical Negotiator*

R. Walton & R. McKersie. 1965. *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations*

2. 1/19 Ideas from game theory

A. Many IPE specialists have not read the negotiation analysis literature. Say “bargaining” to U.S. economists or political scientists and a majority will think “game theory.” This week samples from studies that rely on this method in some way to introduce the way of thinking about process associated it. Most IR applications have been to security rather than economic bargaining, paradoxically. Schelling is foundational for all IR. Prepare to report orally on the main points of each required title, with your evaluation of its strengths and shortcomings. For greater depth, consult supplements and Professors Todd Sandler and Peter Rosendorff.

1. Schelling, T. [1960] 1980. *The Strategy of Conflict*, chaps. 1-4. These chapters are the same in all editions.

2. Wriggins, H. 1976. "Up for Auction: Malta Bargains with Great Britain," in *The 50% Solution*, ed. I. W. Zartman, pp. 208-234. Can you apply any of Schelling's ideas to interpret the negotiation process in this case?

3. Fearon, J. June 1994. Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: an empirical test of a crisis bargaining model. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38:236-69. Could any of Fearon's ideas be relevant for an economic negotiation?

4. Mansfield, E., H. Milner, B. P. Rosendorff 2000. “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade.” *Am.Pol.Science.Review* 94:305-22. In this article what contribution does game theory make? What is your evaluation of the article?

B. Review or read Odell, “Case Study Methods in IPE,” on my home page under “publications,” for ideas about possible research methods to use in your proposal exercises. Note that selecting one or a few cases and rejecting many other candidates is a decisive step in any research design using case studies.

C. Turn in a one or two page proposal (to be graded) for a new concrete empirical research project about the economic negotiation process. Either choose a hypothesis from this week's readings, or show otherwise that you understand the basic reasoning

about strategic interaction that is illustrated in these works. As for form, all your proposals should provide (a) a specific research question about negotiation, (b) some specific recognized method to answer it (from “Case Study Methods” or any other source), (c) some specific empirical domain (place, time, issue area) from which to gather information; and (d) a provisional hypothesis (a generalization) that you think might be confirmed. Assume a team of assistants and all the resources you need. An illustrative proposal will be distributed in class.

Supplementary:

Evolutionary Game Theory. Summer 2003. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. //plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/game-evolutionary/

Raiffa, H., J. Richardson, D. Metcalfe. 2002. *Negotiation Analysis*. How NA differs from most game theory, according to one of the founders of GT and of NA.

Fearon, J. and A. Wendt. 2002. Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View. In *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. W. Carlsnaes, 52-72

Allan, Pierre, and Cédric Dupont. 1999. International Relations Theory and Game Theory: Baroque Modeling Choices and Empirical Robustness. *International Political Science Review* 20:23-47.

Powell, R. 1998. Bargaining Theory and International Conflict. *Annual Review of Political Science* 5:1-30. (war as seen through game models)

Aggarwal, V. 1996. *Debt Games*.

Martin, L. 1992. *Coercive Cooperation*

Conybeare, J. 1988. *Trade Wars*

Oye, K., ed. 1985. *Cooperation under Anarchy*.

Young, Oran, ed. 1975. *Bargaining*, pp. 21-37, 129-44, 145-163

3. 1/26 **A synthetic framework for economic negotiation theory**

Study J. Odell, *Negotiating the World Economy* (ordered at the bookstore). What are two (or more) ways in which this book could have been better or a subsequent one could be better? Write 1 to 2 pages on these questions and turn them in at class (graded).

II. THE NEGOTIATORS' PROCESS

4. 2/2 **Subjective barriers and processes: psychological and constructivist theories**

A. Read or review:

1. Bazerman, M. and M. Neale, 1992, *Negotiating Rationally*, 1-66

2. Thompson, M. 1995. They Saw a Negotiation: Partisanship and non-partisan perspectives. *J. of Personality and Social Psychology* 68: 839-53.

