Whereas Israel had been forced by US pressure to withdraw from the territory it had captured in the 1956 Sinai campaign, after the June 1967 war Israeli spokesmen immediately made it clear that there could be no return to the 1949 armistice lines.
A final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was stressed by Israel, was dependent on direct peace talks with the surrounding Arab states to establish definitive boundaries which took account of Israel's legitimate security interests. An eloquent exposition of the Israeli case was put during an emergency session of the UN General Assembly held from June 19 to July 21, 1967, by Foreign Minister Abba Eban, who rejected a Soviet demand that Israel should withdraw to the 1949 lines and argued as follows: "What the Assembly should prescribe is not a formula for renewed hostilities but a series of principles for the construction of a new future in the Middle East. With the ceasefire established, our progress must not be backward to an armistice regime which has collapsed under the weight of years and the brunt of hostility. History summons us toward to permanent peace, and the peace that we envisage can only be elaborated in frank and lucid dialogue between Israel and each of the states which have participated in the attempt to overthrow her sovereignty and undermine her existence. We dare not be satisfied with intermediate arrangements which are neither war nor peace. Such patchwork ideas carry within themselves the seeds of future tragedy. Free from external pressures and interventions, imbued with a common love for a region which they are destined to share, the Arab and Jewish nations must now transcend their conflicts in dedication to a new Mediterranean future in concert with a renaissance Europe and an Africa and Asia which have emerged at last to their independent role on the stage of history. In free negotiation with each of our neighbors we shall offer durable and just solutions redounding to our mutual advantage and honor. The Arab states can no longer be permitted to recognize Israel's existence only for the purpose of plotting its elimination. They have come face to face with us in conflict. Let them now come face to face with us in peace...." In a speech to the Knesset on Oct. 30, 1967, Prime Minister Eshkol reiterated that Israel would not allow the situation which prevailed before June 5 to be restored and stated that in the face of the Arab position of non-recognition of Israel his government would "maintain in full the situation as it was established in the ceasefire arrangements". In a further speech on Dec. 1 Eshkol enumerated five points on which Israel's policy was based: (i) permanent peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors; (ii) the achievement of peace by direct negotiations and conclusion of peace treaties between Israel and its neighbors; (iii) free passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran; (iv) agreed and secure borders between Israel and its neighbors; and (v) a settlement of the refugee problem "within a regional and international context" following the establishment of peace in the Middle East.
The Arab states, however, immediately adopted a policy of continued non-recognition of Israel and refusal to consider any form of peace negotiations. Speaking at the UN General Assembly session on June 26, 1967, King Hussein of Jordan accused Israel of having planned aggression against the Arab countries for many years and of initiating hostilities on June 5. Calling on the United Nations to condemn Israel and to enforce the return of Israeli troops to the pre-war lines, he warned that if this did not happen the Arab nation would rise again and that "the battle which began on June 5 will...become only a battle in what will be a long war". At a summit conference of Arab nations held in Khartoum in late August 1967 it was decided inter alia that "any necessary steps" would be taken towards consolidating Arab military strength and that the Arab states would enforce "the principles of non- recognition and non-negotiation" and would "make no peace with Israel, for the sake of the rights of the Palestinian people in their homeland".
Lengthy deliberations at the United Nations eventually resulted in the unanimous
adoption by the Security Council on Nov. 22, 1967, of a resolution (242) proposed by
Britain which emphasized "the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war
and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can
live in security". In its substantive passages this resolution affirmed that
"the fulfillment of [UN] Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and
lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the
following principles: (I) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in
the recent conflict; (ii) termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect
for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and
recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force". It further affirmed
"the necessity (i) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international
waterways in the area; (ii) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (iii)
for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state
in the area through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones".
