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**Governing Entrepreneurial Strategic Alliances
that Capitalize on the Curriculum:**

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This working paper is part of the American Council on Education (ACE)'s Changing Enterprises Project, a two-year effort to map and analyze the new directions colleges and universities are pursuing to extend and capitalize on their teaching and learning activities in response to increased competition and changing fiscal realities.

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In many ways the landscape of American higher education continues to change rapidly and dramatically. Digital technologies are leading to significant changes in the ways colleges and universities deliver higher education, and in how they are organized and structured (Duderstadt, 2001; Obligner, Barone, & Hawkins, 2001). Traditional colleges and universities clearly no longer hold the monopoly over postsecondary education as for-profit, corporate, and foreign universities and providers enter the fray capitalizing on emerging technologies and a growing interest in life-long learning (Adelman, 2000; Newman & Scurry, 2002). Magnifying the realities of the competitive marketplace are changes in funding patterns as higher education costs continue to escalate and traditional sources of revenue decline (Hovey, 1999; Ikenberry & Hartle, 2001; Morino Institute, 2001). Finding new sources of ready capital in the technology-rich competitive environment seems to be a high priority for most colleges and universities.

Potentially untapped resources to generate new revenue are the curriculum and various instructional activities—such as individual courses, short courses, degree programs, certificates, and certifications. Some campus leaders see these institutional resources as offering rich possibilities in the search for revenue. In a phrase, some institutions are moving toward “capitalizing on the curriculum.” For a long time research universities have similarly exploited their research capacities to generate new revenue and enhance their competitiveness through capitalizing on patents, tech parks, university-industry partnerships, and incubator projects. The word “entrepreneurial” is no longer foreign to universities both in the U.S. and abroad (Clark, 1998; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). Institutions now are turning to their courses, curricula, and teaching activities¹ to tap new markets and create revenue opportunities. In many cases, technology is the primary vehicle to enable institutions to move in these directions and deliver instruction to new populations of students.

New approaches that capitalize on a college or university’s instructional capacities are proving to be unpredictable and complicated ventures. While new efforts constantly emerge (e.g., International Cyberuniversity and Commonwealth University), others are falling by the wayside (e.g., NYU On-Line, e-Cornell) and still others struggle

¹ I use the terms instructional capacities, curriculum and courses interchangeably throughout this document to indicate a family of activities while acknowledging that in practice, while related, each are different.

(e.g., Universitas 21; University of Michigan and Jiao Tong University graduate engineering program). It is too early to know what the landscape will look like three, five, or ten years hence. Examples of these innovative strategies include:

- Partnerships that create new academic programs and colleges—such as the new Bioengineering School joint venture between Virginia Tech and Wake Forest.
- Global consortia—such as Global University Alliance and Universitas 21—that involve multiple partners from numerous countries and span oceans via technology.
- Joint ventures that offer programs and courses, such as the new global executive management program offered jointly by Harvard and Stanford.

These activities raise a series of questions for academic leaders and policy makers regarding their governance and administration, the philosophical, values, and social implications of these activities, and the potential conflict between academic and entrepreneurial cultures, to name just a few. Although the potential questions are many, the focus of this investigation is on the issues related to the governance and oversight of strategic alliances that seek to capitalize on the curriculum. What are the governance, oversight and coordinating mechanisms of these alliances? What is the role of the academic senate as institutions seek to mine their instructional capacities for revenue? What are the critical governance issues associated with these ways of business? How do institutions accommodate new groups of stakeholders (not to mention shareholders) into campus decision making?

The Entrepreneurial Context

Entrepreneurialism—as well as market and marketlike behavior²,—is alive and well in the academy worldwide as colleges and universities take advantage of new opportunities and respond to constraints generated by constrained fiscal resources, increased competition, and the rise of globalization (Clark, 1998; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). A British researcher wrote of institutions realizing “the necessity to make income generation a mainstream, rather than ‘fringe’ activity” (Lund, 1999, p. 9). Seeking new resources has become a major preoccupation

of institutional leaders. It has spurred institutions to undertake revenue saving and cost avoidance strategies, intensify capital campaigns and create sophisticated fund raising strategies, develop complex tuition and aid formulas, and become commercial in many ways.