3. Review Odell, *Negotiating the World Economy*, chaps 4 & 5.
4. Risse, T. 2000. "Let's Argue!": Communicative Action in World Politics. *IO* 54:1-40.
5. H. Farrell. 2003. Constructing the International Foundations of E-Commerce: The EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Arrangement. *International Organization* 57: 277-306.
6. Odell, J. 2002. Bounded Rationality and the World Political Economy. In *Governing the World's Money*, D. Andrews, R. Henning, and L. Pauly eds. On my home page. Could a single theory unify the psychological and the constructivist approaches?

B. Turn in a one-page research project outline beginning from an idea in or stimulated by something you read for this week.

Supplementary:

- Ulbert, C. and T. Risse. September 2005. Deliberately Changing the Discourse: What Does Make Arguing Effective. *Acta Politica* 40:351-67.
- Hurd, I. Summer 2005. The Strategic Use of Liberal Internationalism: Libya and the UN Sanctions, 1992-2003. *IO* 59:495-526
- Boyer, M., et al. March 2005. Negotiation as a Constructivist Process: Perceptual Assumptions and Negotiator Choice in Simulated International Negotiations. Presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, Honolulu.
- Acharya, A. Spring 2004. How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism. *IO* 58:239-276
- Johnston, A. I. 2001. Treating International Institutions as Social Environments *International Studies Quarterly* 45:487-516
- Thompson, L. L. 2001. *The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator*, 2d ed.
- Berejekian, J. 1997. The Gains Debate: Framing State Choice. *Am.Pol.Sci.Rev.* 91: 789-805.
- Levy, J. 1997. Prospect Theory, Rational Choice, and International Relations. *ISQ* 41:87-112
- Babcock, L. and G. Loewenstein 1997. Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases. *J of Econ. Perspectives* 11:109-26.

5. 2/9 The distributive strategy and process. Which tactics and conditions are most favorable for gains from this strategy? What falsifiable hypotheses have been proposed? What environmental conditions condition the choice and payoff of this strategy?

A. Review Malta & the UK, and *Negotiating the World Economy*, chap. 6.

B. Study the following:

1. Lax, D. and J. Sebenius. 1986. *The Manager as Negotiator*, chap. 6, 117-153 (or Walton & McKersie, chaps. II & III)
2. Bayard, T., and K. Elliott. 1994. *Reciprocity and Retaliation in US Trade Policy*, pp. 1-22, 51-97
3. Schoppa, Leonard J. 1999. The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining. *IO* 53: 307-42.
4. Sebenius, J. 1996. Sequencing to Build Coalitions: With Whom Should I Talk First? In R. Zeckhauser, ed. *Wise Choices*, 324-48.
5. Either J. Odell and S. Sell. Forthcoming 2006. Reframing the Issue: The Coalition on Intellectual Property and Public Health in the WTO, 2001. Or A. Narlikar and J. Odell. Forthcoming 2006. The Strict Distributive Strategy for a Bargaining Coalition: The Like Minded-Group in the World Trade Organization, 1998-2001. Both in *Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA*, ed J. Odell. On www.usc.edu/enn, under What's New.

C. Turn in a one-to-two page comparative research project outline beginning from an idea in something you read for this week.

Supplementary:

- Kirshner, J. 1995. *Currency and Coercion: The Political Economy of International Monetary Power*
- L. Shoppa. 1993. Two-level games and bargaining outcomes: why *gaiatsu* succeeds in Japan in some cases but not others. *IO* 47: 353-86
- Ryan, Michael P. 1991. Strategy and Compliance with Bilateral Trade Dispute Settlement Agreements: USTR's Section 301 Experience in the Pacific Basin. *Michigan Journal of International Law* 12, no. 4: 799-827.
- Hufbauer, G., J. Schott, and K. Elliott. 1990. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*.
- Odell, J.S. 1985. The outcomes of international trade conflicts. *ISQ*.
- Yoffie, David. 1983. *Power and Protectionism*
- Odell, J. S. 1980. Latin American trade negotiations with the United States. *IO* 34: 207-228.
- Liebert, et al. 1968. The Effects of Information and Magnitude of Initial Offer in Interpersonal Negotiation," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 4: 431-41.
- Walton, R., and R. McKersie. 1965. *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations*, chaps. II and III.