Resolution 242 was accepted both by Israel and by the front-line Arab states except Syria,
although on the basis of differing interpretations of the key phrase calling for an
Israeli withdrawal "from territories occupied in the recent conflict". Israel
cited the absence of the definite article before the word "territories" to mean
that it was not bound to carry out a complete withdrawal, particularly since the
resolution also referred to the right to "secure and recognized boundaries". The
Arab states, on the other hand, claimed that the resolution called for a complete Israeli
withdrawal and cited the equally authentic French text, where the key phrase is rendered
"retreat des forces armees israeliennes des territoires occupes". It should be
noted, incidentally, that such semantic arguments were of no interest to the PLO, which
has always refused to accept Resolution 242 because it made no reference to the rights of
the Palestinian people.
The outcome of the 1967 war and the terms of Resolution 242 set a new tone for the Arab-Israeli conflict, which thereafter revolved less around the fundamental Palestinian Arab challenge to the legitimacy of the state of Israel and more around the quest of Egypt, Syria and Jordan for the recovery of their lost territories. The Israelis made no immediate move to annex their conquests, which were placed under military administration pending a negotiated peace settlement with the interested Arab governments under which definitive boundaries would be agreed.
But they did very quickly-- by legislation adopted in the Knesset on June 28, 1967, empowering the government to apply the law, jurisdiction and administration of the state to any part of Eretz Israel ("Land of Israel", effectively signifying the whole territory of Palestine)--merge the Israeli New City of Jerusalem with the Old City, agreeing in July 1967 that Jerusalem was henceforth "one city indivisible, the capital of the state of Israel". This step was condemned not only by the Arabs but also by the UN General Assembly on July 4, by 99 votes to none with 20 abstentions. The Israelis also began a controversial program of establishing Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, which although limited in the early years and officially related to security requirements was strongly criticized by the international community, including the United States. In this situation the PLO and its various member organizations increasingly resorted to extreme methods, which included a growing number of attacks on Israel targets outside Palestine, notably the El Al airline.
After six years of uneasy truce, the fourth Arab-Israeli war broke out on Oct. 6, 1973, when Egyptian and Syrian forces launched major offensives across the Suez Canal and on the Golan front respectively, choosing the Day of Atonement (Yom Kippur), the holiest day in the Jewish year, to do so and thereby apparently taking the Israeli armed forces by surprise. Although Jordan did not open a third military front against Israel, units of the Jordanian Army were sent to the Syrian front, as were strong Iraqi armored contingents and relatively token Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti units. On the Suez front Egypt received active military assistance from Morocco and Algeria and also from the Iraqi Air Force. The declared war aims of Egypt and Syria were to recover the Arab territories lost to Israel in 1967.
After some oŁ the bitterest and most bloody fighting since World War II, marked by great tank battles and heavy losses of men and material on both sides, a binding ceasefire came into effect on Oct. 24 in response to two successive UN Security Council resolutions. By that time the Egyptian Army had established itself along much of the eastern bank of the Suez Canal north of Ismailia and held a narrow strip of Sinai varying from three to 10 miles in width in different sectors and amounting to some 500 square miles of territory. For their part, the Israeli forces, in addition to having contained an attempted Egyptian thrust deeper into Sinai, had consolidated a successful counter-offensive across the Suez Canal in the southern sector, giving them control of about 500 square miles of Egyptian territory west of the Great Bitter Lake and the town of Suez.
On the northern front the Syrians also achieved initial successes, recapturing much of the Golan Heights lost in the 1967 war and advancing almost to the edge of Galilee plain. However, they were eventually checked and driven back in a powerful Israeli counteroffensive, so that when a ceasefire came into effect on Oct. 24 the Syrians had not only surrendered all their initial gains but had also lost an additional 300 square miles of territory to the Israelis, who had advanced to within 20 miles of Damascus. Total Israeli casualties in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war included 2,400 soldiers killed. As in previous wars, the casualties of the Arab side were never officially released.
