Fire Department Resources

The Chief of Police activated the City's EOC at about 4:00 PM. Wednesday. However, it was difficult to get things going. Key EOC administrators had gone home, requiring hours to get them back to the EOC. It was not until after 4:45 PM that city department staff were notified to come to the EOC. The Mayor declared a state of local emergency at 9:00 PM (Webster, 1992). According to the Webster report, the "Emergency Operations Organization [or EOCI was largely dysfunctional" (Webster, 1992, p.24). Apparently it was inadequately staffed, no one appeared to be in charge of directing the response, and there were no plans for responding to a civil disturbance. Virtually every element of the [city] EOC's command, control, communications and information network seems to have broken down, with the result that the EOC seems to have been in a 'catch up' position for most of the disorder period. While there seems to have been modest improvement in the conditions by the third day, it does not appear that the EOC ever provided effective command and control. Hence, it is questionable whether the EOC ever served as an effective mechanism to coordinate the activities of either the police or the many other agencies called upon to assist in the response (Webster, 1992, p. 25). None of the fire departments that responded in the field, and interviewed for this study, had prepared specific contingency plans for a massive civil disturbance. They did implement their multi-@asualty incident plan or their disaster response plan. Generally, most responders initially thought that there would be a few multi-casualty incidents but not a massive disturbance. Of EMTs (fifty-eight fire service, eight private company) who responded to the EMSA survey, 44% (28) felt that the disturbance lasted longer than they expected when the event started. The verdict was announced at 3:00 PM on April 29, Wednesday. Angry crowds gathered almost immediately at 55th and Normandy, and Florence and Normandy (Webster, 1992). Looting began at the latter location at about 4:15 PM. Rioters at Florence and Normandie attacked cars and motorists with crowbars, bottles and rocks at 5:45 PM. The first report of civil disturbance related violence came in at 5:57 PM. An LA City Fire rescue unit reported that they had discovered three riot related injured people at Florence and LaSalle. The first requests for law enforcement protection came from firefighters and a rescue ambulance at about 6:00 PM due to people throwing bricks and gun fire in the immediate area. Most of the following description is drawn from Los Angeles City Fire Department's EMS response. Los Angeles City Fire Department Bureau Commanders and staff personnel convened at Headquarters under the direction of the Chief Engineer and General Manager of the Department. A recall of fire personnel had begun by 6:30 PM. Fire department staff had bricks and stones thrown at them as they reported in. Meanwhile, (6:15 PM) LAPD established a Field Command Post at 54th and Arlington Regional Transit District Bus yard (Webster, 1992). "At 6:30 PM there were as many as 100 police officers available for deployment. By 7:00 PM, the number had grown to 480 officers, By 12:00 AM, the number assigned had ballooned to 1,790" (Webster, 1992, p. 122). The Assistant LA City Fire Chief quickly requested police escorts through the City EOC at 6:45 PM to protect fire service equipment and personnel. Mutual aid was requested from Los Angeles County Fire Department. Los Angeles City Fire Department organized its response at all levels using the Incident Command System. Liaison was established with County Fire, LAPD, the Sheriff's office, and with LAEMSA at their EOC. Dedicated telephone lines were used to carry communications between public service agencies and quickly filled up. Eventually runners were also used to augment communications. The description that follows is taken from materials prepared by Denney, 1992; Eisner, 1992; Pratt, 1992; Webster, 1992 and from fire service personnel interviews. The Eisner article is a particularly good published account of the fire service response. All times are approximate. A Medical Branch was set up with a three person EMS planning group at LA City Fire Headquarters. They assessed the event and began to identify actions needed to respond. Working with a Battalion Chief in the field, initial preparations were made to staff the Arlington and 54th street command post set up by LAPD at about 6:50 PM with an engine company and an EMS unit (Eisner, 1992). The boundaries of the Arlington command post were defined by Imperial Highway on the South, Central Avenue on East, Crenshaw Avenue on the West, and the Santa Monica Freeway on the North. At this time the disturbance was about two hours old and there were no significant structural fires. An EMS Supervisor in the planning group monitored the volume and type of calls being dispatched into South Central Los Angeles. He also maintained contact with LAPD. On the basis of this information, a second command post was established with additional resources. The Arlington operation would be responsible for riot related activities North of Slauson Avenue. The second command post was set up at Fire Station 64. It was responsible for all activities from Slauson Avenue South (later Station 64 would be downgraded to a staging area). Two ambulances and a paramedic unit were stationed