Slaughter and Leslie (1997) charted in their study of Canadian, American, British, and Australian universities what they called the “quiet revolution” occurring among universities generated by increased entrepreneurialism and shifts in funding. In their study, they use the term “academic capitalism” to describe institutional entrepreneurial responses to increasingly in competitive funding situations. They examined global political economic and national policy changes to place academic change in a larger context in the four countries under study and conducted case studies of Australian institutions to understand the impact of academic capitalism on faculty and their institutions. Their key finding was that the structure of academic work, and thus undergraduate and graduate education, has changed in response to global and national trends that enhanced competition for scarce resources. The effect was that institutions and faculty more aggressively sought external dollars, typically tied to market-related research, and that academic fields close to the market, such as business and technology, benefited while others did not. Other findings suggested that individual academics and institutions spend less time and resources on teaching and more of both on entrepreneurial activity, and that management had gained more institutional power taking precedent over shared governance.

Clark (1998) examined entrepreneurialism in European universities. Starting from the premise that institutions cannot meet growing knowledge production and dissemination demands given downturns in government funding, he identified five entrepreneurial universities that succeeded with deliberate institution-wide efforts to become more innovative and competitive. He found among these five universities (1) modified institutional values that combined traditional academic values with an entrepreneurial spirit, (2) a strengthened managerial core aggressively seeking resources for the institution and diversifying funding streams, and (3) new organizational structures

² Slaughter and Leslie (1997, p. 11) make a distinction between market and marketlike behavior. Market behavior is the for-profit activity of institutions. Marketlike behavior refers to institutional and faculty

including those that connect more strongly traditional academic departments to the outside world and promote contract research and consultancy, and new interdisciplinary centers whose functions complement but differ from traditional academic departments.

Capitalizing on the Curriculum. Most discussions of entrepreneurial activity in higher education focus on research/knowledge production and transfer where the capital stems from faculty research talent (see Etkowitz, Webster & Healey, 1998; Fairweather, 1988) or around business and administrative activity and services (Lund, 1999). However, as institutions look for other potential sources of revenue many are beginning to turn to their curriculum, courses, and instructional capabilities. In the past institutions have found small-scale ways to tap this resource to generate income, such as through summer sessions (i.e., Middlebury College's summer foreign language program) and study abroad programs for students enrolled at other institutions (i.e., Arcadia University). Others have partnered with corporations to provide education and training for their employees on a contract basis. However, rarely are these approaches more complex than consumer-supplier relations and offer little challenge to current ways of operating and governing.

Advances in technology and its widespread acceptance in teaching and learning have given many institutions the hope of reaching a larger number of potential students, thus generating substantial revenue. Over 2000 U.S. institutions offer on-line courses (Newman & Courtourier, 2001). Globalization has also opened new doors. For example, almost all Australian universities are deeply engaged in what is known as "offshore education" where students enroll at Australian institutions but study outside the country at a foreign partner institution's campus (Davis, Olsen, & Boh, 2000). In 2000 approximately one-third of the approximately 100,000 international students enrolled in Australian higher education where.

The curriculum is quickly becoming a widely recognized potential source of capital. However, to what extent can it accurately be considered capital in an economic sense? Alder and Kwon (2002) developed the following template to assess if something was capital:

competition for moneys regardless of its source.

- A long-lived asset into which other resources can be invested, with the expectation of a future (albeit uncertain) flow of benefits.
- It is both “appropriable” in the sense that it can be used for other purposes and “convertible,” in that it can be converted to other kinds of capital, such as liquid, human, cultural, and social.
- It can either be substituted for or can complement other resources.
- Like physical capital and human capital, but like financial capital, it needs maintenance.
- It depreciates (like human capital, but unlike physical capital).

