Tuesday, January 11, 2000

AMERICAN EMBASSY, TOKYO

POLITICAL SECTION

OFFICE OF TRANSLATION SERVICES

INQUIRIES: 03-3224-5360

INTERNET E-MAIL ADDRESS: ustkyots@ppp.bekkoame.or.jp

DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS

Tuesday, January 11, 2000

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

INDEX:

(1) Stormy negotiations predicted for review of the sympathy budget; Japan calls for lightening burden due to fiscal difficulties, no longer treating it as sanctuary, while the U.S. asks for keeping current level as "material to persuade the Congress"

(2) Japan-U.S. defense chiefs meeting ends; "15-year problem" rocks Futenma relocation plan

(3) Japan, U.S. to conduct drill in anticipation of regional crisis

(4) Defense Agency, Joint Staff Council conducted secret study of anti-guerrilla measures at time of nuclear suspicions in 1993 in anticipation of Korean crisis; Study report digs up Japan's lack of coastal defense posture

(5) My vision for the 21st century -- Interview with new leaders of LDP: Kaoru Yosano, former Minister of International Trade and Industry; Constitutional debates needed, in looking toward the 21st century

(6) Shigeki Hakamada, professor at Aoyama Gakuin University (modern Russian studies): There will be no change in Japan's policy toward Russia

(7) Shigeki Hakamada, professor at Aoyama Gakuin University: Good timing for passing along government power to Putin

(8) Sato named NPA deputy chief

ARTICLES:

YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full)

January 7, 2000

Japan-U.S. talks aimed at reviewing Japan's host nation support (HNS, the so-called sympathy budget) for U.S. military bases in Japan started with a meeting between Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Kawara and U.S. Defense Secretary Cohen on the 5th (Japan time, early morning of the 6th). The two officials agreed to start the work of reviewing the special measures agreement, under which Japan provides HNS. However, the two remained at odds over a reduction in the budget, with Kawara indicating the need for cuts and Cohen calling for maintaining the present level. Stormy negotiations are predicted in future talks.

In the defense chiefs' summit on the 5th, Secretary Cohen asked Japan to maintain the current level of HNS, saying, "I understand Japan's budgetary restrictions, but I hope Japan will keep the present level also in the future." Director General Kawara responded, "HNS has been financed by the people's tax money. So it is necessary to look into the issue from various angles, such as Japan's fiscal condition." As it stands, both sides failed to find common ground.

Japan's intention of reducing HNS stems from the thinking that "the sympathy budget framework was initially set up out of consideration for the U.S.' fiscal situation. It would be strange for Japan to provide the same level of support as before at a time when its economy is in bad shape." Expenses for maintaining USFJ facilities, which are not included in the special measures agreement, have already been set lower in the draft budget for fiscal 2000 than the original sum requested by JDA. Observers interpret the retrenchment as Japan's indication before the agreement is reviewed that it no longer views the sympathy budget as a sanctuary.

Looking at such a trend, many officials at the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA) expressed their concern, one official remarking, "I understand the efforts of fiscal officials to cut the budget, but if they underscore only the need to reduce Japan's burden, the Japan-U.S. security arrangements might be undermined." One senior official also said, "Should the U.S. Congress begin to react strongly to Japan's stance, the situation will get out of control."

In the meeting, Cohen emphasized that Japan's bearing a high share of the costs of maintaining U.S. Forces in Japan has become major material to convince the U.S. Congress of the importance of continuing the USFJ presence. He said, "When I explain this issue to the Congress, I often cite Japan's generous contribution as a good example."

The special measures agreement, due to expire in fiscal 2000, sets the maximum limit for Japan's burden of providing funds for the salaries of Japanese base employees and for base utilities. The focus in future talks will likely be on a review of the maximum limits and reductions in items subject to HNS.

DFAA has judged, "In terms of the schedule for compiling fiscal 2001's budget, it is desirable to conclude a new agreement by next August, when government offices submit their budget requests." But some officials take a pessimistic view, as seen from this comment by a JDA official: "With the presidential election coming this year, the U.S. will need to give priority to domestic measures. It is hardly conceivable that it will easily accept Japan's request." Working-level talks are expected to start this month, but a landing spot on this issue is nowhere in sight.

