Dis73a03 Yom Kippur War, 1973-1974
Parties: Israel versus Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq
Agents: UN, US

It was apparently during spring 1973 that Egyptian President Sadat determined to redress the balance of power in the Middle East by means of another war with Israel (Laquer, 44). Following a summer of mending relations with the USSR, receiving massive shipments of Soviet offensive weaponry, and negotiating with Syria and Jordan during September, Sadat launched his attack on 6 October 1973, an important religious holiday for both Jews and Moslems. Strong Egyptian armored thrusts across the Suez Canal were initially successful in pushing Israeli forces far back in the Sinai, and a coordinated attack from Syria was simultaneously successful in the Golan area. Jordanian units fought under Syrian command, and the northern Arab attack was also strengthened by Moroccan motorized units and Iraqi armored and air forces.

Israeli reserves had not been mobilized and its defense forces had not been fully alerted; consequently, the Arab forces made considerable progress during the first three days of fighting. By 10 October, however, Israeli reserves began to reach the frontlines, and from that time through the rest of the conflict the Arabs progressively suffered defeats and reverses. By 15 October the northern Arab forces had been pushed back beyond the 6 October line.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian forces had been consolidating their position on the east bank of the Canal, and on 13 October they began a major offensive. Enormous tank battles ensued in the Sinai, and it became clear after major battles on 14 October that the Egyptian offensive had lost its momentum. On 16 October Israel established a position on the west bank of the Canal, which was progressively enlarged and strengthened such that by 22 October -- the date of the first armistice -- it stretched 25 miles along the Canal in a band 20 miles wide. The first armistice was broken, however, and a successful cease-fire was not established for another three days; by that time the Egyptian forces on the west bank of the Canal were entirely cut off, and the northern front was also under Israeli control.

Naturally, the war involved global as well as regional politics. The USSR had actively supported the Arab cause and on the third day of fighting (9 October) it called upon various Afro-Arab states to fully support Egypt and Syria. Also at that time, the USSR instituted a massive air operation to re-supply Egypt and Syria with military equipment. Soviet naval maneuvers and public statements of Soviet officials helped to develop an impression that the USSR might intervene even more actively. After several days of fighting, with Israel becoming increasingly dominant, US Secretary of State Kissinger visited Moscow on 20 October to discuss the conflict in response to an urgent request from Soviet First Secretary Brezhnev. Following these discussions, the superpowers cooperated in convoking a meeting of the UN Security Council, which passed their joint resolution calling for a cease-fire, negotiations among the parties, and implementation of Resolution 242 (see Case269: Arab-Israeli Confrontation, 1967-1973). The superpowers pressured their client states to accept the resolution's provisions.

Although formally accepting the cease-fire, Israel continued to improve its military position on the west bank of the Canal, effectively isolating the Egyptian forces on the east bank. For unclear motives, the USSR engaged in a series of military and diplomatic actions that US President Nixon's administration saw as being quite provocative; refusing a Soviet plan for the superpowers to police a truce in the Middle East with their own force and concerned that the USSR would unilaterally intervene with strong military forces, on 25 October the US placed its forces on world-wide military alert. A new Soviet-American agreement was quickly reached; The Security Council reaffirmed its call for a cease-fire and recreated the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF: seeCase119: Suez War, 1956-1957) to supervise it. Furthermore, the five permanent Council members were prohibited from participating in a peacekeeping force in the area. The US military alert was then gradually lifted. On the same day, the USSR told the US that it would act to relieve the surrounded Egyptian force with Soviet forces unless Israel permitted Egyptian supplies to be provided; the US thereupon pressured Israel to return to the 22 October lines, but this pressure was resisted. A visit by Kissinger to Egypt, however, broke the impasse, and on 11 November Israeli and Egyptian military commanders signed an agreement for negotiating a withdrawal to their earlier positions and for the relief of the isolated Egyptian troops.

Further negotiations between the parties under UN auspices at Geneva led to a disengagement agreement signed 18 January 1974; the UNEF was then used to oversee the disengagement and to supervise a buffer zone between the forces. Agreement was more difficult to reach in the northern sector, but on 31 May 1974 a disengagement agreement was signed there as well, creating a UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) as a supervisory peacekeeping mission.

Largely under US leadership, peace-building efforts began quickly after the disengagement agreements (see Case326: Arab-Israeli Negotiations, 1974-1978). A basic agreement, however, remained elusive. Furthermore, additional strains engendered by the Yom Kippur war are also still simmering.
The Arab states used an oil embargo in order to force other states toward a policy hostile to Israel, and the success of their efforts in doing so created continuing tensions between Europe and the US. The oil embargo also vastly enhanced the power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), giving rise to a new political-economic constellation of world forces and interests that are in conflict over several issues in addition to the Arab-Israeli problem.