The instructional capacities and the curriculum have these characteristics. The curriculum and instructional capacities are long-lived. Other resources are invested in them as institutions continually develop new courses and revise curricula. These elements are appropriable in that they can be used for other purposes such as its content might be available for both graduate and undergraduate courses, or materials for public lectures or research. It can also be converted to other types of capital, particularly social and cultural capital, and its development relies on human capital (Slaughter & Leslie, 1997). The curriculum supplements other types of institutional capital, such its human and physical capital. It requires on-going maintenance, as an outdated curriculum or pedagogies do little good. Finally, the curriculum depreciates and requires new investments over time.

To define more sharply the focus of this effort, we modify Slaughter and Leslie’s (1997) definition of academic capitalism to define the types of activities under investigation by substituting instructional activity and the curriculum for research activity and additionally qualifying the target audience of such activity. Capitalizing on the curriculum can be thought of as:

Those entrepreneurial activities undertaken with a view to capitalizing on instructional activity or the curriculum (or aspects of it) through contracts or grants with business, government or social agencies, or other institutions seeking to reach populations of students not currently enrolled by alliance partners.

Strategies to Capitalize: Strategic Alliances

Two strategies are emerging to capitalize on the curriculum. Some institutions are forming strategic alliances and others are creating for-profit units with the explicit purpose of generating revenue. The focus of this effort is on strategic alliances because they seem to be the majority of approaches involved in this type of activity, they are more realistic for a wider range of institutions because they require less initial investment, and efforts by individual institutions to create for-profit arms have struggled, with many being closed in their infancy (e.g., e-Cornell, NYU On-Line, UMUC On-Line, and e-Temple). Finally, they may also offer challenges to governance because of the multiple partners involved. The alliance literature in higher education and even among non-profit organizations is limited; thus much of this discussion stems from a review of the management literature.

For this project we define strategic alliances as “any voluntarily initiated cooperative agreement between firms that involves exchange, sharing or co-development, and it can include contributions by partners of capital, technology, or firm-specific assets” (Gulati & Singh, 1998, p. 781). The important components of this definition are the sharing, exchange and co-development activity and the recognition that parties make some type of organization specific contribution to or investment in the alliance, which goes beyond making a simple financial contribution and calling the relationship an alliance (Waddock, 1988). Many discussions of strategic alliances are often coupled and confused with definitions of other types of relationships that have little to do with strategy or be actual alliances and instead more closely represent purchasing relationships or philanthropy (see for example Martin & Samels, 2002).

Strategic alliances are “established for a variety of reasons relating to the inability of one of the partners to solve an important problem” (Borys & Jemison, 1989, p. 241). They are one type of interorganizational relation (IORs), which is the broad concept management and organization scholars use to describe organizations working together in a variety of arrangements. Under this rubric we will concern ourselves with four types of alliances.³

³ The broad concept of IORs also include mergers, supplier arrangements, license agreements, acquisitions, and contractual agreements (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Gulati & Singh, 1998) as well as trade associations,

- Joint Ventures are alliances where partners create a separate entity that includes a separate oversight body and includes shared financial investments (Harrigan, 1988)
- Minority Investments are alliances that do not have separate structures but instead are created when one partner or set of partners takes a minority equity position in the others, such as IBM's investment in Intel (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Harrigan, 1988).
- Equity Joint Programs are alliances that have shared equity but do not have distinct governance bodies; instead parent organizations extend oversight.
- Cooperative Agreements are the remaining alliances, which do not involve shared equity or have separate entities, but instead are organizations working together to advance their interests (Harrigan, 1988)

Alliances that capitalize on the curriculum may be differentiated not only by their structure, but also by the number of partners, the types of partners, and the consistency of their motivations for participating in the alliance. Alliances may be constituted of a pair, triad, or network of partners. They may consist of traditional colleges or universities (i.e., regionally accredited, degree granting) working (1) with each other, (2) with corporations, or (3) with foreign universities. Triads or networks may also include a combination of the three. The reasons for their formation may also vary and partners may have the same motivations (such as gain access to each other's knowledge or expertise) or they may have different but compatible motivations (such as legitimacy for one and access to production facilities for the other). The governance issues may very well differ along these lines. For example, research in the corporate sector suggests that higher numbers of partners is more difficult to coordinate as are more complex relationships, such as those that seek to generate new products as compared to those that simply seek to provide access to markets (Gulati & Singh, 1998).