The sympathy budget framework was set up in 1978 at the request of then JDA Director General Shin Kanemaru who sought to give consideration to the U.S.' fiscal condition at the time. Under the framework, Japan initially shared the burden of providing expenses for the maintenance of the billeting of U.S forces in Japan.

The sum of the budget (contract basis) was 6.1 billion yen in 1978, but in 1987, when a special measures agreement was concluded to require Japan to provide adjustment allowances for Japanese USFJ base employees and other expenses, the amount was increased to 117.7 billion yen. Afterward, the agreement was revised and the Japanese Government has borne expenses for the basic salaries of Japanese base employees, as well various allowances and utilities at the bases, with the sum skyrocketing to 281.9 billion yen in fiscal 1997. In fiscal 2000 draft budget, 260.3 billion yen has been earmarked.

(00010703ys)

(2) Japan-U.S. defense chiefs meeting ends; "15-year problem" rocks Futenma relocation plan

ASAHI (Page 3) (Excerpt)

January 7, 2000

Okinawa and Nago City's intent to offer a Futenma alternative site for use up to 15 years was transmitted to the U.S. side during the Japan-U.S. defense chiefs' talks on the 5th (6th, Japan time). Aware of America's stand, Japan's defense chief served only as the conduit. The year 2000 made a start with the "15-year problem" of Okinawa, which has been rocking the Japan-U.S. security arrangement.

Japan

Consideration given to U.S., Okinawa

Press: You had to save Okinawa's face, right?

Defense Agency Director General Kawara: I didn't have such insincere thinking.

Defense Agency (JDA) Director General Tsutomu Kawara's face hardened temporarily as he made the above comment in a press conference held at a Washington hotel subsequent to the meeting with Secretary of Defense William Cohen. Glaring at the reporters, Kawara also shot back: "I can understand the sentiments of Okinawa which had broached the issue of a time limit."

Minutes earlier, in his talks with Secretary Cohen, Kawara had expressed some understanding toward the U.S. position. Specifically he remarked, "It is extremely difficult to forecast the international situation. I am aware that such a factor should be taken into consideration in dealing with the time limit problem."

In December, a senior JDA official received a call from U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell. His message was clear: The U.S. cannot accept the 15-year time limit no matter what.

The Japanese Government immediately came up with this policy direction: "We will 'take it up' in the upcoming defense chiefs talks but we will not discuss it right away."

Chief Cabinet Secretary Mikio Aoki's comment was simple on the outcome of the talks: "We simply put it on the table, but we are not yet at a stage to discuss it with the United States."

The defense chiefs also reached an understanding that the two countries would discuss the military setup, including the makeup of the U.S. forces in Japan. Is the 15-year problem going to be part of the process? Director General Kawara only indicated: "The subject needs to be looked into by all Cabinet ministers. I am not in a position to provide an answer with a clear outlook."

U.S.

"Zero reply" for fear of growing impact

Citing a whole passage in the 1996 Japan-U.S. joint statement, Secretary Cohen made the following comment regarding the "time limit" issue: "There is a need to closely discuss the military setup, including the makeup of troop strength, in line with changes in the international security environment."

It was essentially a "zero reply" indicating that the U.S. has no intention of making any new promises. The U.S. showed a negative reaction chiefly because "We cannot project all the chances in the international situation 15 years from now" (senior U.S. official).

The view now being heard among U.S. Government officials is: "The Japan-U.S. security arrangement will continue serving as the foundation of the peace and security of the [Asia-Pacific] region for at least the next 20 to 25 years."

If the U.S. accepts Okinawa's time limit proposal at this point, it might have to give similar treatment to all other host nations. "Such might rock the foundation of America's overseas presence" (Pentagon source).

Okinawa

Governor: Matter moved half a step forward; Anti-base group: Conditional proposal not acceptable

Learning of the fact that Japan broached Okinawa's 15-year proposal, Governor Keiichi Inamine commented: "The issue moved half a step forward, if not a full step. The people of Okinawa cannot endure the base beyond 15 years. I will continue to press the central government."

Nago Mayor Tateo Kishimoto also commented: "I would like the two governments to continue talks earnestly."

The reaction of the leader of the anti-base group was less than exited: "It has become clear that the 15-year proposal was not acceptable for the U.S."