6. 2/16 The mixed-integrative strategy and process, including mediation.
What are some concepts for describing this process and which tactics and

conditions are most favorable for gains from a mixed-integrative strategy? What falsifiable hypotheses have been proposed?

A. Review the Jönsson 2002 essay and read:

1. Walton and McKersie 1965. *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations*, chs. IV & V (what do they mean by integrative bargaining, what is the process, what are the dilemmas?)
2. Lax, D. and J. Sebenius. 1986. *The Manager as Negotiator*, chap. 5.
3. Sebenius, J. 1992. Formal Individual Mediation and the Negotiators' Dilemma: Tommy Koh at the Law of the Sea Conference. In *Mediation in International Relations*, ed. J. Bercovitch & J. Rubin.
4. Review *NWE*, chap 7; Odell and Sell, Reframing the Issue; Farrell, Safe Harbor Arrangement.
5. Odell, J. 2006. Breaking Impasses in International Regimes: The WTO, Seattle and Doha. Unpublished manuscript on Blackboard.
6. Zartman, I.W. and M. Berman 1982. *The Practical Negotiator*, chap. 1, skim chaps 4-6 to grasp the main ideas of their 3 stage process; also in *NWE* p140.

B. Do psychological findings by Bazerman, Neale and Thompson suggest any moves or process that could reduce conflict and expand joint gains?

C. Turn in a one to two-page comparative research proposal beginning from an idea in something you read for this week.

Recommended:

- Tallberg, J. 2006. *Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union: The Power of the Presidency*.
- Murphy Ives, P. 2003. Negotiating Global Change: Progressive Multilateralism in Trade in Telecommunication Talks. *International Negotiation* 8:43-78.
- Raiffa, Richardson and Metcalfe. 2002. *Negotiation Analysis*, parts III and IV
- Friedheim, Robert L. 1999. Explaining Japan's Failure in the International Whaling Negotiations. In *International Negotiation*, eds. Berton, Kimura & Zartman, 151-190
- Bercovitch, J. 1996. Understanding Mediation's Role in Preventive Diplomacy. *NJ* 12: 241-58
- Sebenius, J. 1995. Dealing with Blocking Coalitions and Related Barriers to Agreement: Lessons from Negotiations on the Oceans, the Ozone, and the Climate. In *Barriers to Conflict Resolution*, ed. K. Arrow et al.
- Heckscher, Charles, and Lavinia Hall. 1994. Mutual Gains and Beyond: Two Levels of Intervention. *NJ* 10, no. 3: 235-48.

- Hampson, F. & M. Hart. 1994. *Multilateral Negotiations: Lessons from Arms Control, Trade and the Environment*
- Fisher, R. and W. Ury. 1981. *Getting to Yes*, chaps 1-5.
- Zartman, I.W.ed. 1974. *International Multilateral Negotiation: Approaches to the Management of Complexity*
- Mayer, Frederick W. 1992. Managing domestic differences in international negotiations: the strategic use of internal side payments. *International Organization* 46, no. 4
- Weber, S. 1991. *Cooperation and Discord in U.S. Soviet Arms Control* [forms of reciprocity]
- Rhodes, C. 1989. Reciprocity in trade: the utility of a bargaining strategy. *IO*

III. THE NEGOTIATORS' CONTEXT

7. 2/23 Markets and the official negotiation process

This family of hypotheses implies that in international economic negotiations, exogenous market conditions of several types will drive states' domestic politics, their policies, and in turn their external demands, reactions to others' positions, and negotiated outcomes.

- A. Review *Negotiating the World Economy*, chap. 3. Recall writings on changes and differences in world markets, including globalization and sectoral differences, from IR 541 and other courses.
- B. To go deeper, choose two of the three sections below. In those sections read each title marked with an asterisk. Also read one supplementary article from any section or a required one from the third section. The supplementary article will be selected in class. Prepare to summarize its findings and your evaluation orally for your classmates (not graded).
- C. Turn in a proposal (graded) for a new research project investigating a link between market conditions of some type and an aspect of either an international negotiation process or an outcome. This week, select from this literature a hypothesis that uses an economics idea, or invent a hypothesis using another economics idea. Make this a comparative project that uses quantitative data and statistical methods. If you are not sure whether needed data on the process or outcomes exist, spell out briefly what data you would like someone to create for this project.