Formation and Management. A synthesis of the management literature on strategic alliances suggests that they are formed for a variety of reasons, which are not

agency federations, and corporate-financial interlocks (Oliver, 1990). All which, while partnerships, are not the focus of this work because many do not go beyond a simple purchaser-seller relationship, while others suggest becoming a single organization that dissolves the relationship, and still others are simply not relevant because their functions do apply to academic activities.

exclusive (Gulati & Singh, 1998) and may change over time (Spekman, Forbes, Isabella, & MacAvoy, 1998). Alliances open doors to markets, financial and other types of resources, new products, and knowledge (Bailey & McNally Koney, 2000; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Hagadoorn, 1993; Oliver, 1990). Organizations work together to extend capabilities and improve the delivery of services, generate greater economies of scale, and reduce expenses through linking complementary technology or sharing facilities and capacities, and jointly investing in technology (Bailey & McNally Koney, 2000; Borys & Jemison, 1989; Gulati & Singh, 1998; Hagadoorn, 1993; Whetten, 1981). Organizations partner to more quickly develop new ideas and products and to “leapfrog” into new areas (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Hagadoorn, 1993; Harrigan, 1988). They join together to learn from one another (Doz, 1996; Hagadoorn, 1993) as firms cannot always buy knowledge in the marketplace (Barringer, & Harrison, 2000). Together organizations may do a better job monitoring the changing environment to understand emerging opportunities or risks (Gulati & Singh, 1998; Hagadoorn, 1993). They also form alliances to defend current strategic postures (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Harrigan, 1988). Finally, an organization may seek to form alliance with others to gain legitimacy through association with others, particularly larger, visible, reputable, and prestigious firms (Bailey & McNally Koney, 2000; Barringer, & Harrison, 2000), which may help firms gain access to critical resources and expertise (Barringer, & Harrison, 2000) and give the appearance of rationalized activity (Oliver, 1990).

Managing strategic alliances is difficult as their poor history of success in the private sector demonstrates. Park and Russo (1996) site a series of studies that put the failure rate of joint ventures and other strategic alliances among corporations at 7 in 10, 2 in 3, and 1 in 2. However, as Osborn and Hagedoorn (1997) remind us, management is hardly ever simple and no support exists suggesting that joint ventures are more difficult to manage than comparably complex administrative units.

That said, strategic alliances operate differently from other organizational structures. Participants must select potential partners wisely, which includes identifying partners with compatible (if not similar) goals and those willing and able to commit the needed resources (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Once selected partners must reconcile the purposes of each into a common purpose as well as develop

compatible expectations for each other and for the alliance (Doz, 1996). Partners often have different goals not only for themselves, but also for the alliance. Resolving this conflict can be difficult because partners do not share a common understanding of the environment, or in some cases even come from the same environment (Boryst & Jemison, 1989). Partners must also reconcile potentially different cultures, operating procedures, and governance structures (Boryst & Jemison, 1989; Saxton, 1997). They must develop new procedures for collaborating, defining problems, and exploring solutions (Rondinelli & Landon, 2001), as well as maintaining stability (Boryst & Jemison, 1989) and ensuring trust (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Finally, partners must negotiate dividing the returns and outcomes generated (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994, Spekman, Forbes, Isabella & MacAvoy, 1998).