* * * * * *

Comment by Yukio Okamoto, international affairs commentator:

Limiting the term to 15 years runs counter to security common sense. Setting a time limit is faithful to domestic politics but unfaithful to the Japan-U.S. security arrangement. The Government has been in a tight spot, and Director General Kawara said all he could. But what will he do in the next meeting and the meeting after the next one? The Government cannot get away with it with words alone. The Government should not let Okinawa harbor empty hopes. Instead, the Government should provide a direction pointing to shifting bases to mainland Japan in the long run and endeavor to convince Okinawa, although such would be time consuming.

Comment by Masaaki Gabe, professor at Ryukyu University: Defense chief Kawara conveyed the 15-year proposal to the U.S. side in a way to mislead the people of Okinawa that he has fulfilled Okinawa's request. Nothing has changed since the pre-reversion period when Japan did not know when it could have the bases back. It is meaningless unless "15 years" is clearly stipulated.

(00010704st)

(3) Japan, U.S. to conduct drill in anticipation of regional crisis

NIHON KEIZAI (Page 2) (Full)

December 30, 1999

Japan and the United States will conduct a joint command post exercise (CPX) in February 2000 for the first time in anticipation of a possible contingency near Japan. The planned CPX drill is based on Japan's enactment of legislation connected to the updated guidelines for defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. The exercise, which anticipates a possible development of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula, will simulate the Self-Defense Forces' (SDF) logistical operations in support of U.S. forces, as well search and rescue operations for missing U.S. servicemen. The two countries also plan to study counteractions to deal with an hypothesized armed guerilla attack against Japan.

In the CPX, the U.S. forces first will detect signs of a contingency developing on the Korean Peninsula and swing into operation. The Japanese Government, after close consultation with the U.S. Government, will confirm by Cabinet decision that this is "a situation in areas neighboring Japan," which "will have a serious impact on the peace and stability of our country." The SDF will carry out such operations as: 1) providing fuel and provisions and the like to the U.S. forces, as well as transportation of such commodities; 2) transporting wounded U.S. servicemen to medical facilities, as well as receiving such wounded; and 3) rescuing and transporting Japanese citizens by using SDF aircraft and vessels. The drill includes: a combined study of the number of SDF personnel to be mobilized, as well as their organizational structure and deployment; and a simulation of what equipment to secure and transport conditions.

In addition, a hypothesis has been developed regarding an invasion of and attack on Japan by armed guerillas. A concrete study will be carried out regarding the use of force, extending to mobilizing the SDF for public security and defense in order to counter terrorist activities in urban areas and to stop acts aimed at destroying such vital facilities as atomic energy plants.

(00010701bbim)

TOKYO SHIMBUN (Top play) (Full)

January 7, 2000

With the emergence of suspicions about North Korea's nuclear development program in 1993, the Joint Staff Council (JSC) of the Defense Agency, anticipating a North Korean guerrilla attack, conducted a secret study of measures to defend coastal areas and vital installations in Yamaguchi Prefecture and Nagasaki Prefecture's Tsushima islands, which are situated near the Korean peninsula, officials said on January 6. The now-unveiled report of that study, which premised anti-guerrilla counteractions under normal circumstances, points out Japan's lack of legislative measures and effective operations against possible guerrilla infiltration, and it underscores the necessity of territorial defense postures and emergencies legislation.

According to study materials and officials involved in the study of anti-guerrilla countermeasures, a JSC study group in 1993 anticipated a guerrilla attack against Japan in a tense situation that could have arisen immediately before the possible outbreak of an emergency on the Korean peninsula in the wake of North Korea's declaration of its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The JSC team studied what the Self-Defense Forces could do against guerrillas under normal circumstances with no orders issued to the SDF for defense operations, public security operations, or standby postures.

The JSC study team presumed in its case study that guerrillas or commandos might come out to attack SDF facilities, U.S. military installations, and vital commercial facilities. An air attack was also anticipated in the study. In order to counter such attacks, the Ground Self-Defense Force, in Yamaguchi Prefecture, mobilizes its troops from the 17^th Regiment (headquartered in Yamaguchi City) to watch the coastal areas of Hagi, Toyoura, and Shimonoseki, and then sets up positions to be provided against airborne and seaborne attacks.

The GSDF guards commercial facilities and the U.S. military's Iwakuni base and its telecommunications post in cooperation with police. The Maritime Self-Defense Force defends the coastal areas of Yamaguchi Prefecture with the Maritime Safety Agency, and the Air Self-Defense Force reinforcing its air reconnaissance activities.