1974 and 1975 Disengagement Agreements The UN Security Council's first 1973 ceasefire resolution (338), which was adopted on Oct. 22 but not observed until a further resolution had been passed late the following day, was proposed jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union and received the support of 14 of the 15 Security Council member states, with China refraining from voting. In addition to calling for a ceasefire, it urged the parties concerned "to start immediately...the implementation of Resolution 242 [of November 1967] in all of its parts" and decided that immediate negotiations should be initiated "aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East".
The co-operation of the two super-powers in securing the passage of Resolution 338 rejected their joint concern that the Middle East conflict might escalate into a broader confrontation, although the situation remained tense for several days.
President Nixon disclosed on Oct. 26, 1973, that he had ordered a precautionary alert of US military forces throughout the world early the previous day after receiving information which had "led us to believe that the Soviet Union was planning to send a very substantial force" into the Middle East. In the event, the threat of a US-Soviet confrontation had been dissipated by the adoption during the night of Oct. 25-26 of a Security Council resolution providing for the creation of a UN peace-keeping force for the Middle East, the personnel of which would not be drawn from any of the five permanent members of the Security Council (i.e. the USA, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China). On the basis of this resolution a new UN Emergency Force (UNEF) was deployed on the Suez front by early November 1973 and on Nov. 11 Egypt and Israel formally signed a ceasefire agreement at the "Kilometre 101" checkpoint on the Cairo-Suez road at the edge of the Israeli- occupied enclave west of the Suez Canal. This was the first major agreement between Israel and an Arab country since the signature of the 1949 armistice agreements.
A feature of the complex negotiations which led over the next two years to the conclusion of military disengagement agreements between Israel on the one hand and Egypt and Syria on the other was the key diplomatic role played by the United States and in particular by the US Secretary of State, Dr Henry Kissinger. Another important and related factor was the emergence from the 1973 war onwards of the "oil weapon" as a potent means by which the Arab states, taking advantage of the near-monopoly position which they then enjoyed as oil exporters, could exert pressure on Western states with a view to securing support for Arab conceptions of a just Middle East settlement, i.e. one which involved major concessions by Israel. At the time of the 1973 war use of this weapon took the form of an embargo on supplies to the United States and the Netherlands (because of their open support for Israel) and restrictions on supplies to other developed countries; subsequently it took the form of massive price increases which not only threw the economies of the industrialized states into recession but also had serious consequences for the existing international monetary system.
Against this background (and with the ever-present threat of further total embargoes on Arab oil supplies), the quest for a resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict took on added urgency for the industrialized countries, beyond their fundamental concern that Middle East instabilities represented a threat to world peace. In December 1973 the United States and the Soviet Union made a joint effort to bring about meaningful Arab-Israeli negotiations by inviting Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Israel to a peace conference in Geneva on the basis of the UN Security Council's call for a "just and durable peace"; however, Syria refused to attend (and the PLO was not invited) and the conference was adjourned inconclusively on Jan. 9, 1974.
Thereafter, the Soviet Union was able to play little direct part in the overall Middle East negotiating process, particularly since President Sadat of Egypt had already reversed Nasser's policy of close alignment with the Soviet Union--a reversal culminating in his unilateral abrogation in March 1976 of the 1971 Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation.
With Egypt now accepting that the road to progress ran through Washington, Dr Kissinger was able to mount a direct diplomatic effort with the Middle East parties, the first fruit of which was the signature by Egypt and Israel on Jan. 18, 1974, of an initial military disengagement agreement. Under its terms Israel withdrew its forces from the areas west of the Suez Canal held since the October 1973 ceasefire and also pulled back several miles on the Sinai front east of the canal, where three roughly parallel zones were created, each about six miles wide. The first of these, immediately to the east of the canal, became an Egyptian limited-forces zone, the second a central buffer zone in which UNEF contingents were stationed and the third an Israeli limited-force zone. For Egypt the general effect of the agreement was that it regained control of all Egyptian territory west of the canal and also the whole of the eastern bank; Israel, although withdrawing 12-13 miles east of the canal, was left in control of the rest of Sinai, including the strategically important Mitla and Giddi passes in Sinai and the Bir Gafgafa defense zone behind them, as well as Sharm el Sheikh commanding the Straits of Tiran.