More than consortia. Colleges and universities have a long history of working together through consortia and exchange; however, these partnerships are not strategic alliances and differ in key ways from those activities explored here. First, they tend not to be strategic in nature and instead are operational, more concerned with efficiencies than with effectiveness (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Second, they typically do not involve revenue-generating activities, although they may be created to avoid expenses. Third, not all focus on academic issues and if they are about academic issues (as compared to business or library functions) they tend to be limited to exchanges or cross-enrollments of students currently enrolled in one of the partner institutions.

Campus Governance

For this project, we consider campus governance as the processes where various stakeholders (typically administrators and faculty, but sometimes students and staff members, and less often trustees) come together to make decisions in legitimate ways. It is also a set of arenas (Birnbaum, 1988) where values—oftentimes unstated or ill defined until acted upon (Birnbaum, 1988; March, 1994)—come into contact and conflict with priorities, beliefs, assumptions, and budgets. Through these processes and in these places various stakeholders develop rules and expectations for what constitutes legitimate joint decision making (Birnbaum, 1988; Eckel, 2000). We use this definition to differentiate shared governance from other definitions of governance, including formal governance

and faculty governance. First, the broader term of governance includes board activity as well as campus-based governance and is more encompassing. Second, formal governance is the structures through which governance is typically associated, such as the faculty senate and its subcommittees or the board and its committees. Campus governance may include formal governance, but it also includes other processes that occur elsewhere, such as ad hoc committees that bring multiple stakeholders together that might fall outside traditional formal structures. Finally, faculty governance, in contrast to campus governance, includes those processes and activities where faculty are the lead decision-makers (or believe themselves to be). Our definition of campus governance extends the focus of the inquiry to include activities that may fall outside more narrow definitions, limits it to on-campus decisions (and thus excludes board decisions), and attempt to avoid the debate of “who decides who decides.”

The 1966 Statement on Government, jointly formed by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), the American Council on Education (ACE), and the Association of Governing Boards of Universities and Colleges (AGB), is one well-known and widely cited text on governance (AAUP, 2001). The Statement sets forth specific responsibilities for faculty, administrators, and trustees, as well as identifies activities that they should address jointly. For example, the statement notes that faculty should have primary responsibility for the curriculum, and the president is largely responsible for the creation of new resources. The Statement’s broad sweep of university issues makes it possible for various stakeholders to set their claims, on the same piece of the governance pie and argue convincingly, not to mention passionately, that it falls within their domain. In alliances that seek to generate new revenue through the curriculum, both seem to be able to assert first rights. To complicate matters, the Statement does not suggest roles for external groups, or provide insight on how to balance curricular matters across multiple institutions, which may be the case here. The Statement’s only discussion of external relations focuses on representing the institution publicly, not on creating and managing interinstitutional activities. If governance on one campus is complicated and potentially contentious, what will it be like when the issues and activities are curricular as well as financial, and they are joint among many campuses? The Statement is of little help in these matters.

Entrepreneurial Governance. Marginson and Considine (2000) in their study of the “enterprise university” in Australian tertiary education identified five trends affecting entrepreneurial-university governance. First, they note the influence of executive power and a strong will to manage and to do so following widely accepted principles of good management practice. Second, they identify structural changes in which collegial governance structures are replaced with less formal ones that strengthen executive power, provide for increased information flow, and are less constrained by bureaucratic practices. The third trend is enhanced flexibility regarding personnel, resources, communication and authority. Fourth, the authors note a shift from academic disciplines and departments being influential in governance to interdisciplinary centers and research centers playing key roles. Finally, they suggest that resources and authority are pushed further down the organization but with corresponding constraints that limit decision-making. The effects are raised accountability and expectations for individuals lower in the organization but less freedom to act.