The SDF services take similar postures on the Tsushima islands. In the event of an imminent attack against Japan, the SDF will move out to destroy or repel guerrillas and commandos and block their airborne and seaborne intrusions, the study report says. The SDF, however, is not authorized to mobilize troops under normal circumstances. In a tense situation, SDF troops therefore will be staged for "training" purposes.

The JSC team analyzes problems in eight areas—broken down into problems in general, operations, intelligence, logistics, manning, communications, public relations, and budget appropriations. In the beginning, the study report notes insufficiency in the study of emergencies legislation, and says there are no stipulations applicable to coastal defense.

Furthermore, the JSC study report lists a number of questions, specifying the following points:

· The chain of command is unclear in case the SDF is to act with the MSA, police, and fire departments against guerrillas or commandos.

· The SDF is not authorized to arrest any enemy elements.

· The effectiveness of land lease is also questionable.

· The SDF's communications capacity is extremely limited.

The JSC report concludes that the SDF should be vested with powers regarding activities to block enemy infiltration, and urges the government to make a decision.

The report refers to the need for emergencies legislation that will restrict private or civil rights in order to facilitate operations. Additionally, it also touches on the notion of territorial defense, suggesting the necessity of allowing the SDF to move out and use weapons under normal circumstances. However, the study of emergencies legislation is the first for the uniformed staff since the so-called Mitsuya plan was revealed in 1963.

(00010703im)

SANKEI (Page 3) (Full)

January 7, 2000

-- Calls for debating the Constitution are mounting. What is your view about the present Constitution?

"I regard it very highly. But regarding Article 9, which does not have a clear-cut definition of the right of self-defense, I find it too hard to understand. No one can gain a good grip of it by just reading it through. I think it is time for us to discuss the way our Constitution should be in the 21st century. We need to depart from the present state where Article 9 is interpreted in an irrational way. Our country does not need to become a military power nor do we need to send our troops armed with weapons abroad. The origin of Japan's unhappiness after all lies in the ambiguity of Article 9. We should state our self defense right in a clear-cut manner."

-- How do you think Japanese diplomacy should be reshaped?

"The diplomatic order in the world is set by law, and the law is secured by strength. If we ignore this reality and proceed into diplomatic talks, we will soon realize this situation through mutual talks. Japan's postwar diplomacy has been centered on economic affairs, and this line will continue into the future as well. If this continues as is, my worry is that our country will remain in as situation in which we not act even if the peaceful order of the world is threatened."

-- Is it all right to continue as is?

"We cannot change the present situation we are placed in for the time being. Only when someone emerges who is well balanced in thinking about the way Japan should be, can our country start a full-scale debate."

-- What will happen to Japan-U.S. relations?

"In the 21st century as well, the pillars of Japan-U.S. ties will continue to be the security and economic aspects. The present mechanism of teaming the Japan-U.S. alliance with our Self-Defense Forces is excellent. I think it good to keep this framework in general. If we try to change it simply swayed by our desire to have our own identity without any perspective, our attempt will fail. But I think it would be a good idea to form a regional free trade zone that lines up with the World Trade Organization (WTO)."

-- The social welfare sector needs to be drastically reformed.

"We can be proud of our health insurance system and pension plan in comparison with other countries. But now there is the fear that these programs may be lost for the people are reluctant to pay their share and are seeking only the benefits. We need to make it clear that the benefits come from the contributions. Raising the national contribution rate is unavoidable, but hiking it to the same level as those of Northern European countries is not necessarily a good idea."

-- What points would you emphasize in the economic area?

"We should not adopt a policy of tolerating inflation. We should end in fiscal 2000 the economic policy of relying on fiscal policy measures. Even if our economy shows zero growth, we have to reconcile ourselves to that situation. In order to strengthen the Japanese economy, it is vitally important for us to have a production capability that would allow us to offer goods and services to all parts of the globe. Strengthening our economic fundamentals is perhaps one means to bring Japanese economy back to stable growth."

-- The debts held by the central and local governments combined are estimated at being far more than 600 trillion yen.

"Reducing the cost by administrative reform is a key approach, but the fiscal deficits will not be dissolved unless we think hard about how to drastically reduce annual expenditures. Shifting more of the burden to the people will be unavoidable in the future. Considering this possibility, hiking the indirect taxes may be an unavoidable policy choice if we keep the present systems in place."