there. A logistics section was also established at the LA City Fire EOC. Eventually, three supervisors would be assigned to the field to coordinate fire service EMS operations. As things got progressively worse during the evening, plans were expanded to respond to the anticipated spread of the violence. The first fatality occurred at 8:15 PM, a youth shot in the head by an unknown gunman. The Fire Service set up additional satellite staging locations in the disaster area. For example, a staging area was established at 51st and Avalon. Fire and ambulance resources were sent there. One of the EMS supervisors at the Arlington command post was assigned to coordinate EMS responses with the LAPD escort dispatcher. LAPD priorities were: (1) snipers, (2) barricaded suspects, and (3) fire department escorts. These priorities made it difficult to obtain protection, even as additional EMS resources arrived. No dispatch assignments were made for two hours because of this delay. Apparently LAPD also had problems establishing who was in charge. "As a result, the Field Command Post became a sort of 'black hole' into which police officers from all over the City were poured, but out of which few were deployed on the first night" (Webster, 1992, p. 109). During late Wednesday afternoon and evening the LA County Fire Department dispatch center sent private ambulances and private EMS responders, without law enforcement protection, directly into what was rapidly becoming the disaster area. Around 6:00 PM, the EMS supervisor at the Arlington Command Post determined that responder safety had become a major issue. He directed that all dispatches (the public's call was answered at the PSAP), including EMS, be routed by way of computer radio link to his command post. EMS dispatches were not prioritized at Arlington. They were logged by number, location, and type of incident. The caller was recontacted and told that there would be a delay. Alternative forms of transport were suggested. It is not known if pre-arrival instructions were given. Eventually, three paramedics were assigned to handle EMS dispatches at the Arlington command post. At times, up to seven rescue vehicles were given an assignment but were unable to leave because they lacked protection. Fire trucks did enter the area to fight fires without protection (Eisner, 1992). Police escort began to be available at about 7:18 PM Wednesday evening. Its availability seems to have varied by staging area; major ones like Arlington had more, lesser ones such as individual fire departments had less. Once police protection was obtained, callers were again contacted to determine if they still needed emergency medical care. If they did, a fire rescue unit was dispatched. Police protection would be dispatched by LAPD with them. Red lights and sirens were used both ways. Some EMTs complained that LAPD would start out with them on a dispatch and then be pulled away in the field leaving them without protection. This may have been a result of the requirement that law enforcement not pass over jurisdiction boundaries, and that they return to the staging area after an assignment, which was not required of the fire service (Webster, 1992). If police reported that they had been shot at in a specific area fire units were immediately pulled out. It is assumed that rescue units were not dispatched into such areas. The injured were taken to County Fire Station 164, and then transferred to a Goodhew or Adams ambulance for transport to a hospital. At times, private company transport ambulances also accompanied rescue units into the field. On Thursday, at 3:00 PM, the California Highway Patrol arrived at the Arlington command post to provide protection which considerably improved the situation. But, problems obtaining law enforcement protection continued to cause delays of one to two hours throughout the incident. Some dispatches involved removing dead bodies from the street. Both police and fire service personnel removed them, with the permission of the Los Angeles County Medical Examiner, before a full scene investigation (this created a problem for determining if the death was civil disturbance related or not). Often crowds demanded that the bodies be moved. Bodies were put in police car trunks by responders at the scene and often kept there for hours before being moved to the city morgue (Pratt, 1992). A field morgue was not established at the Arlington command post. Coordination of such efforts is the responsibility of LA DHS EOC which includes the County Medical Examiner (LA DHS, 1984). Unwitnessed cardiac arrests were very difficult to write up in the field. It is impossible to determine how they occurred under such conditions. (Pratt, 1992) The response system developed by the Los Angeles City Fire Department, and refined on Wednesday, was used during the entire response. The California Highway Patrol began to provide escorts Thursday evening (Eisner, 1992). An important point to keep in mind is that this incident reached its full height in about four hours in contrast to the Watts incident which took 48 hours (Eisner, 1992). It took only three hours to exhaust all the fire service mutual aid resources in Region 1. This event was extraordinary for the rapidity with which it developed and the level of violence that occurred so quickly after it got under way.

Medical Care for the Injured

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