I. Macroeconomic & monetary issues

- *Odell, J. 1988. From London to Bretton Woods: Sources of Change in Bargaining Strategies and Outcomes. *J. Public Policy*. 8:287-316.
- *Frieden, J. 1991. Invested Interests: the politics of national economic policies in a world of global finance. *International Organization* 45: 425-52. If he is

right, what external negotiating positions should we expect different governments to take?

Supplementary:

- Klimenko, M. Oct 2002. Trade interdependence, the international financial institutions, and the recent evolution of sovereign-debt renegotiations. *Journal of International Economics* 58:177-210.
- Katada, S. 2001. *Banking on Stability*
- Mesjasz, C. 2000. Reorganization of Commercial Debt: Negotiations between Poland and the London club (1981-1994). In *International Economic Negotiation: Models versus Reality*, ed. V. Kremenyuk and G. Sjöstedt, eds.
- G. Garrett. 1996. Capital Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy. In *Internationalization and Domestic Politics*, ed. Keohane and Milner.
- R Chang. 1995. Bargaining a Monetary Union. *J. Econ. Theory*. J. Keohane & J. Nye 1977. *Power and Interdependence*.

II. Investment regulation issues: the MNC and the state

*Fagre, N. and L. Wells. Autumn 1982. Bargaining power of multinationals and host governments. *J. of International Business Studies* 13: 9-23.

*Ramamurti, R. 2001. The Obsolescing 'Bargaining Model'? MNC-Host Developing Country Relations Revisited. *J. International Business Studies* 32:

Supplementary:

- Sawyer, A. 2000. Renegotiation of the VALCO Agreement: Contribution to a theoretical interpretation. In V. Kremenyuk and G. Sjöstedt, eds. *International Economic Negotiation*, 99-116
- Encarnation, D. & M. Mason 1990. Neither MITI nor America: the Political Economy of Capital Liberalization in Japan. *IO* 44: 25-54.
- Kobrin, S. 1987. Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing Countries. *IO* 41: 609-38

III. Trade policy issues:

*Zeng, Ka. 2002. Trade structure and the effectiveness of America's 'Aggressively Unilateral' Trade policies. *International Studies Quarterly* 46:93-115.

*Chase, Kerry. 2003. Economic interests and regional trading arrangements: the case of NAFTA. *International Organization* 57: 137-74.

Supplementary:

- J. Goodman, D. Spar and D. Yoffie. 1996. Foreign Direct Investment and the Demand for Protection in the United States. *IO*
- Lazer, D. July 1999. The Free Trade Epidemic of the 1860s and Other Outbreaks of Economic Discrimination. *World Politics* 51: 447-483.
- Milner, H. and D. Yoffie. 1989. Between free trade and protectionism: strategic trade policy and a theory of corporate trade demands. *IO* 239-72. What external negotiating positions and responses does this model predict?
- Frieden, J. 1988. Sectoral conflict and US foreign economic policy 1914-1940. *IO* 59-90.
- I. Destler and J. Odell. 1987. *Anti-Protection: Changing American Trade Politics*
- J. Odell. 1985. The Outcomes of International Trade Conflicts: The U.S. and South Korea, 1960-1981. *ISQ* 29: 263-86

8. 3/2 Domestic political institutions, processes, and tactics

Recall relevant background material from your earlier courses.

A. Read or review:

1. Putnam, R. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the logic of two-level games. *IO* 42: 427-460.
2. *Negotiating the World Economy*, chaps. 6, 7 and 8, and Mansfield, Milner, Rosendorff (2000) from week 3 (game theory)
3. Walton, R. and R. McKersie. 1965. *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations*, chap 9.
3. Two articles from part I and two articles from part II below, to be selected in class. Outline one of these articles and bring one copy of the outline for each classmate.