-- Education reform is high on the political agenda.

"I think it necessary that moral education must be thoroughly provided to students not only in our schools but also in our communities and households. I am worried that the levels of learning in junior and senior high schools are too low. Those who want to study science need to learn higher levels of physics and mathematics. Also we need to switch to a notion that those who are good at studies should be treated better."

-- But there seems to be resistance against special programs for gifted and talented students.

"We have to overcome such resistance. If we fail to cherish gifted and talented students in our society, we will see our national strength decay. To give an example of baseball players, we need to nurture excellent players like Nagashima, Oh, and Matsui. We need to foster players who can bat .350 and hit 50 home runs. Under the current educational system, it is not possible to do so. If no action is taken, the Japanese society will remain sluggish in the future as well."

Comment

Kaoru Yosano is a key policy expert in the LDP who is particularly strong in economic and financial affairs. When he served as deputy chairman of the LDP's Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), he earned the reputation among central government officials of being the de facto chairman. He was noted for being strikingly clear-cut in expressing his views. He flatly rejected the stance of continued economic growth by depending on fiscal policy measures. He also stressed the need to reduce the social welfare and public works budgets. A protégé of former prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, Yosano is influential in political circles. His hobby is playing the game of go. He is considered one of the new leaders in the party, but some have this advice for him: "He needs to work harder behind the scenes" (senior member of the Eto-Kamei faction). What will be his next move?

[Ken Kasahara]

(00010705ku)

(6) Shigeki Hakamada, professor at Aoyama Gakuin University (modern Russian studies): There will be no change in Japan's policy toward Russia

ASAHI (Page 9) (Full)

January 1, 2000

President Yeltsin had a grip on power that resembled an animal instinct. Considering that, I am surprised that he quit. He has frontloaded the presidential election by selecting Prime Minister Putin to be acting president. The reason is because he wanted to make sure that power is transferred to Putin before his popularity wanes. His poor health is one reason for his resignation. In my view, however, business magnate Berezovsky and a band of his aides with acquired vested interests have succeeded in convincing him to support their argument that Putin would be able to contain the recent move by law-enforcement authorities to plunge a scalpel into alleged bribery cases involving his family and the people close to him.

Former Prime Minister Primakov, who had won relatively high support as a candidate in the next presidential race, is now rebuilding his position after the setback he suffered in the State Duma. There has also appeared the possibility of his staging a joint struggle teamed with the Communist Party, the number one party in the Duma. That is probably why Yeltin's camp is trying to turn the tide of the presidential race in its favor, by speeding up the timetable.

Although Prime Minister Putin is rallying popular support because of his high-handed stance toward the West and the Chechen issue, it will be difficult for him to steer (national politics). The trend of public opinion is changing. He cannot hold out by his high-handed stance alone. There is no guarantee that a conciliatory attitude will bring about the settlement of the problem, either. The Chechen factor has driven his popularity high. However, it could work as a negative factor. The situation is very delicate.

Regarding the future of Japan-Russia relations, such as the territorial issue, the Japanese Government on its part probably wanted to exact a promise from President Yeltsin through another round of negotiations. It is probably vexed that it was unable to do so. However, since the Japanese side has been feeling that a method of negotiations fastening hope on President Yeltsin alone has limitations, there will be no change in its policy line in aiming at stable bilateral relations even if Putin takes over the political reins. Putin's policy toward Japan remains to be seen. However, he is bound to seek good bilateral relations. It will take time for the next administration to be on a firm footing. The challenge for the time being is to establish a mutual relationship of trust.

(99910606yk)

(7) Shigeki Hakamada, professor at Aoyama Gakuin University: Good timing for passing along government power to Putin

YOMIURI (Page 11) (Full)

January 1, 2000

The Russian people had given full support to their government's military operations in Chechnya. However, people have begun to express their concern over the situation in recent polls. Under such circumstances, the view is that the Kremlin has judged that the popularity of Putin (as the general commander of the Chechen operations), which is now at its zenith, would not last for six more months.