Alliance Governance. The literature on strategic alliances in the corporate sector suggests four main issues for alliance governance. The first three concern themselves with operations of the alliance. The final one focuses on the relationship between alliance and partner activity. The first is the processes through which problems are defined and solutions explored (Rondinelli & Landon, 2001). Second, the means by which activities are coordinated and stability maintained is important (Borys & Jemison, 1989; Gulati & Singh, 1998). The third area concerns itself with resources, including the amount invested by each partner, the returns for that investment, and the obligations and distribution of both among partners (Spekman, Forbes, Isabella & MacAvoy, 1989; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). The final issue is slightly different and focuses on the “permeability” of alliance governance. Borys and Jemison (1989) suggest that “the key question [for alliance governance] is: what is the degree of and nature of the permeability of the hybrid boundary; what elements—resources, authority, obligations—are allowed to cross it?” (p. 241).

Alliance governance in the context discussed here may be additionally complicated by the involvement of multiple partners unfamiliar with each other’s processes and cultures and who have a different understanding of the environment, or in

the case of global partnerships or corporate-university alliances come from different environments. Alliances may very well create strange bedfellows as corporations and institutions or American and foreign universities try to work collaboratively in new ways.

Conceptual Framework: Rules of Governing Alliances

The definition of campus governance used in this effort moves beyond stakeholder responsibilities and structures to focus on decision-making processes. All organizational processes are guided by a set of operating rules, both informal and formal. Rules shape behavior; they inform the organization of the focus of the process, invite expected people to participate, determine participant obligations and rights, set parameters for work, and act as a guide to determining feasible outcomes (Burns & Flam, 1987; March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000). Rules also embody organizational lessons learned about how to do things, they are trophies from political battles, and they are guides that help interpret ambiguous and uncertain situations (March, Schulz & Zhou, 2000). Rules embody both political solutions—the agreements and negotiations between organization actors—and technical solutions—guidelines on how the alliance operates (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000).

This study adopts social rule systems theory as its conceptual framework. This theory specifies “to a greater or lesser extent who participates (and who is excluded), who does what, when, where and how, and in relation to whom” (Burns & Flam, 1987, p. 8). Understanding the rules underlying decision making is particularly useful in contexts in which actors are interdependent but lack rigid organizational structures for social coordination, (Burns & Flam, 1978), which is the case both in higher education governance generally and in alliance formation. In higher education, important decision-makers are loosely connected and wander in and out of decision making processes (Birnbaum, 1988; Cohen & March, 1986). Thus, although organizational structures might exist, in many instances they result in little consistency across decision opportunities. In new strategic alliances, partners seek to design rules that will shape alliance activities and processes that reflect the rules dominate in their individual organizations (Doz, 1996). Once participants have negotiated rules and worked through

any conflicts, they then must implement the negotiated rules (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000).

Social rule system theory focuses on the rules actors follow in decision making situations that stem from their understanding of their own identities and how they should act in a given situation. This theory is shaped by a logic of appropriateness, as compared to a logic of consequence, which shapes most rational decision-making theories (i.e., choices are made by judging anticipated outcomes with the intent of maximizing results) (March, 1994). The logic of appropriateness appears when a newly appointed administrator is enjoined to “act like a leader” or when newly elected faculty senators act like an academic on the senate floor. The important questions of this framework are What kind of situation is this? Who am I, and What does a person such as I do in situations such as this? (March, Schulz, & Zhou, 2000). We chose a framework based on the logic of appropriateness because organizations engage in alliances for a variety of reasons, many of which are unclear at the beginning (Doz, 1996), making theories of consequence inappropriate. Instead in ambiguous and uncertain situations, actors may instead turn to rules based upon well-known identities that can help them make new sense and offer appropriate behavior (March, 1994).

Alliances offer multiple challenges to rule making and rule following. In newly formed alliances, actors from distinct organizations must forge new identities as partners (and thus negotiate new rules) while concurrently maintaining important identities from previous roles, such as acting like a faculty member or administrator in the governance arena, or being a corporate manager. Partners also must reconcile the dominant and accepted rules of operation from at least two organizations (Doz, 1996), and when the alliance results in a new entity (such as a joint venture), rules, both explicit and implicit, need to be negotiated not only between partners, but also with the newly formed entity (Borys & Jemison, 1989). Rules in alliances may be shaped according to shared norms and values of the partners, adhere to practices common to an industry, or be determined by contractual agreement (Boys & Jemison, 1989).