B. Turn in a one or two page proposal for a new *comparative* research project on domestic institutions or domestic politics, in the same format as week 2. Choose a hypothesis from the readings or invent one. Think especially about ideas linking DI or DP and elements of the international *process* (e.g., strategies used by the parties, likely reactions to a distributive strategy, coalitions most likely to be formed, persuasion attempts most likely to be effective)--rather than links directly between DI/DP and the outcome ignoring the process. Use either qualitative or quantitative methods.

I. Differences or changes of domestic institutions affect external negotiating positions, responses, and outcomes

Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff. Summer 2002. Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements. *IO* 56:577-513.

- Stubbs, R. 2000. Signing on to liberalization: AFTA and the politics of regional economic cooperation. *Pacific Review*. 13:297-318
- Jupille, J. 1999. The European Union and International Outcomes. *IO* 53:409-25.
- Winham, G. 1998. Explanations of Developing Country Behaviour in the GATT Uruguay Round Negotiation. *World Competition Law and Economics Review*. 21:109-34
- Bailey, M., J. Goldstein and B. Weingast 1997. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade. *World Politics* 49:309-38.
- Milner, H. 1997. *Interests, Institutions, and Information*
- Cowhey, P. Spring 1993. Domestic institutions and the credibility of international commitments: Japan and the United States. *IO* 47:299-326.
- Encarnation, D. and L. Wells. Winter 1985. Sovereignty en garde: negotiating with foreign investors. *IO* 39: 47-78.

II. While institutions are constant, domestic political processes (group pressures, bureaucratic politics, the media and public opinion, elections) and negotiators' domestic tactics affect the external negotiation process.

- Zahariadis, N. July 2003. Domestic Strategy and International Choice in Negotiations Between Non-Allies. *Polity*. 35:573-94.
- Wang Yong. 1999. Why China Went for WTO. *China Business Review*
- Schoppa, L. Summer 1993. Two-level games and bargaining outcomes: why *gaiatsu* succeeds in Japan in some cases but not others. *IO* 47: 353-386.
- Friman, H. R. Summer 1993. Side-payments versus security cards: domestic bargaining tactics in international economic negotiations. *IO* 47: 387-410.
- Evans, P, H. Jacobson, and R. Putnam, eds. 1993. *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press. Eichengreen and Uzan, or Milner, or Kahler.
- Winham, G. 1980. Robert Strauss, the MTN, and the Control of Faction. *Journal of World Trade Law*

9. 3/9 The international organization as context, issue, and party

A. Re-read *Negotiating the World Economy*, pp. 186-194 and 197-201. Review your earlier studies of international regimes plus what you have learned in this course about the cases of NATO and Mintoff, Bretton Woods, the ITO, the UN, the European Union, NAFTA, AFTA, and the WTO.

B. The following articles sample research on the effects of regimes as contexts for subsequent negotiations.

Review R. Keohane, *After Hegemony*, chap. 5, A Functional Theory of Regimes (IR 500)

Eising, R. 2002. Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization. *IO* 56:85-120.

Steinberg, R. *IO* 2002. In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO.

Smith, James McCall. Forthcoming 2006. "Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the Bananas Case." In *Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA*, ed J.Odell. On www.usc.edu/enn, under What's New.

Mansfield, E. and E. Reinhardt. 2003. Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements. *IO* 57:829-62.

C. Turn in a one-page proposal for a comparative project investigating the negotiation process in the context of some international organization.

Supplementary:

Tallberg, J. Forthcoming 2006. *Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union: The Power of the Presidency*.

Davis, Christina. Forthcoming 2006. Do WTO Rules Create a Level Playing Field for Developing Countries?" In *Negotiating Trade: Developing Countries in the WTO and NAFTA*, ed. J. Odell. On www.usc.edu/enn, under What's New.

Spector, B. and W. Zartman, eds. 2003. *Getting It Done: Post-Agreement Negotiation and International Regimes*

Frieden, J., and L. Martin 2003.