If a person other than Putin gains the presidency, then there is concern that the law-enforcement authorities may make a searching inquiry into Yeltsin's family and close aides. The most effective strategy for the Kremlin to get Putin -- whom it finds to be the most easy to control -- elected in the presidential race was for Yeltsin to resign. In that way, Putin can now run in the race as a holder of the important position of acting president, instead of having to just wait for six months without doing anything. This strategy has apparently boosted in one sweep the possibility of Putin's winning the election.

Putin has yet to come up with a clear-cut stance toward relations with Japan. At present, it is too early to predict whether Yeltsin's resignation will open up the vista for Japan-Russia relations or whether it will worsen the situation. The only thing that Japan can do is to go along with the developments up to this point.

(00010704yk)

(8) Sato named NPA deputy chief

SANKEI (page 3) (Full)

January 7, 2000

The National Public Safety Commission (NPSC) and National Police Agency (NPA) yesterday decided on the new lineup of senior NPA officials, following the resignation of NPA chief Yuko Sekiguchi. NPA Deputy Director General Setsuo Tanaka will be promoted to succeed Sekiguchi as NPA director general. Osaka Prefecture Policy Headquarters chief Hidehiko Sato will replace Tanaka. Their appointments will be approved a Cabinet meeting on the 11th and officially announced the same day.

Setsuo Tanaka, NPA Director General-designate: Graduated from the law faculty of Kyoto University; joined the NPA in 1966; has been deputy NPA chief since March 1997, after having served in such posts as Miyagi Prefectural Police Headquarters chief and director general of the NPA Traffic Bureau; age 56; legally domiciled in Fukui Prefecture.

Hidehiko Sato, NPA Deputy Director General-designate: Graduated from the law faculty of Tokyo University; entered the NPA in 1968; has been head of the Osaka Prefectural Policy Headquarters since January 1999, after having served as head of the Saitama Prefectural Headquarters and director general of the NPA Criminal Investigation Bureau; age 54; legally domiciled in Tokyo.

Masuo Okumura, Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Deputy Superintendent-General-designate: Graduated from the law faculty of Tokyo University; joined the NPA in 1971; has been serving as MPD Personnel and Training Bureau chief since August 1999, after having served in such posts as Tokushima Prefectural Police Headquarters and MPD Public Security Bureau chief; age 52; legally domiciled in Osaka.

Jiro Bando, NPA Traffic Bureau Director General-designate: Graduated from the law faculty of Tokyo University; entered the NPA in 1970; has been MPD Administrative Bureau chief since January 1998, after having served in such posts as head of the Ishikawa Prefectural Police Headquarters and MPD Security Bureau chief; age 53; legally domiciled in Tokushima Prefecture.

Tomonori Sano, Chugoku Regional Police Bureau Director General-designate: Graduated from the Tokyo University law faculty; joined the NPA in 197; has been National Police Academy vice president since January 1999, after having served in such posts as director of the NPA's Security Division and Miyagi Prefectural Policy Headquarters; age 52; legally domiciled in Tokyo.

Iwao Uruma, Osaka Prefectural Policy Headquarters Chief-designate: Graduated from the Tokyo University law faculty; entered the NPA in 1969; has been MPD deputy superintendent general since January 1999, after having served in such posts as chiefs of the Nara Prefectural Police Headquarters and Aichi Prefectural Police Headquarters; age 54; legally domiciled in Oita Prefecture.

Tetsuro Ito, Chiba Prefectural Police Headquarters Chief-designate: Graduated from the law faculty of Tokyo University; entered the NPA in 1972; has been MPD Security Bureau chief since January 1998, after having served in such posts as Ishikawa Prefectural Police Headquarters and MPD chief inspection officer; age 51; legally domiciled in Fukuoka Prefecture.

Yasuhiro Chikaishi, MPD Security Bureau Director General-designate: Graduated from the law faculty of Tokyo University; entered the NPA in 1973; has been NPA's Security Planning Division director since August 1999, after having served in such posts as Yamanashi Prefectural Police Headquarters chief and director of the NPA's Security Division; age 51; legally domiciled in Kagawa Prefecture.

Takashi Suetsuna, MPD Administrative Bureau Director General-designate: Graduated from the literature department of Tokyo University; joined the NPA in 1974; has been director of the NPA's Finance Division since September 1997, having served as Kochi Prefectural Police Headquarters chief and director of the NPA's Allowance and Welfare Division; age 50; legally domiciled in Oita Prefecture.

(00010706kn)