Finally, some rules are most likely to be more important to alliances in general and to alliances involving universities and their partners. To govern alliances participants develop rules to shape processes for collaboration, define problems and explore solutions,

and determine partners' shares of returns on investments (Rondinelli & London, 2001; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Previous research on governance and institutional behavior suggest that those rules associated with legitimacy are extremely important to governance and those rules vary across institution and are based upon local expectations (Birnbaum, 1988; Eckel, 2000). Structures and processes used to resolve the same problems vary by institution; however, each problem solving approach must meet institutionally defined thresholds for legitimacy. Violating well agreed upon norms can impede action and create disequilibrium within the organization (Schein, 1994).

Methodology

The intent of this effort is to explore and map the governance issues associated with this particular type of strategic alliance, thus we adopt a qualitative theory-building design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994). Identified earlier were four sets of configurations that define strategic alliances formed to capitalize on the curriculum—types of alliances (such as joint ventures, minority interests, or joint programs); types of partners (such as domestic institutions, foreign institutions, or corporations); the number of partners; and reasons for participating in the alliance (such as access, learning, extend capabilities, legitimacy). Because these configurations describe overlapping characteristics of alliances in practice, together they serve to set the parameters of a range of alliances under investigation. Seeking to build a theory of governance associated with these alliances, we identified a set of alliances that represent a range of configurations, and that also were accessible (Yin, 1994). To generate a list of potential alliances, researchers reviewed news stories and press releases concerning alliances and interviewed university leaders familiar with alliances and similar strategies. From this list, we selected the following alliances that were accessible and represented diverse alliance characteristics:

- Joint Ventures Involving a Diverse Network of University Partners - Global University Alliance, a partnership of universities from three continents (or Alliance for Lifelong Learning, a partnership of Yale and Stanford Universities and the University of Oxford, of which Princeton University pulled out).

- Joint Ventures Involving Paired Domestic Universities - Bioengineering School alliance between Virginia Tech and Wake Forest.
- Joint Programs Involving Paired Domestic Universities - Harvard-Stanford Global Management Project.
- Joint Program between Paired US and International Universities - Johns Hopkins University and the National University of Singapore are developing a joint Ph.D. program in basic sciences and a master's program in clinical research. (Hopkins is also developing a series of distance-education courses in medicine, postdoc. training courses, and a training program for nurses.) (or Princeton–Oxford Leadership MA program).
- Joint Program between a University and Corporate Partner - University of Michigan-Dearborn and Erudite Corporation have entered into a partnership to co-produce e-learning management training courses for Erudite's healthcare clinics and develop e-learning programs and services for a broad range of clients.
- Minority Interests of University Partners in Corporate Parent - Cardean University (UNext) and Columbia Business School, Stanford University, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, the London School of Economics and Political Science.

We identified the primary contacts from the various institutional partners and conducted interviews (by phone and in person) and reviewed archival data for each of the partnerships. The interviews focused on questions associated with alliance decision rules that surfaced from a review of the literature—coordination, resource investment and returns, problem identification and resolution, accommodating atypical partners in the governance arena, negotiating governance rules, and the challenges of adhering to them. However, the researchers were also open to other topics that emerged from the interviews.

We adhered to data analysis and quality assurance practices common to theory-building research (Doz, 1996; Eisenhardt, 1989). From the collected data, case reports were drafted that included all of the potentially relevant collected material (Yin, 1994).

Out of the larger case reports, each case study was crafted. Two three-step data analysis processes were then used--pattern coding, memoing, and proposition writing (Miles & Huberman, 1994)--first within each case and then across the cases. We used the concepts surfaced in the first case as a template for future data analysis across the other alliances, extending and refining ideas and seeking theoretical replication (Yin, 1994).

To be continued.....

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