Busch, M., and E. Reinhardt. 2002. Testing International Trade Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement. In *The Political Economy of International Trade Law*, ed. D. Kennedy and J. Southwick;

Elgstrom, O., B. Bjurulf, J. Johansson, A. Sannerstedt. June 2001. Coalitions in European Union Negotiations. *Scandinavian Political Studies*. 24:111-128

Chasek, P. 2001. *Earth Negotiations: Analyzing Thirty Years of Environmental Diplomacy*

Moravcsik, A. 1999. A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation. *IO* 53: 267-306.

Jönsson, C., and J. Tallberg. 1998. Compliance and Post-Agreement Bargaining. *European Journal of International Relations* 4: 371-408

Noland, M. 1997. Chasing Phantoms: The Political Economy of USTR. *IO* 51: 365-388 [international norms shape bilateral trade outcomes]

Bartilow, Horace. 1997. *The Debt Dilemma: IMF Negotiations in Jamaica, Grenada, Guyana*.

Susskind, L. 1995. Barriers to Effective Environmental Treaty-Making." *Barriers to Conflict Resolution*, eds. K. Arrow et al.

Hampson, F. O. 1994. *Multilateral Negotiations*

- Zartman, ed. 1994. *International Multilateral Negotiation*
 Martin, L. 1992. *Coercive Cooperation*
 Benedick, R. 1991. *Ozone Diplomacy*
 Zartman, I. W. 1987. ed. *Positive-Sum: Improving North-South Negotiations*

RECESS.

10. 3/23 Individual meetings. Bring a 1 or 2 page memo proposing your own research project, using the same format as earlier proposals. If you plan case studies, it should say which cases you have selected and why not others. Take a preliminary look at possible sources of evidence before our meeting, since I will ask you whether you think you can get enough evidence to make the project feasible.

11. 3/30 The cultural context

Study the following:

1. Cohen, R. 1997 (revised ed.). *Negotiating Across Cultures*, chaps 3, 4 & 6
2. Graham, J. April 1993. The Japanese Negotiation Style: Characteristics of a Distinct Approach. *Negotiation Journal (NJ)*. 9: 123-40;
3. Brett, J. et al. 1998. Culture and Joint Gains in Negotiation. *NJ* 14: 61-86.
4. Mingst, K. and C. Warkentin. 1996. What Difference Does Culture Make in Multilateral Negotiations? *Global Governance* 2: 169-88.
5. Albin, C. 1999. Justice, Fairness, and Negotiation: Theory and Reality. In *International Negotiation*, ed. Berton, Kimura and Zartman, 257-90 [other chaps. also deal with culture and justice]

Supplementary:

- Goff, P. 2000. Invisible Borders: Economic Liberalization and National Identity. *International Studies Quarterly* 533-62
- Solomon, R. 1999. *Chinese Negotiating Behavior*
- Faure, G. et al., eds. 1998. *La négociation: situations et problématiques*
- Zartman, I. W. 1997. Conflict and Order--Justice in Negotiation. *International Political Science Review*. 18: 121-38.
- Drake, L. 1995. Negotiation Styles in Intercultural Communication. *International J. of Conflict Management* 6:72-90.
- Faure, G. & J. Rubin, eds. 1993. *Culture and negotiation*
- Druckman, D and R. Harris. 1990. Alternative Models of Responsiveness in International Negotiation. *JCR* 34: 234-51.
- Young, H. P. 1991. *Negotiation Analysis*

Ogura, Kazuo. 1979. How the 'Inscrutables' Negotiate with the 'Inscrutables': Chinese Negotiating Tactics Vis-a-vis the Japanese. *The China Quarterly*

12. 4/8 Individual meetings; report your research accomplishments and raise questions. Circulate 2 papers.

13. 4/15 Circulate and discuss student papers

Please read your colleagues' papers and write a page or two of reactions and constructive suggestions on one of the papers. Give copies to the author and the professor (graded). You are exempt from this writing requirement the day your paper is discussed.

14. 4/22 Circulate and discuss student papers

15. 4/29 Discuss student papers