Further intense "shuttle" diplomacy by Dr Kissinger resulted in the signature on May 31, 1974, of a similar military disengagement agreement by Syria and Israel covering the Golan front, where the two sides had continued to engage in regular hostilities notwithstanding the official existence of a ceasefire. The general effect of the agreement was that Israel withdrew from all the territory it had captured in the October 1973 war as well as from some areas occupied since the 1967 war, including the town of Quneitra. Limited-force zones were established on either side of a central buffer zone in which contingents of a newly-created UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) were stationed. The agreement also provided that Syrian civilians who had fled during the hostilities would be able to return to the areas vacated by Israel and Syrian administration restored. Since the May 1974 Syrian- Israeli disengagement agreement, no further changes have been negotiated as regards the territorial position on the Golan Heights.
As regards the Sinai front, however, a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement was signed on Sept. 4, 1975, again after protracted diplomatic efforts by Dr Kissinger. Under this agreement Israel withdrew its forces by a further 12 to 26 miles and the vacated area became the new UN buffer zone, with the old buffer zone being added to the existing Egyptian limited-forces zone. As part of this general withdrawal Israeli forces moved back to the eastern end of the Mitla and Giddi passes and a new Israeli limited-forces zone was established adjacent to the vacated area on the eastern side. Israel also vacated the Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudar oilfields on the Gulf of Suez (by February 1976), together with a narrow coastal strip running northwards to Egyptian-controlled territory south of Suez (this strip being demilitarized and placed under joint UN-Egyptian administration).
Other features of the Egyptian-Israeli agreement were that each side undertook to refrain from the use or threat of force or military blockade, to observe the ceasefire scrupulously and to renew the UNEF mandate annually; that non-military cargoes moving to ar@d from Israel in non-Israeli vessels would be allowed to pass through the Suez Canal; and that the United States would provide up to 200 civilian technicians to man electronic early-warning stations in the area of the Mitla and Giddi passes.
In conjunction with the second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, the United States made a number of important commitments to Israel, namely (i) to be "fully responsive" to Israel's defense, energy and economic needs; (ii) to hold consultations with Israel in the event of a "world power" (i.e. the Soviet Union) interfering militarily in the Middle East; (iii) to accept the Israeli view that a further Egyptian-Israeli agreement and any negotiations with Jordan should take place within the context of an overall Middle East peace settlement; (iv) to consult and "concert" policy with Israel on the timing and procedure of a reconvened Geneva peace conference; and (v) not to recognize or negotiate with the PLO under its present orientation. Egypt was able to comply with the provision concerning Israel's right of passage through the Suez Canal because on June 5, 1974, President Sadat had reopened the waterway on the eighth anniversary of its forcible closure by Egypt at the start of the 1967 war. On Nov. 2, 1975, the Greek freighter Olympus made a north-south passage of the canal bound for the Israeli port of Eilat with a cargo of cement, which thus became the first Israeli cargo shipped through the canal with the official approval of the Egyptian government since the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948.
For Egypt the 1974 and 1975 disengagement agreements were psychologically important
because they confirmed and consolidated the limited territorial gains made in the 1973
war, in which the Egyptian armed forces had for the first time performed creditably
against those of Israel. The attempted invasion of the new Jewish state in 1948 had ended
in a debacle; in both the 1956 and the 1967 wars Nasser's forces had been comprehensively
defeated; but in 1973 President Sadat became the "hero of the crossing" of the
Suez Canal. Although many military analysts of the time took the view that if the fighting
had continued Egypt would have been defeated for a fourth time, the ceasefire left
Egyptian forces in control of the first stretch of territory wrested from Israel by
military force since the creation of the latter in 1948. With Arab military honor thus
restored--at least in Egyptian eyes--it became easier for Egypt to move towards its
historic rapprochement with Israel.